The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance

by

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2

II. The Changed Environment: What Factors Have Spurred Enhanced Activism by Hedge Funds? ................................................................. 11
   A. The Decline of Staggered Boards ................................................................. 18
   B. The Enhanced Power of Proxy Advisors ............................................... 19
   C. SEC Rules ............................................................................................................ 22
   D. Broker Votes ....................................................................................................... 26
   E. The “Wolf Pack” Tactic ..................................................................................... 27
   F. The Shrinking Concept of “Group” ................................................................. 37
   G. Proxy Access ......................................................................................................... 41
   H. Tactics: The Game Plan for Each Side ......................................................... 44

III. Are Hedge Funds Shortening the Investment Horizon of Corporate Managers: Framing the Issue ............................................................ 46

IV. A Survey of the Evidence .............................................................................................. 56
   A. Who are the Targets of Hedge Fund Activism? ........................................... 56
   B. Does Hedge Fund Activism Create Real Value? ......................................... 59
   C. What are the Sources of Gains from Activism? ............................................ 65
   D. Do the Targets of Hedge Fund Activism Experience Post-Announcement Changes in Real Variables? ................................................. 69

V. Implications ..................................................................................................................... 73
   A. Closing the Section 13(d) Window ............................................................... 76
   B. Expanding the Definition of Insider Trading ............................................. 82
   C. Redefining Group .............................................................................................. 85
   D. Focusing on the Proxy Advisor ................................................................. 86
   E. Private Ordering ................................................................................................... 87

VI. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 90
I. Introduction

Hedge fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically.\(^1\) No one disputes this, but divergent explanations exist for it. Some see activist hedge funds as the natural champions of dispersed shareholders, who are not economically capable of collective action in their own interest.\(^2\) So viewed, hedge fund activism can bridge the separation of ownership and control. That, however, may assume what is to be proved. Others believe that hedge funds have interests that differ materially from those of other shareholders.\(^3\) We begin therefore with a more modest, two-part explanation for increased activism: First, the costs of activism have declined, in part because of changes in SEC rules, in part because of changes in corporate governance norms (for example, the sharp decline in staggered boards), and in part because of the new power of proxy

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\(^1\) See text and notes infra at notes 14 to 25.


advisors (which is in turn a product of legal rules and the fact that some institutional investors have effectively outsourced their proxy voting decisions to these advisors). Second, activist hedge funds have recently reaped high profits at seemingly low risk, and unsurprisingly, their number and assets under management have correspondingly skyrocketed. If the costs go down and the profits go up, it is predictable that activism will surge (and it has). But that does not answer the question (on which we focus) of whether externalities are associated with this new activism.

Others have also criticized hedge fund activism, but their predominant criticism has been that such activism amounts in substance to a “pump and dump” scheme under which hedge funds create a short-term spike in the target stock’s price, then exit, leaving the other shareholders to experience diminished profitability over the long-run. This is not our claim (nor do we endorse it). Rather, we are concerned that hedge fund activism is associated with a pattern involving three key changes at the target firm: (1) increased leverage; (2) increased shareholder payout (through either dividends or stock buybacks), and (3) reduced long-term investment in research

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4 See text and notes infra at notes 32 to 40 and 185 to 186.
5 See text and notes infra at notes 21 to 22.
and development. The leading proponent of hedge fund activism, Harvard Law Professor Lucian Bebchuk, has given this pattern a name: “investment-limiting” interventions; he agrees that this pattern is prevalent but criticizes us for our failure to recognize that “investment-limiting” interventions by hedge funds “move targets toward...optimal investment levels” because “managements have a tendency to invest excessively.” We persist in our skepticism about the desirability of such “investment-limiting” interventions and explain why.

This article has three basic aims: First, we attempt to understand and explain the factors that have caused the recent explosion in hedge fund activism. Second, we focus on the impact of this activism, including in particular whether it is shortening investment horizons and discouraging investment in research and development. Finally, we consider possible legal interventions, and evaluate them in terms of our preference for the least restrictive alternative.

Because we believe the world we describe is rapidly changing, we have some doubts about the relevance of empirical papers that study hedge fund activism in earlier decades. Indeed, we

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8 Id. at 61, n. 94

9 The Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang study uses a database of approximately 2,000 activist hedge fund interventions between 1994 and 2007. Id. at 4. Substantial as this effort is, hedge fund behavior in that era is different from today. In that era, there were relatively few activist hedge funds and possibly more opportunities for legitimate activist intervention. More recent studies support somewhat different results. Here, we give special attention to two such studies: (1) Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Jeremy Grant and Hammes F. Wagner, “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study” (Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 10507)(March 15, 2015)(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271), and (2) Yvon Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Hedge Fund...
suspect that the past success of such activism may be fueling a current “hedge fund bubble” under which an increasing number of activist funds are pursuing a decreasing (or at least static) number of companies that have overinvested (that is, made allegedly excessive investments in research and development or other long-term projects). This article is particularly focused on those market and legal forces that may be driving this bubble. Here, the single most important cause of increased hedge fund activism appears to be the development of a new activist tactic: namely, the formation of the hedge fund “wolf pack” that can take collective (or, at least, parallel) action without legally forming a “group” for purposes of the federal securities laws (which would trigger an earlier disclosure obligation).\textsuperscript{10} This new tactic, of course, explains our title. Hedge funds have learned that to the extent they can acquire stock in the target firm before the “wolf pack” leader files its Schedule 13D, announcing its proposed intervention, significant gains will follow for those who have already acquired that stock. If high gains are possible at low risk, one can expect that this tactic will be exploited—and possibly overused.\textsuperscript{11}

Of course, new tactics are not necessarily bad and may be efficiency-enhancing. Most studies have found that hedge fund activist campaigns result on average in short-term gains for shareholders, but the evidence (as we will show) is more mixed with respect to long-term gains (where the most thorough recent study reports long-term gains that are statistically

Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical Evidence” (Institute for governance of public and private corporations, April 1, 2015).

\textsuperscript{10} The “wolf pack” tactic and the case law on “group” formation is examined infra in the text and notes at notes 61 to 79.

\textsuperscript{11} Eventually, as the number of hedge funds pursuing “activist” strategies increases, it follows that at some point the number of profitable opportunities for such intervention will decrease. That point may have been reached. Active competition among hedge funds implies that increasingly marginal opportunities for activist gains will be pursued.
insignificant). Even if one concludes that hedge fund activism is associated on average with stock price gains for shareholders, it still does not follow that public policy should seek to further encourage or stimulate hedge fund activism, in part because of four limitations on these studies:

(1) These studies tend to ignore or downplay the distribution of short-term returns and the fact that a significant proportion of firms experience losses as a result of hedge fund activism;

(2) The positive abnormal stock returns on which the proponents of hedge fund activism rely do not truly establish causality or demonstrate that hedge fund activism has reduced agency costs; instead, improved results at target firms may be attributable to other factors (including market speculation about an expected takeover or simply a regression to the mean);

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12 See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy and Randall S. Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729 (2008) (finding on average an abnormal short-term return of 7% to 8% over the period before and after the filing of a Schedule 13D announcing an activist’s acquisition of 5% or more of the stock of a target firm). A more recent (and entirely consistent) study is that by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, supra note 7. They find an approximately 6% average abnormal return during the 20-day window before and after a Schedule 13D filing. Id at 43 and Figure 2. This and other studies are considered infra at notes 118 to 167.

13 Indeed, in the most recent revisions to their paper, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang now back off of earlier, stronger claims and concede that “causality issues in corporate governance and finance are notoriously difficult to resolve with absolute confidence” See Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, supra note 7, at 41. We believe they are difficult to resolve with any confidence. These authors further acknowledge that they cannot identify “the extent to which improvements are due to activist interventions.” Id. We agree. Although we think they have largely discredited the “pump and dump” theory that a stock drop automatically follows once activists exit the firm, they have not shown convincingly that activist interventions improve the governance or operating performance at target firms.
(3) These studies overlook (or give only inadequate attention to) the possibility that whatever shareholder wealth is created by hedge fund activism may reflect only a wealth transfer from bondholders, employees, or other claimants; and

(4) The impact of hedge fund activism on American corporations (and long-term investment) cannot be adequately measured by looking only to the post-intervention performance at those companies that experience a hedge fund intervention; this ignores the general deterrent impact of such activism on the many more companies that experience no such intervention, but that increase leverage and dividends or reduce long-term investment in fear of the growing risk of such an intervention.

These limitations are important. If the distribution of short-term returns shows that a significant number of firms experience losses (and sizeable ones), then hedge fund activism looks very different depending on whether one examines it from the perspective of the hedge fund manager or the corporate director. To the diversified fund manager, a tactic is justified if it produces a portfolio-wide positive return. In contrast, a corporate director is responsible for, and must consider the welfare of, only one company. Thus, the possibility of a negative return (particularly when the upside return may be only modest) may reasonably cause a board of directors to reject a strategy favored by a group of hedge funds that, like them, also wants to maximize shareholder value.

