2016 GCGC

10-11 June 2016

Executive Remuneration Standards and the “Conformity Gap” at Controlled Corporations


Guido Ferrarini

Professor of Business Law and Capital Markets Law


Ok-Rial Song



In this paper we analyze the relationship between conformity to executive remuneration standards, corporate ownership, and the level and structure of CEO compensation for large European listed companies in the years 2007 and 2010.

We show that controlled corporations, either family or State owned, conform to executive remuneration standards less than widely held firms. We also show that weaker compliance is associated with lower CEO pay and more “conservative” incentive structures. We interpret this “conformity gap” from the perspective of individual firms and from a societal perspective, with the aim to contribute to frame the policy questions concerning executive pay at controlled corporations.

Different policy implications depend on whether the conformity gap reflects a lower need for managerial incentives, given the monitoring by controlling shareholders, or the latter’s willingness to extract private benefits of control. We argue in this paper that the former hypothesis seems to prevail, so that regulators should abstain from increasing the level of enforcement of executive remuneration standards.

Visit our partner site :footer-logo-new

Designed By Astwood


We're not around right now. But you can send us an email and we'll get back to you, asap.


Log in with your credentials

Forgot your details?