2017 GCGC
CONFERENCE: Tokyo

2-3 June 2017

The Value of Takeover Defenses

Speaker:

Robert Jr. Jackson

Professor of Law and Director Columbia Law School

Discussant:

Emiliano Catan

Assistant Professor of Law NYU Law School

Abstract:

This paper offers the first study of the shareholder welfare effects of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes in a research design that can support causal inference. We examine a series of four events between 2004 and 2010 that suddenly and exogenously changed the legality of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes for a peculiar class of company known as a closed-end fund. In the first two events, a court held for the first time that these defenses were legal under the Investment Company Act of 1940. In the latter two events, the SEC officials expressly rejected the court’s decision, rendering these defenses effectively illegal. We show that as poison pills and control share acquisition statutes became more legal, closed-end fund stock prices increased; and as these defenses became less legal, closed-end fund stock prices decreased. We find, in other words, that closed- end fund shareholders liked the poison pill.


Visit our partner site :footer-logo-new

CONTACT US

We're not around right now. But you can send us an email and we'll get back to you, asap.

Sending
Designed By Astwood

Log in with your credentials

Forgot your details?

peuterey hamburg peuterey regina woolrich kinderjacke duvetica adhara duvetica damen duvetica daunenmantel duvetica herren duvetica kinder duvetica kinderjacke duvetica mantel duvetica deutschland barbour lille barbour moto barbour paris barbour pas cher barbour shop online doudoune moncler aliexpress parajumper fille parajumper rouge parajumpers wikipedia pjs beige pjs occasion pjs paris peuterey femme peuterey homme