Similarly, others have suggested that the post-intervention gains in stock price experienced by the subjects of hedge fund activism may reflect simply a regression to the
mean. We do not purport to know if that is true, but this possibility can only be investigated adequately if a more carefully selected control group is used that has the same characteristics as those firms that were the targets of activism (and this has not yet been done).

In order to establish causality on the part of hedge fund activists, these studies would need to use a method such as propensity score matching. In such methodologies, one can examine what is often referred to as the “but for” explanation. In our context, targets and non-targets would be matched in all observable firm characteristics in the pre-Schedule 13D filing period (that is, they would have the closest propensity score). Thus, rather than simply controlling for size and industry group (as many studies do), other variables, such as life cycle liquidity effects, would also be considered. This approach should permit the investigator to determine whether, “but for” the intervention of the activist hedge fund, shareholder value would have been created in the post-Schedule 13D filing period. This refinement has not, however, been used in any existing study of which we are aware.

14 See Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Activist hedge funds: creators of lasting wealth? What do the empirical studies really say?” at 12-13 (Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations) (July 2014) (reporting a “clear pattern of convergence towards the mean”). Their point is that firms that outperform or underperform the mean over one period move closer to the mean over the next period. Professors Allaire and Dauphin have renewed their criticisms of Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, supra note 7, after the latter’s revision of their paper in December 2014. See Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Still Unanswered Questions (and new ones) to Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang,” January, 2015 (Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations).

15 For example, see Paul R. Rosenbaum and Donald R. Rubin, The Central Rule of The Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 Biomedicalica 41 (1983) and Guido W. Imbens and Donald R. Rubin, CAUSAL INFERENCE IN STATISTICS, SOCIAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES: An Introduction (2014).
Finally, although shareholders are basically entitled to seek gains from any source (including bondholders), public policy has little reason to encourage wealth transfers. Public policy is ultimately our focus. Although we do not doubt that some hedge fund interventions promote efficiency, there are likely diminishing returns to increased activism, and, at some point, more interventions may only produce decreasing gains for shareholders at the expense of growing costs to other constituencies. Thus, from a policy perspective, we will argue that new rules promote greater transparency with regard to hedge funds’ activities would come at an acceptable cost, even if they were to chill certain kinds of “creeping control” acquisitions.

Above all, our concern is with the possibility that hedge fund activism may exacerbate an important externality: namely, it may encourage corporate boards and managements to forego long-term investments (particularly in research and development) in favor of a short-term policy of maximizing dividend payouts and stock buybacks. Such a shift away from long-term investment could ultimately prove costly to the American economy, but those costs would not necessarily be observable within the time periods examined by the existing studies. As more activists chase a constant or declining number of inefficient targets, the prospect for over-deterrence grows. Nor would the costs from over-deterrence be borne only by the actual subjects of hedge fund activism that these studies cover, as other corporations would predictably take similar defensive measures. Worse yet, if such a short-term investment horizon were to be imposed (or at least encouraged) by hedge fund activism and if the gains to shareholders were primarily wealth transfers from bondholders and others, then on the macro level the American economy would suffer an injury with little compensating benefit.

In this light, we begin in Section II with an analysis of those factors that have spurred greater activism on the part of hedge funds. Then, in Section III, we consider evidence
suggesting that a danger exists of a shift toward a short-term investment horizon that is suboptimal. We do not claim that we can prove such a shift has occurred because any such shift involves the decision-making of a broad community of corporate executives, not just those who have been subjected to an activist campaign. In effect, we are asking: “What is the general deterrent effect of hedge fund activism. Does it reduce agency costs or deter long-term investments—or both?” This is not a question that can today be answered with confidence. Although it is possible (with difficulty) to measure the impact on firms that experience an activist campaign, it is far more difficult to estimate that impact on all firms (including the much larger number of firms that have not experienced such a campaign). Yet, it is implausible to believe that other firms will ignore the heightened risk of a proxy fight that may remove their directors and officers. Indeed, there is evidence in some industries that managers are keenly aware that long-term investments may be disfavored by hedge fund activists and may elicit a proxy contest.

In Section IV, we survey recent studies to reach assessments about: (1) who are the targets of hedge fund activism; (2) the stock price returns from hedge fund activism and the distribution of those returns; (3) the degree to which wealth transfers explain the positive stock price returns to activism; (4) the post-intervention evidence about changes in operating performance of hedge fund targets; and (5) the holding periods and exit strategies of hedge fund activists.

In Section V, we evaluate some policy options, looking for the least drastic means of accomplishing policy goals. Our conclusion in earlier sections that causality has not been adequately established leads us to examine both (i) what policy options should be considered that would protect shareholders (other than the activist coalition) and other constituencies without
precluding hedge fund interventions, and (ii) what forms of private ordering could be reasonably employed by target companies to adjust the balance of advantage in these corporate battles (and how should courts respond to these efforts).

Finally, Section VI offers a brief conclusion that surveys how the structure of shareholder ownership is changing and what the consequences might be.

II: The Changed Environment: What Factors Have Spurred Enhanced Activism by Hedge Funds?

Once upon a time, institutional investors followed the “Wall Street Rule”: if dissatisfied with management, they sold their stock, but they did not attempt to intervene or challenge management. This passivity was probably the consequence of shareholder dispersion (which made activism costly) and conflicts of interest (large banks—both commercial and investment—did not want to alienate corporate clients). With the growth in institutional ownership, however, behavior changed. This was particularly true in the case of hedge funds, which, unlike mutual funds, typically hold concentrated blocks in a limited number of companies (rather than a broadly diversified portfolio). Concentrated ownership makes shareholder activism rational from a cost/benefit standpoint.

16 A number of commentators date the appearance of “activist” hedge funds conducting proxy fights to 2005. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. Corp. L. 681, 685 (Summer 2007). We make no claim as to when they first appeared, but they at least began to receive widespread press attention in 2005. But see statistics discussed infra at note 20.

17 It is necessary to acknowledge here that no generally accepted definition exists for the term “hedge fund.” Everyone makes this observation at the outset of their article or memorandum and then suggests a working definition. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Daniel M. Hawke, and Pauline E. Calande, Hedge Funds: An Enforcement
The types of activist campaigns run by hedge funds range from modest interventions in corporate governance (e.g., proposals to separate the positions of CEO and Board Chairman) to more intrusive interventions seeking to sell the company, fire the CEO, or spin off divisions. As will be seen, the more intrusive the intervention, the greater the likely positive stock market response. The frequency of such campaigns has skyrocketed, with one recent survey counting 1,115 activist campaigns between 2010 and early 2014.\(^{18}\) 2014 alone saw a record 347 campaigns by “activist” hedge funds.\(^{19}\) Clearly, this escalating rate of intervention is in sharp contrast to earlier periods when, for example, only 52 campaigns could be identified over a 20

\(^{Perspective}\). 39 Rutgers L.J. 541, 543 (2008). Four characteristics usually identify hedge funds (and in any event most commentators seem to believe that they “know one when they see one”). Those four key characteristics are:

(1) they are pooled, privately organized investment vehicles;

(2) they are administered by professional investment managers with performance-based compensation
and significant investments in the fund;

(3) they cater to a small number of sophisticated investors and are not generally readily available to
the retail-investment market; and

(4) they mostly operate outside of securities regulation and registration requirements.”

See Richard Lee and Jason D. Schloetzer, Director Notes: “The Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman,” (The Conference Board May 2014) at 2.


\(^{19}\) See Jacob Bunge and David Benoit, “DuPont Repels Push by Peltz to Join Its Board,” May 14, 2015, at p. 1. This number, compiled by FactSet, is up from 219 in 2009. Because there were 148 such campaigns in the first six months of 2014 (see Rob Copeland, “Activists’ Returns Rise about the Din,” The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2014 at C-1 (citing data from FactSet SharkWatch)), the above total of 347 activist campaigns for 2014 implies that there were nearly 200 campaigns in the last half of 2014 and thus that the trend is still accelerating.
consecutive month stretch in 2005-2006.\textsuperscript{20} That amounts to a more than 1,000\% increase between that period and today and again raises the possibility of a bubble: namely, that more and

\textsuperscript{20} See Briggs, supra note 16, at 695-696. This study covered all of 2005 and the first eight months of 2006 and found only 52 corporations “to have become the subject of a significant hedge fund campaign” during this time period. Id. at 696. Similarly, a Conference Board study reports that the number of “shareholder activist events” rose from 97 events in 2001 to 219 events in 2012. See Lee and Schloetzer, supra note 17, at 1.

Different definitions of activist “interventions” are possible. If we look simply to the number of Schedule 13D filings by activist hedge funds, Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang present the following data:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Filings \\
\hline
1994 & 10  \\
1995 & 37  \\
1996 & 99  \\
1997 & 212 \\
1998 & 161 \\
1999 & 118 \\
2000 & 120 \\
2001 & 96  \\
2002 & 134 \\
2003 & 127 \\
2004 & 148 \\
2005 & 237 \\
2006 & 269 \\
2007 & 272 \\
Total & 2040 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

See Lucian A. Bebchuck, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., and Wei Jiang, \textit{Pre-Disclosure Accumulation by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy}, 39 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1 (2013) at *9 (Table I). Although the number of filings
more hedge funds are pursuing fewer and fewer legitimate opportunities for activist interventions.

Historically, hedge fund activism focused on smaller cap companies because it was too costly to assemble a sizeable stake in a larger cap company. But this is changing. In 2013, for the first time, almost one third of activist campaigns focused on companies with a market capitalization of over $2 billion. If we instead use $10 billion as our dividing line for “large cap” stocks, we find that only 17 such companies were targeted by activist investors in 2010, but then in 2011 to 2013, the number of such activist campaigns rose to 21, 23, and 42, respectively. In effect, they have doubled since 2011. Finally, in 2014, Pershing Square Capital Management L.P. joined with a strategic bidder in an over $60 billion joint tender offer for Allergan, Inc, and Trian Fund Management began a proxy campaign that narrowly failed at DuPont, one of the oldest, largest and most iconic of U.S. companies, but, more importantly, a highly profitable firm that had consistently outperformed all relevant benchmarks for corporate performance. In short, whatever their size or profitability, few companies today seem immune has waxed and waned in the past, the years 2005 to 2007 showed a marked increase. Activism then waned with the 2008 financial crisis, but rebounded sharply since 2010.

21 See Lee and Schloetzer, supra note 17, at 3.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 See text and notes infra at notes 102 to 106.

25 In 2014, DuPont’s stock price gained 20% on the year to easily beat the S&P index. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, “In DuPont Fight, Activist Investor Picks a Strong Target,” New York Times, January 28, 2015 at B-7 (noting that “By about any measure, DuPont has beaten the benchmarks over the last three years and throughout the five-year tenure of (its CEO).”) See also Bunge and Benoit, supra note 19 (noting that DuPont’s market
from the reach of hedge fund activism. Seemingly, if a credible scenario can be offered to the market that breaking up a company will yield shareholder gains, activist funds will assemble to attack even those companies with a long record of profitability.

Only a specialized group of hedge funds engage in activist campaign and proxy fights, but they have recently done very well. Over a ten year period, activist hedge funds appear to have earned a 13% return, which more than doubled the 5.8% return for all hedge funds as a group.\textsuperscript{26} Equally important, the assets managed by “activist” hedge funds have soared, growing over seven times from $23 billion in 2002 to $166 billion in early 2014, and the top ten activist hedge funds alone attracted $30 billion in new investment in 2013.\textsuperscript{27}

capitalization exceeded $68 billion). DuPont’s size made it the largest target to date of a proxy campaign by activist shareholders.

\textsuperscript{26} See Michelle Celarier, “Cash Flowing to Activists Because They’re Delivering Best Returns,” N.Y. Post, January 14, 2015, at p. 32 (also noting also that the S&P index gained only 8% over the same period). For another study finding “activist” hedge funds to have earned a 6.5% return in the first half of 2014, thus more than doubling the 3.1% rate of return for hedge funds as a group, see Copeland, supra note 19, at C-1.

\textsuperscript{27} See Lee and Schloetzer, supra note 17, at 2. For slightly different numbers, see David Benoit, “Activists On a Roll, With More to Come,” The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2015 (calculating that the assets managed by activist funds rose to $115.5 billion in November, 2014, up from $93 billion at the start of 2014). See also Juliet Chung and David Benoit, “Activist Investors Add to Their War Chests,” The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2014 at C1 (finding that the assets under management at a specific group of activist hedge funds grew by $9.4 billion in the first half of 2014 and now total $111 billion). The size and reach of activist hedge funds may soon increase significantly, as hedge fund manager William Ackman has announced plans for a $2 billion IPO of a new fund in London, which will be listed on Euronext Amsterdam, thus giving him more permanent capital that cannot be withdrawn by investors. See Maarten van Tartwijk, “Pershing Square, $2 billion IPO planned,” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2014 at C2.
Hedge funds initiated the majority of proxy contests in 2013, accounting for 24 of the 35 contests conducted with respect to Russell 3000 companies.\footnote{28 See Lee and Scholetzer, supra note 17, at 3.} Although long more active than other investors, hedge-fund initiated proxy contests have represented a steadily increasing percentage of all proxy contests, rising from 39\% in 2009 to 69\% in 2013.\footnote{29 Id.} More importantly, they are winning these fights, securing partial or complete victories in 19 of the 24 contests they initiated in 2013 (or nearly 80\%).\footnote{30 Id.} In proxy campaigns to elect their nominees to the board, activists won at least one board seat in about 73\% of recent proxy fights.\footnote{31 See Benoit, supra note 27, at B-2. For this same 73\% figure, see Dana Mattoli and Liz Hoffman, “New Activist Hedge Fund Has CEO Backing,” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2015 (citing FactSet Shark Watch).} Revealingly, once the activists win a board seat, 44\% of those companies changed their CEO within 18 months thereafter.\footnote{32 See David Benoit and Joanne S. Lublin, “Activist Investors Turn CEO Pickers,” The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2014 at C-1 (citing data compiled by FactSet Shark Watch). They further report that activists won some 39 board seats in 2013.}

To be sure, increased engagement between shareholders and management has entered the mainstream. An Ernst & Young report finds that half of all S&P 500 companies disclosed engaging with investors in 2013, up from only 23\% in 2012, and these contacts are often between institutional investors and members of the board outside the presence of management.\footnote{33 See EY Center for Board Matters, “2014 Proxy Season Review: New developments raise bar for effective communication” (August 6, 2014). A recent survey of large institutional investors finds that 63\% of responding institutions had directly approached management to offer advice and/or criticisms within the past five years and that}
Yet, even if there is a greater shareholder desire for engagement with management, hedge fund activism is qualitatively different. As others have stressed, traditional institutional investors—basically, pension funds and mutual funds—are essentially “defensive” in their activism, while hedge funds are “offensive,” seeking a target in which to invest in order to pursue a proactive agenda.\textsuperscript{34} From such an “offensive” perspective, activist hedge funds attempt to identify target firms with special characteristics, either to create shareholder value or to realize the private benefits of control.\textsuperscript{35}

Initially, we need to focus on what factors explain the increased frequency and success of activism. We do not suspect that these factors are exclusively legal in nature. Indeed, one reason for a hedge fund to shift to a “proactive” strategy is that it realizes that it cannot

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} See Brian Cheffins and John Armour, \textit{The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds}, 37 Iowa. J. Corp. L. 51 (2011). As they argue, “defensive” activists take action to protect an existing investment, whereas “offensive” activists seek a target to fit their agenda for activism.
\item \textsuperscript{35} We will not focus on this theme of private benefits in this memorandum, but “offensive” activists appear to often plan their “exit” in advance and have increasingly used “greenmail” transactions (i.e., issuer purchases of their shares) to assure that “exit.” See Hoffman and Benoit, supra note 17. Although the sale of their block back to the issuer may be at the market price, a sale of the same block into the market would likely reduce the price they received.
\end{itemize}
consistently outperform the market (at least in the absence of “inside” information). By investing in industry laggards and seeking to improve them, it outflanks the problem that even the best of stock pickers cannot beat an efficient market. Still, legal factors and other secular changes do help to explain the timing of this transition. The following factors stand out, but are not exhaustive:

A. **The Decline of Staggered Boards.** A threat to sell the company or fire the CEO is an empty one if the activist faces a staggered board and can only elect one third of the directors at the next annual election. Although once popular, staggered boards have recently declined to the point that they will soon be rare. In 2000, 300 of the S&P 500 had staggered boards, but as of the end of 2013, only 60 did.\(^\text{36}\) This decline is directly attributable to a campaign led by Harvard Law School Professor Lucian Bebchuck, whose Harvard Law School Shareholder Rights Project has successfully sponsored numerous shareholder resolutions calling on boards to eliminate the staggered board.\(^\text{37}\) But the disappearance of staggered boards probably owes even more to the growing influence of the proxy advisors (and most notably Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”)), which regularly supports proposals seeking to declassify the board and may oppose the board nominees of companies that maintain staggered boards.

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\(^{37}\) See Steven Davidoff, “The Case Against the Staggered Board,” New York Times Blogs (Dealbook) (March 20, 2012). Overall, the Shareholder Rights Project has been extraordinarily successful. In the 2012 proxy season alone, the Shareholder Rights Project succeeded in destaggering one third of the staggered boards in the S&P 500. See Brandon Gold, *Agents Unchained: The Determinant of Takeover Defenses in IPO Firms* (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262095) (May 6, 2013), at 20. Although the board need not respond affirmatively to these shareholder resolutions, they are likely to incur the displeasure of ISS (or other proxy advisors) if they do not.
With the decline in staggered boards, corporate management come under greater pressure and face the prospect of a proxy fight that could remove the entire board. In 2012-2013, proxy campaigns to obtain full or majority control rose to 42% of all proxy battles, which is a substantial increase over prior years. The threat of sudden ouster is thus real and increasing.

B. The Enhanced Power of Proxy Advisors. Even more important than the decline of staggered boards has been the rise of proxy advisors. Their rise to prominence began in the early 1980s in the wake of a U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), which seemed to require a prudent trustee to vote the shares it held in portfolio companies. Failing to vote shares in its view implied wasting a portfolio asset and signaled that the fiduciary was breaching its duty of care. Somewhat belatedly, the SEC took a similar position in 2003, adopting rules that are at least read by the registered investment advisors to mutual funds to require them both to vote their shares “in the best interests of clients” and to disclose annually how they actually voted. This year, under

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38 See Benoit, supra note 36, at C-1. Only about 20% of the 520 proxy fights since 2008 have attempted to replace the entire board (according to data compiled by FactSet SharkWatch). Id.

39 The Department of Labor codified these policies in 1994, after previously announcing them less formally in earlier advisory letters. See 29 C.F.R. §2509.94-2. Specialists disagree as to what both the Department of Labor and the SEC’s rules actually require, but their impact on institutional investors seems clear.

criticism that its rules delegated too much power to proxy advisors, the SEC has suggested that investment advisers are not required to vote on every issue, but it has not suggested that voting in an election of directors could be omitted.\textsuperscript{41}

Because many mutual funds compete by attempting to minimize overhead costs and thus have only small in-house staffs, these funds found it easier to outsource the voting decision to a third party. Proxy advisors—most notably Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass-Lewis—developed to fill this role. Both mutual funds and pension funds differ in terms of how much they rely on ISS’s recommendations, but many appear to defer almost entirely. One study this year finds that over 25\% of mutual funds vote almost exactly as ISS recommends.\textsuperscript{42} Other funds rely less and vote independently, but a Business Roundtable survey found that 40\% of its member firms’ shares were held by institutions that basically followed ISS’s voting recommendations.\textsuperscript{43}

Both ISS and Glass Lewis publish their voting policies, and both strongly support shareholder activism, opposing takeover defenses and seeking to maximize shareholder power.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} See Division of Investment Management, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (“Proxy Voting. Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisor Firms”) (June 30, 2014).


\textsuperscript{43} See Briggs, supra note 16, at 692 (discussing 2003 memorandum by the Business Roundtable).

Both also determine their voting policies based on interactions with (and polling of) institutional investors, so that proxy advisors and their clients reciprocally influence each other. Estimates differ as to the impact that an ISS recommendation will have in a contested proxy vote, but it is clearly significant and can easily make the difference between victory and defeat. One measure of ISS’s influence is that most public companies in order to comply with ISS’s guidelines have either redeemed their poison pill or adopted a poison pill that is consistent with ISS’s guidelines (and thus has a duration of one year or less).

As noted later, controversy has arisen as to the propriety of the apparent deference given by many institutional investors to ISS, but no conservative challenger to ISS and Glass-Lewis’s

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45 For the finding that an ISS recommendation can change certain votes by 30% on average, see Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizo Ferri, and David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019239) (August 2, 2013). This 30% average impact was in the context of “say on pay” votes (where institutional investors may have less interest) and probably overstates the impact of an ISS recommendation on director elections. Conversely, Professors Choi, Fisch, and Kahan estimate that a recommendation from ISS, the most influential of the proxy advisors, shifts investor votes by between 6% and 10%. Stephan Choi, Jill Fisch and Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality, 50 Emory L. J. 869 (2010). This may understate the current impact of an ISS recommendation, given the increasing tendency of some mutual funds today to defer entirely to ISS. See Iliev and Lowry, supra note 42. Even if the proxy advisor’s impact cannot be more precisely quantified than somewhere between 10% and 30%, this amount is sufficient to swing many elections where (a) retail shareholders may not vote, and (b) other hedge and mutual funds may bring the total activist ownership up to 30% or more. See text and note infra at note 73 (describing silent ownership by hedge funds in the Sotheby’s proxy contest).

46 ISS’s policy is to require a shareholder vote for any poison pill plan having a duration longer than 12 months. That is, the board must put the poison pill to a shareholder vote within that period or face an ISS disapproval. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 44, at 25.
activist stance has been able to gain any significant market share. This probably reflects the market’s satisfaction with their leadership. Still, some event studies have found that when institutions vote as ISS recommends, the outcome (at least in some contexts) is actually to decrease share value.\textsuperscript{47}

C. SEC Rules. Once, the SEC’s proxy rules swept very broadly. Because they define the term “solicitation” to include any communication made “under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy,”\textsuperscript{48} corporations could deem “almost any statement of views” by a shareholder (or an agent thereof) as amounting to a proxy solicitation, even when the maker of the statement was not seeking proxies.\textsuperscript{49} As a result, the issuer (or the SEC) could sue the maker of such a statement or opinion, seeking to bar it from further solicitation on the ground that it had failed to file a proxy statement. This had a clearly chilling impact on shareholder speech and dissent, as compliance with the SEC’s rules required the proponent to file a preliminary proxy statement with the SEC for its review before mailing it to shareholders. For decades, this had implied both delay and inhibited speech, plus the substantial costs of printing and mailing an often lengthy document.

\textsuperscript{47} One recent study finds a statistically negative impact on stock price as the results of certain compensation program changes made by public companies in response to comments from proxy advisory firms. See David F. Lareker, Allan L. McCall, Gaizka Ormazabal, \textit{Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms} (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101453) (June 13, 2014).

\textsuperscript{48} See SEC Rule 14a-1 (“Definitions”) which defines the term “solicit” and “solicitation” for purposes of the proxy rules in this fashion. (17 C.F.R. §240.14a-1).

\textsuperscript{49} The SEC conceded in a 1992 release that the term “solicitation” was broad and that “almost any statement of views” by a shareholder could be challenged as a proxy solicitation. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 31, 326 (“Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders”) (October 16, 1992).
Moreover, these rules made the SEC into a de facto censor of the proxy contestant’s speech. The SEC could effectively determine that statements were unfair or unsubstantiated and bar them. The proponent could avoid these rules only if it solicited ten or fewer shareholders.

But then in 1992, the SEC decided to deregulate, and it abandoned its former role as proxy censor. This greatly reduced delay, and the new rules also permitted “freer” speech. For example, Rule 14a-2(b)(3) permits proxy advisors to distribute “proxy voting advice” to shareholders, at least so long as it was not acting as an agent for a proxy contestant. Similarly, Rule 14a-2(b)(1) broadly allows statements amounting to a proxy solicitation so long as the solicitor does not seek proxy authority. Effectively, this allowed institutional investors (and hedge funds) to communicate with each other in an uninhibited fashion. They could now publically oppose management’s nominees (but not seek to obtain proxies for their own candidates) without preparing a proxy statement.

The 1992 reforms also authorized “short slates”—that is, proxy contests in which the insurgent sought only to elect a minority of the board seats up for election. This was important

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50 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, supra note 49. The SEC finally recognized in 1992 that if it remained a censor with whom contestants had to pre-clear their materials, proxy contestants would not be able to respond to their opponents in a timely manner. Several commentators have made this argument, none more effectively than Professor Bernard Black. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990). For an overview of the impact of the SEC’s 1992 reforms, see Briggs, supra note 16, at 686-689.

51 See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2(b)(3). There are other preconditions to this rule, including that the proxy advisor discloses to the recipient of the advice “any significant relationship” that it has with the issuer or a proxy contestant.

52 See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2(b)(1).

53 See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-4(d). Originally, this had not been much used, because strategic bidders wanted control. However, the “short slate” rule well suits the needs of hedge funds, who typically would rather play the role of
because, in the absence of a takeover bid, the shareholders might be understandably reluctant to pass control to an insurgent group that was not offering them any control premium. Instead, under the short slate rule, the insurgent could seek minority representation on the board in order to push a specific agenda (e.g., the spinoff of a division, a higher dividend payout, a stock buyback, etc.) This rule encouraged hedge funds to seek board representation with the possible objective of putting the company up for sale, but without themselves acquiring control.54 Because hedge funds are not typically strategic bidders and traditionally did not want control (which carried some risk of liability), this rule well served their needs.

The next major step for the SEC toward deregulation came in 1999 with the adoption of Rule 14a-12.55 So long as no proxy card was furnished shareholders, Rule 14a-12 allowed virtually unlimited communication with other shareholders before any proxy statement was filed. In effect, the election contest could precede the filing of the proxy statement, if all written materials so used were promptly filed with the SEC and contained certain prescribed legends. Oral communications were entirely deregulated (subject to the antifraud rules) and did not need to be filed in any form with the SEC.

54 The goal of the short slate rule also was to encourage “constructive engagement” through minority board representation—without a confrontational battle between activists and the issuer. See Ronald J. Gilson et. al., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. Corp. L. 29 (1991) (advocating the adoption of a short slate rule).

In practice, the impact of Rule 14a-12 was to eliminate the need for a proxy statement in several contexts. First, if the insurgent found that it could not attract majority support, it could simply abandon its campaign and never file a proxy statement. Second, facing a likely loss, the target corporation might decide to settle with the insurgent and voluntarily place some of the insurgent’s nominees on its board, thereby again eliminating the need for the insurgent to file a formal proxy statement. After 2000, the prospective shelter of this rule enabled insurgents to circulate lengthy documents, sometimes of several hundred page length, without any prior proxy statement being distributed.\(^{56}\)

Although insurgents faced high costs in mailing a proxy statement to all shareholders, they did not actually need to do so. The SEC has long permitted them to mail only to the shareholders whose votes they solicited.\(^{57}\) Thus, they could direct their mailings to institutional shareholders and ignore retail shareholders with small holdings. In 2005, the SEC further reduced these costs to insurgents by eliminating the need to mail any proxy statement to shareholders.\(^{58}\) Instead, consistent with the SEC’s earlier-adopted “access-equals-delivery”

\(^{56}\) See Briggs, supra note 16, at 696-697 (discussing example of a 348 page “book” distributed by Carl Icahn’s investment banker pursuant to Rule 14a-12).


\(^{58}\) Instead, the proxy contestant could simply email a Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials and leave it to the shareholder to seek out its proxy statement on the dissident’s website. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55, 146 (“Internet Availability of Proxy Materials”), 72 Fed. Reg. 4148, 4150-60 (January 29, 2007). The insurgent will have to mail or otherwise send its proxy statement to requesting shareholders, but such requests are few.
model for registration statements in the public offering context, the proxy contestant needed only to email a short notice to shareholders that its proxy materials were available online at a website or at the SEC in order to comply. Thus, a proxy statement would be filed, but not mailed, and the proxy contestant saved significant costs, but could still file and seek proxy authority if the contest went the full distance to a vote.

In sum, deregulation has greatly reduced the costs of proxy contests and thereby encouraged hedge fund activism.

D. Broker Votes. Historically, brokers were permitted to vote shares held in their “street name” for their clients, at least on “routine” matters.59 As a practical matter, this did not significantly affect contested elections for board seats (which were not considered “routine” and so brokers could not vote), but it did mean that in voting on shareholder proposals or on corporate governance issues, brokers would typically vote the shares held by retail shareholders in favor of management’s position. Institutional shareholders would still vote their own shares in order to comply with the policies on voting of the Department of Labor and the SEC. Then, in 2010, both the New York Stock Exchange and the Dodd-Frank Act acted independently to

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This policy change followed the SEC’s earlier and similar decision in 2005 to move the distribution of prospectuses to a “notice equals access” model. See Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44, 722, 44, 782-86 (August 3, 2005).

59 For the old rule, see New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual §452 (2003) (permitting brokers to vote shares held in their name on an uninstructed, discretionary basis on “routine” matters). The New York Stock Exchange voted to change this practice even before the 2008 financial crisis, but had to await SEC approval of its rule change, which approval came only in 2009, effective for shareholder meetings occurring after January 1, 2010. For an overview, see Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Texas L. Rev. 987, 1015-1018 (2010).
change this landscape, by barring brokers from voting shares held in their names without shareholder instructions in most circumstances.60

The net impact is that the shares held by retail shareholders are less likely to be voted (as they tend toward passivity), thus giving greater relative weight to the voting preferences of institutional shareholders. In effect, in a vote to approve a merger or a vote on a shareholder proposal, management loses its previously built-in advantage based on brokers voting the shares of passive retail shareholders for management. Even more importantly, if the corporation’s own bylaws require a director to submit his resignation if the director fails to receive a majority of the votes cast (and such “majority vote” provisions are now widely prevalent), broker votes can no longer be counted for this purpose, thus increasing the insurgent’s chances to unseat an incumbent in a “withhold the vote” campaign. As a result, hedge funds can pressure boards to increase the payout to shareholders with the threat of a “withhold the vote” campaign, even when they do not choose to run their own candidates for the board. This is low-cost pressure.

E. The “Wolf Pack” Tactic. The term “wolf pack” is often used (including by courts), but it is seldom defined.61 As used herein, it will mean a loose network of activist investors that act in a parallel fashion, but deliberately avoid forming a “group” under Section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That provision states that “[w]hen two or more persons act as a…group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an

60 Section 957 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit discretionary voting by brokers with respect to director elections and with respect to “any other significant matter” (as determined by the SEC).

61 For a careful review of the “wolf pack” strategy, see Briggs, supra note 16, at 697-99. Published in 2007, this article shows that the technique was being used at least as early as 2005. Only its prevalence has truly changed.
Thus, if three “persons” each acquire 2% of the stock in a target company and their relationship makes them a “group”, their shares are aggregated by Section 13(d), which treats them as a single “person” who must file a Schedule 13D within ten days of the formation of the group because they have collectively crossed its 5% beneficial ownership threshold.

Why is it important not to form a “group” for Section 13(d) purposes? Multiple reasons can be given. First, it is possible that all members of a Section 13(d) “group” will be sued by the target company, who will assert alleged disclosure violations in their Schedule 13D. Avoiding joining a “group” protects those activist investors who individually own less than 5% of the target’s stock, because the target will usually not know of their existence. Unless these investors declare themselves part of a group, they are basically invisible so long as they individually stay below the 5% ownership level. Although Section 13(d) litigation is unlikely to result in significant civil liability, it can be costly to defend, and hedge funds (other than the leader of the “wolf pack”) can sidestep this cost by not joining a “group.”

Second, and more importantly, avoiding a “group” delays the moment at which the Schedule 13D must be filed. The individual hedge fund organizing the activist campaign can quietly buy up to 5% of the target’s stock at a price that does not reflect its incipient campaign (which campaign may likely be read by the market as signaling a possible takeover or control contest). Then, it can buy even more stock in the ten-day window that Section 13d(1) gives it.

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62 See Section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78m(d)(3). For the conclusion that hedge funds perceive themselves to face little risk of being deemed a group (so long as they do not explicitly agree to cooperate), see Briggs, supra note 16, at 691 (“hedge funds…engage in ‘wolf pack’ tactics against companies undeterred by a fear of somehow magically becoming a group because they hunt together and seek ‘the same prey.’”) Later, we will assess the prospects for changing this attitude.
after the acquirer crosses 5% before it must file its Schedule 13D. Shares acquired during this ten-day statutory window period may be more costly (as active purchasing will be detected and may alert the arbitrageurs), but the price will still be less than the level to which it will rise on the filing of the Schedule 13D. Acting in this fashion, the hedge fund activist organizing the campaign will typically wind up holding a stock position of 6% to 10% as of the time of its Schedule 13D filing. Much (but not the majority) of this stock will be acquired in the ten-day statutory window before a Schedule 13D must be filed after the investor crosses the 5% threshold. Generally, the typical activist will not cross the 10% threshold, probably because at that point it will become subject to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which may force it to surrender any “short swing” profits to the corporation on shares acquired in excess of 10%. In sum, here again, there is a cost in becoming a “group,” because if a half dozen hedge

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63 Bebchuck, Brav, Jackson and Jiang find that “hedge fund activists typically disclose substantially less than 10% ownership with a median stake of 6.3%.” See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson and Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 Iowa J. Corp. Law 1, 3 (2013). Of course, the stake so disclosed represents only the holdings of those making the Schedule 13D filing and not the total stake of the entire “wolf pack.” An earlier study of 52 activist “interventions” in 2005 and 2006 found that in twenty-six (or 50%) of these “interventions,” the disclosed activists held a stake of at least 9.5% and only five held a stake of less than 4.9%. In three of these 52 cases the participating institutions held a majority of the shares. See Briggs, supra note 16, at 697. Although the broader “group” of institutions may thus exceed 10%, no individual institution will typically exceed that level, probably because of the impact of Section 16(b), as discussed in the next footnote.

64 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 entitles any shareholder to sue to recover “short swing” profits for the corporation (plus attorney’s fees) that are based on a purchase and sale, or a sale and purchase, within six months, of the stock of a “reporting company.” See 15 U.S.C. §78p(b). Although Section 16(a) requires a “group” to disclose its beneficial ownership, Rule 16a-1(a)(4) permits each member of the group to disclaim beneficial ownership of the other group members’ equity securities. See 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-1(a)(4).
funds collectively owning 15% of the stock were deemed a “group,” they might be required under some circumstances to forfeit their profits on the sale of shares over the 10% level. Such shares would also be illiquid until Sections 16(b)’s six month period ran.

A third problem with “group” formation involves the target’s response to the filing of a Schedule 13D. The target may respond by adopting a “poison pill” (or shareholder rights plan, as it is more formally known) that will effectively bar the “group” from acquiring more of the target’s shares. Most public corporations today do not have a “standing” poison pill in place, but adopt one only in response to a perceived “threat”.65 Let us suppose then that the “wolf pack” leader buys 5.1% quietly and then another 3.9% more hurriedly during the ten-day window before it files (for a total of 9%). Simultaneously, some six to ten hedge fund allies (all of whom will deny forming a “group”) buy another 12% to 15%, mainly in the same ten-day window period. This produces a grand total of 21% to 24% if we add the other funds’ shares to the 9% of the “wolf pack” leader. If the leader and its allies were deemed a “group,” two consequences would follow. First, they would have had to file a Schedule 13D at a much earlier point (as even the initial holdings of the group may already exceed 5% at the moment of group formation). Such an earlier filing would have made it more costly to acquire additional shares post-filing.

65As recently as 2005, 35% of public companies still had a poison pill in place. See Victor L. Lewkow and Sharah G. ten Siethoff, “The Embattled Poison Pill,” Insights, April 2005, at 13. That number has since dropped markedly, probably because of the opposition to poison pills of ISS and other proxy advisors (and the fact that companies, once made the subject of a corporate control contest, can then adopt a poison pill). One recent survey finds that some 471 companies have “traditional” poison pills in place, while another 25 have “two-tier” poison pills (which impose a lower threshold on “activist” investors). See Ronald Orol, “Five Developments to Watch As Activism Gains Steam,” The Deal Pipeline, January 9, 2015 (citing FactSet Shark Watch data).
Hence, the same group would probably have wound up holding a much lower aggregate amount than the 24% stake in this hypothetical.

Second, the response of the target to the Schedule 13D’s filing may be to adopt a poison pill that barred further acquisition of stock by any member of the group. Specifically, the poison pill might use a 10% ceiling (as has been upheld in a recent case). But if no group is formed, the only person barred by any poison pill adopted on the Schedule 13D’s filing will be the “wolf pack” leader filing the Schedule 13D. Although the poison pill may purport to apply to those who act in concert with this “wolf pack” leader, their identities will remain unknown to the target company, and each of these allies will carefully keep its distance from the “wolf pack” leader. The bottom line then is that much more stock can thus be assembled by hedge funds loosely aligned with the wolf pack leader if they can avoid being deemed a “group.”

Empirically, it is important to understand that most of the stock price appreciation and most of the high trading volume that surrounds the “wolf pack’s” formation occurs just before the filing of the Schedule 13D during the ten-day window permitted by Section 13(d). The following chart shows this relationship:

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66 In the 2014 proxy contest over the board of Sotheby’s, Sotheby’s adopted a poison pill with a 10% ceiling for “activist” investors, but only a 20% for “passive” investors. “Activist” investors were those who filed a Schedule 13D, and “passive” investors were those who filed a Schedule 13G. See Third Point LLC. v. Ruprecht, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (May 2, 2014).

67 See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1756. For a similar, consistent and more recent finding, see Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, supra note 7, at 43 (Figure 2) (finding a 6% abnormal gain around the Schedule 13D filing, with most of the stock price gain preceding the filing). Others have reported that the trading volume of stocks targeted by activist investors jumps by an average of 40% on the day when a Schedule 13D is filed. See Susan
After the Schedule 13D’s filing, the stock may still appreciate further, but not at the same hyperbolic rate that it rose in the period just before the filing. Similarly, the abnormal trading volume drops sharply within two days after the Schedule 13D’s filing.

This pattern should not be surprising. Those who learn of the incipient Schedule 13D filing face a nearly riskless opportunity for profitable trading, if they act quickly, as the Schedule 13D filing usually moves the market upward. Although the lead hedge fund organizing the “wolf pack” also typically buys during the ten-day window after it crosses 5%, it can buy cheaper earlier (as the above chart makes very clear). Because the lead hedge fund typically does not acquire more than a 10% position, it would buy at least half of its stake in the period before this ten-day window—and at a lower price. Rationally, its incentive is to tip others only...
after it has completed its own purchases (as otherwise it will be forced to buy in a rapidly rising market). Thus, much (and maybe most) of the buying during the ten-day window seems likely to be by other “wolf pack” members. From a tactical perspective, it is the interest of the “wolf pack” leader to tip such allies, as the larger the percentage of shares held by loosely affiliated hedge funds, the greater the likelihood of victory in any proxy contest brought by the lead hedge fund. Actual practices remain uncertain in some respects.

How much calculated tipping by the lead fund actually occurs is uncertain, as information could also leak out by way of gossip and body language within the hedge fund community. But clear examples of such tipping by hedge funds have come to light in litigated cases. Still, whether it tips or sends only veiled signals, the lead hedge fund has little need to insist on confidentiality, at least once it has largely completed its own purchases.

Such tipping by the “wolf pack” leader to its allies of its intent to launch an activist campaign may seem to resemble insider trading, but legally it is not equivalent. Although the information may be material and non-public, there is no breach of a fiduciary or other duty.

68 See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt., (UK), LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that defendant hedge fund contacted other hedge funds about the target to develop allies). Empirical data also points to large purchases by tippees in the ten-day window. One recent study finds that 40% of hedge fund activists “take advantage of a large part of the ten-day window.” See Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang, supra note 20, at 3. If only 40% of hedge fund activists buy in this window period, this suggests that other “wolf pack” members who do not file a Schedule 13D are doing much of the buying in this ten-day window period. This study further finds that, to the extent the “wolf pack” leader does buy during the ten day window, it does so primarily on the day that it crosses the 5% threshold and the next day. Id. at 6. But as the above chart in the text indicates, the abnormal trading peaks several days later, implying that others in the “wolf pack” are responsible for it.

69 Under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), a breach of some fiduciary-like duty is a necessary element before a defendant can violate the insider tradition prohibition. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 US. 642 (1997), does not
Indeed, it is in the interests of the lead hedge fund’s own investors that allies be assembled. In short, the information is not misappropriated, but freely given in order to gain leverage over the target company. Under existing law, such tipping would be unlawful only if a tender offer for the target is made by the “wolf pack” leader. Then, Rule 14e-3 makes it unlawful for the bidder (or others) to tip information relating to an approaching tender offer, once the bidder has taken a “substantial step” towards making such an offer.\textsuperscript{70} This issue has arisen in connection with the Valeant and Pershing Square Capital joint bid for Allergan, Inc.,\textsuperscript{71} but, outside this rare context of a joint tender offer by a hedge fund, insider trading issues seem unlikely to arise.

The “wolf pack” so formed is a loosely knit organization, and some members may drop out well before the proxy contest is begun or comes to a vote. Most do not appear to hold for the long run. Indeed, one well-known study places the median duration for hedge funds from the first Schedule 13D filing to the investor’s “exit” at 369 days (or roughly one year), but a more recent study by basically the same authors shortens the median period to 266 days.\textsuperscript{72} Either way change this result, but simply allows the requisite duty to be one owed to the source of the information, rather than the trading partner.

\textsuperscript{70} See Rule 14e-3(a) begins by stating: “If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence...a tender offer..., it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice....” See 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(a). What constitutes a “substantial step” will depend on the facts and circumstances, but steps such as arranging financing for the tender offer or hiring an investment banker for that purpose seem sufficient.

\textsuperscript{71} For a skeptical review of whether the Valeant/Pershing Square proposed transaction for Allergan may have involved insider trading in violation of Rule 14e-3, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Perhaps Too Clever To Be Legal,” N.Y. Times, August 4, 2014 at p. B1. No view is here expressed or implied on this question.

\textsuperscript{72} For the 266 day period between Schedule 13D filing and divestment, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and Hyunseob Kim, \textit{Hedge Fund Activism: A Review}, Foundations and Trends in Finance (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551953) at p. 18 and Table 4.2 Panel C (February 2010). For the earlier 369 day figure,
activists specialize in short-term interventions. In fact, if the proxy contest is about merely a corporate governance issue (where the impact on share price is likely to be modest), those who bought in the ten-day window period may have little incentive to remain as shareholders for any extended period after the Schedule 13D filing. Alternatively, if the Schedule 13D discloses that the “wolf pack” leader is seeking to sell the company, spin off significant assets, or otherwise trigger a corporate control contest, then the other members of the “wolf pack” may sense a future takeover premium and hold their shares to reap a possible arbitrageur’s profit. In any event, a leading study finds an average 7% positive abnormal stock price reaction to the Schedule 13D’s filing, and this seems sufficient to attract hedge funds who learn in advance of the filing, particularly when they know that they do not have to face potential legal liability for trading on such information.

How large can the “wolf pack” get? Here, it is difficult to gain precise information because neither the “wolf pack” leader nor the target will necessarily know how many silent allies have joined with it. But proxy solicitors can gain an estimate. In the 2014 proxy contest for the Sotheby’s board (where the insurgents had publicly called for the firing of Sotheby’s CEO), the lead hedge fund (Third Point LLC) had, itself, acquired a 9.62% stake in Sotheby’s, but Sotheby’s expert witness in the Delaware Chancery Court litigation (the CEO of Mackenzie Partners, Inc., a prominent proxy solicitor) testified that by his estimate 32.86% of Sotheby’s

See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1769. The 25th and 75th percentile figures in this earlier study were 169 and 647 days, respectively. Id. In the case of “hostile” transactions, the median duration is even shorter—319 days (or a little over 10 months). Id. Of course, as the pace of activism has accelerated, the median duration may have become even briefer today than either study shows. Also, these reported figures are for those hedge funds that file a Schedule 13D. Other funds that simply join the “wolf pack,” before or after the Schedule 13D filing, may hold for an even shorter duration.
stock was held (at the time of the vote) by hedge funds (including Third Point). This was in no respect a record level, and instances have been reported where a majority of the stock was acquired by insurgents.

In any event, because art auction houses (such as Sotheby’s) are low-tech companies that are not usually attractive to hedge funds, this suggests that the Sotheby’s contest provides a good illustration of “wolf pack” formation (as the Delaware Vice Chancellor explicitly noted in upholding Sotheby’s use of its poison pill). To put this ownership level in perspective, it needs to be recognized that, in most proxy contests, some percentage of the shares (probably 15% to 20%) simply do not vote. If so, and if the “wolf pack” can assemble one third of the target’s

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73 See Expert Report of Daniel H. Burch, Chief Executive Officer of Mackenzie Partners, Inc. This report was filed in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, supra note 66. Professor Coffee also served as an expert witness in this case for Sotheby’s. Based on this level of hedge fund ownership (i.e., 32.86%), Mr. Burch concluded that “a holder of between 5% and 9.99% of the outstanding voting shares has a good chance of winning a minority-slate campaign.”

74 See Briggs, supra note 16, at 697 (finding three cases in his survey of hedge fund activism in 2005-2006 in which the institutions participating in the proxy campaign held a majority of the shares). Activists are currently targeting Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (“Hertz”), and the press has reported that hedge funds own more than half of Hertz’s stock. See “Nomination Windows Open at Activist Targets, Hertz, Amgen-Market Talk,” Dow Jones Institutional News, January 14, 2015 (citing FactSet Shark Watch). Much attention earlier focused on the acquisition of 26.7% in J.C. Penney by Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust, most of which occurred during the ten-day window period after they crossed 5%. See Joshua Mitts, A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 203, 204 (2013). This was not a “wolf pack,” however, but two large “wolves,” arguably acting in concert. Still, it shows just how much can be acquired in the ten-day window under Section 13(d)(1).

75 See Third Point LLC. v. Ruprecht, supra note 66, at *58 to *59. Based on what he saw as the board’s objectively reasonable perception of a threat, Vice Chancellor Parsons upheld the use of a poison pill with a 10% ceiling for activist investors.
outstanding stock, then it only has to win another 7% to 10% of the remaining votes to obtain a *de facto* majority. Moreover, because the remaining shares will typically be held primarily by institutional investors (who may not be activists, but who do tend to follow the voting recommendations of their proxy advisors), the lead hedge fund can expect the support of shareholders outside the “wolf pack.” Although ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s recommendations do not invariably favor the insurgents, they do support the insurgents much of the time. When they do so, the insurgents generally win. These facts may explain why insurgents enjoyed a success rate approaching 80% in proxy contests last year. Facing this prospect and aware that the vote was going against it, the Sotheby’s board opted to settle and gave Third Point the seats it was seeking on the Sotheby’s board. This pattern seems likely to play out similarly in future cases.

Of course, it is theoretically possible that the “wolf pack” could vote against its leader, but this seems unlikely. Mutual funds must disclose their votes, and deference to ISS is deeply engrained. To the extent that hedge funds have been provided with a virtually certain opportunity for profit when they learn of the activist campaign before the Schedule 13D filing, hedge funds want to encourage other activists to give them similar advance notice in other cases. Voting against the “wolf pack” leader would thus seem a little like hedge funds biting the hand that feeds them. That may happen, but it is not to be expected.

As a result, the “wolf pack” tactic may tip the voting outcomes in favor of the insurgents—if not always, at least usually.

F. **The Shrinking Concept of “Group.”** At the heart of the foregoing “wolf pack” tactic is the fact that parallel action by like-minded activist investors, even when accompanied by

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76 See Briggs, supra note 16, at 698.

77 See text and notes supra at notes 30 to 31.
discussions among them, does not, without more, give rise to a “group” for purposes of Section 13(d)(3). This outcome is not apparent from the face of the statute, and the SEC’s rules go even further by recognizing that a “group” that must be disclosed can be formed for the purpose of voting shares (as well as for the purposes of buying, holding, or disposing of shares). Still, recent judicial interpretation of the “group” concept has been conservative. For example, in Hallwood Realty Partners L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., the Second Circuit decided that two Schedule 13D filers and a Schedule 13G filer were not a “group, even though one was a well-known raider and all three discussed among themselves how to improve the value of the target company”. In a later Southern District case, even a joint slate of directors proposed by the investors was not sufficient to make them a “group.”

In contrast, earlier cases were more prepared to find a “group.” Thus, in both GAF Corp v. Milstein, and Wellman v. Dickinson, the Second Circuit did find in each case that a “group” was formed for purposes of Section 13(d)(3). In GAF Corp, the group was a family that pooled its holdings, and the defining criterion identified by the Second Circuit was that this effort

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78 Virtually all commentators agree that parallel actions by, and communications among, hedge funds do not make them a group.

79 See Rule 13d-4(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-4(b)(1). This rule adds “voting” to the statutory terms in Section 13(d)(3), which section refers only to “acquiring, holding and disposing” of equity securities. Hence, based on this rule, a “voting group” must also file a Schedule 13D.

80 286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2002).


82 453 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1971).

83 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
threatened “the stability of the corporate structure.”\footnote{84}{See \textit{GAF Corp v. Milstein}, 453 F.2d 709, at 717-718 (2d Cir. 1971).} Similarly, in \textit{Wellman v. Dickinson}, the Second Circuit found that a fired CEO of a company and a number of friends constituted a selling “group” where they “reached an understanding to act in concert in disposing of their shares.”\footnote{85}{682 F.2d 355, at 363.} What made this association a “group”? The key fact to the Second Circuit may have been that the defendants “were linked by a desire to profit from a shift in the corporate control of Becton” (the target company).\footnote{86}{Id at 365.} But if that were the test, it applies broadly, as many hedge funds join in proxy control contests, hoping that a corporate acquirer will materialize and make a merger proposal or a tender offer for control. Under these tests, many loose associations of investors might be deemed “groups.”

Differentiating \textit{Hallwood Realty Partners} from \textit{GAF Corp} and \textit{Wellman} appears to have been the fact that each of the institutional investors in \textit{Hallwood} “made an independent decision to purchase units, based on due diligence and a common understanding among knowledgeable investors that Hallwood units were undervalued.”\footnote{87}{286 F.3d 613, at 616-618 (2d Cir. 2002).} This test places great emphasis on sophistication. Apparently, if sophisticated parties independently reach the same investment strategy, no group arises, even if they actively discuss their investment strategy for the company among themselves.

Decisions must be understood in their context. \textit{Hallwood Realty} did not involve a proxy contest. Hence, its focus on independent decision-making makes more sense. Conversely, when a proxy contest is foreseeable, collective action becomes the critical issue, and independent
decision-making is less relevant when the objective is to assemble a voting majority. Because there is strength in numbers, even sophisticated investors know that they need allies and that independent voting decisions have little impact. Arguably then, Hallwood Realty’s test should be confined to its context, and ongoing discussions among investors should play a larger role in the proxy contest context in the determination of whether a “group” exists. Conscious parallelism in efforts to persuade or induce others to vote in a specific way could logically be viewed as demonstrating the existence of a “voting” group on the part of those soliciting. But that is not the current law.

Overshadowing even the formalistic definition of “group” as a cause of aggressive behavior by the “wolf pack’s” leaders is the absence of any meaningful remedy if a “group” is formed but not reported. Suppose two hedge funds form a “group” that as of its formation holds 5.1% of the target’s shares. They are required to file a Schedule 13D within ten days, but they do not. Indeed, after the expiration of ten days, they each buy up to just below 5% and thus collectively hold just under 10%. Although the issuer may sue for corrective disclosure, this remedy only closes the barn door after the horse has been stolen. Under the current case law, the issuer has no realistic chance of obtaining an injunction that “sterilizes” (i.e., bars the voting of) the shares acquired in violation of the Williams Act’s rules. As a result, activists have every

88 In CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the district court found that a “group” had been formed by two hedge funds, which had acquired over 8% of the target’s stock in violation of Section 13(d), but still concluded that it was powerless under the case law to order sterilization of the shares purchased in violation of the Williams Act’s rules because “irreparable harm” could not be shown once corrective disclosure was made. Id at 567-571. Although the court said that it would have granted such an injunction to deter future violations, it found that it was barred by Treadway Cos v. Care Corp., 638 F. 2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980), in which case the “group” members acquired a 31% block but still escaped sterilization.
incentive to play fast and loose with the “group” concept, because, even if their violation is
detected, all that will happen as a practical matter is that they will be forced to disclose their
unlawful acquisition of shares. But the voting electorate will have been irrevocably changed,
and some shareholders will have sold to the “group’s” members at a discount off the price that
would have prevailed had timely disclosure been made.

G. **Proxy Access.** Traditionally, insurgent shareholders who wished to challenge
management had to conduct a proxy contest to elect their own nominees to the corporation’s
board. Although hedge funds do wage proxy contests, they are an expensive proposition whose
cost deters most shareholders, including particularly institutional shareholders, who, even if they
might desire to change corporate policies, do not themselves want to control (or be deemed to
control) the corporation. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to empower institutional investors by
authorizing a new system of “proxy access” under which a group of shareholders who had held a
defined percentage of the company’s stock for a defined period could add their own nominees to
the corporation’s own proxy statement and thus seek to elect a minority of the board at low
cost. Responding to this new authority, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-11 in 2011, which would

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89 The costs of a proxy contest may make sense for those who acquire a significant percentage stake and expect to
profit from a change in corporate policy, but less so for indexed institutional investors who do not want to exceed a
low percentage (probably between 1% and 5%) of the stock of the companies in their portfolio. In addition, if the
investor were to be deemed to hold “control,” the investor would become subject to potential “controlling person”
characterization has traditionally been a concern for institutional investors.

90 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §971, 124 Stat. 1376,
1915 (2010)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78n(a)(2)). This provision authorized (but did not require) the SEC
have permitted shareholders to nominate up to (at most) three directors to the corporation’s board.91 But this rule was challenged by the Business Roundtable and promptly struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 2011 on the ground that the SEC had not conducted an adequate cost/benefit analysis in adopting the rule.92

That defeat did not, however, end matters. Institutional investors and proxy advisors began to pressure corporations to change their own bylaws to permit some defined percentage of the shareholders to nominate a minority slate of directors by means of the corporation’s own proxy statement. In particular, their goal became achieving a “universal proxy”—that is, a proxy card on which the corporation’s nominees and any insurgent nominees would be listed side-by-side. Predictably, corporations resisted, and for a time the SEC sided with them, allowing managements to use tactics that excluded shareholder proposals for proxy access from their proxy statements.93 Then, in early 2015, SEC Chair Mary Jo White announced that the SEC

92 See Business Roundtable Inc. v. SEC, 647 F. 3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This controversial decision has been much debated, but those issues are beyond the scope of this article.
93 Shareholders seeking to change, or request a change, in the corporation’s bylaws generally must rely on the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8. However, this rule permits the corporation to exclude a proposal that “directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals.” See Rule 14a-8(i)(9). Exploiting this exemption, some companies proposed weak substitutes for “proxy access” and then omitted the stronger proposal made by insurgent shareholders. For a time the SEC’s Staff permitted this technique by granting “no action” letters to corporations that made “conflicting” proposals on proxy access in their proxy statements. In late 2014, such a “no action” letter granted to Whole Foods Markets provoked angry responses from major institutional investors and
would reconsider its policy on proxy access. Equally significantly, some major corporations—most notably, General Electric—agreed to a compromise under which a 3% ownership block that had been held for at least three years could nominate up to 25% of the directors to be elected at an annual meeting. At present, this procedure is gaining adherents and may soon become a widely accepted “best practice.”

What does it mean for hedge fund activism? Few activist hedge funds have held their stock for anything approaching three years (because their business model is to buy stock in a target only after they decide upon an intervention strategy). Thus, they will need allies among traditional institutional investors, who are largely indexed and have held their investments in most companies for multiple years. By partnering up with pension funds and mutual funds, hedge fund appear today to be on the verge of acquiring increased influence over the composition of the target board at greatly reduced cost. At the same time, however, they will need to sell their proposals to traditional institutional investors, and this will likely serve as a moderating influence on some activists.


See Andrew Ackerman, “SEC Shift on ‘Conflicting’ Shareholder Proposals Sparked by Abuse Concerns; staff are reviewing when a shareholder proposal truly conflicts with a management proposal, SEC Chairman White said,” The Wall Street Journal Online, March 19, 2015. SEC Chairman Mary Jo White explained this change in policy in a speech delivered at Tulane University Law School on March 19, 2015. See White, “A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, Remarks At Tulane University Law School 27th Annual Corporate Law Institute.”

The General Electric version of proxy access under which an individual or group holding at least 3% for at least three years can nominate up to 25% of the seats to be elected has also been adopted by Citigroup and Bank of America, all in 2015. See Gretchen Morgenson, FAIR GAME: Time to coax the Directors Into Talking,” N.Y. times, March 29, 2015 at D-1.
All in all, the leverage possessed by activist hedge funds seems likely to increase even further in the near future.

H. Tactics: The Game Plans for Each Side. In theory, activism and proxy fights are about insurgents seeking to convince shareholders that they have a better business plan than the incumbent management team. However, that explanation does not quite fit the data. One well-known study found no difference in abnormal returns between proxy contests in which the insurgents win a board seat and contests in which they lose. In effect, the outcome is irrelevant. Why then does the market welcome such contests? In the foregoing study, the authors generalize that the gains come not from the identity of the victor, but from the predictable tendency of the incumbent management to implement the specific changes sought by the insurgents. These changes typically involve “liquidity events”—special dividends, stock buybacks, spinoff of assets.

Revealingly, some studies find that the average abnormal returns in proxy contests are higher when the incumbent management wins, and at least one study finds negative abnormal returns following a proxy contest in which the insurgent wins seats. Why? Possibly, shareholders want the increased payout through dividends or stock buybacks that the activists are demanding, but feel more comfortable when the incumbent management oversees this process. Shareholders may not trust amateurs (or at least newcomers) to run their business. Of course,

such an increased payout may come at the expense of bondholders and other creditors, but that is not the shareholders’ concern.

Recent events are consistent with this story. In the 2014 battle over Sotheby’s board, Sotheby’s advisers counseled that the best defensive course was to structure a “liquidity event” that would satisfy the non-hedge fund shareholders, and, pursuant thereto, Sotheby’s paid out some $450 million in special dividends and stock buybacks in early 2014 (which came to roughly 15% of its equity market capitalization).\(^9\) Similarly, when Darden’s was faced with a demand from two hedge funds in 2014 to split itself into three divisions, it went part way and sold off its Red Lobster restaurant division for $2.1 billion in order to increase the payout to its shareholders.\(^1\)

Hedge fund-led proxy fights are also often (and increasingly) nasty and personal. Why? Possibly, the “poison pen” letters and the vitriol that have become common are intended to convince shareholders that the two sides cannot reconcile, and thus even the election of a minority slate will entail management turnover and a more likely sale of the company. Thus, the market may be led to raise its estimate of a likely takeover premium. The bottom line is that

\(^9\) Specifically, Sotheby’s paid a $300 million special dividend and began a $150 million stock repurchase in early 2014. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, supra note 66, at *36.

\(^1\) For an overview of this battle, see Steven M. Davidoff, “Battle over Darden Restaurants Leaves Little Room for Compromise,” N.Y. Times, May 21, 2014 at B8. This “compromise” did not work, and the Darden CEO was forced to resign and three seats on its 12 person board were given to the hedge funds. See David Benoit and Julie Jargon, “Darden CEO to Depart in Shake-up,” The Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2014 at B1. The activist—Starboard Value LP—later won control of the entire board. Its suggested changes have clearly reached the point of micromanagement, as it instructed Darden as to how to boil its pasta water. See David Benoit, “Investor to Olive Gardens: Salt the Pasta Water,” The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2014, at B5.
these tactics are consistent with the view that the gains from this type of activism come from either (1) expected turnover premiums, or (2) liquidity events that transfer wealth from bondholders and creditors.

III. Are Hedge Funds Shortening the Investment Horizon of Corporate Managers?: Framing the Issue.

One of the most frequently voiced concerns about hedge fund activism is that it will lead to “short-termism”—a term that is notably undefined and may depend on the eye of the beholder. We will use this term to mean a managerial focus on increased distributions by way of dividends and/or stock buybacks, achieved often through increased leverage, which in turn necessitates reduced long-term investments (particularly in research and development). This claim is usually made by corporate lobbying groups (such as The Business Roundtable), but it has been rejected by most (but not all) academics. Some distinguished academics consider “short-termism” an illegitimate argument, at best a “debater’s weapon” used only by corporate lobbyists.101 Others accept that “short-termism” is associated with institutional activism, but defend it as economically desirable.102 We think, however, this claim deserves a more skeptical analysis that recognizes that investors do not all share the same investment horizon.

To begin with, it is intuitively plausible that hedge funds could have a short-term bias, because their compensation structure so inclines them. Under the standard compensation formula, hedge fund managers charge annually 2% of the assets under management plus a


102 This appears to be the position of Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues: namely, that “investment-limiting” interventions are efficient and desirable. See Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, supra note 7, at 59 to 61.
performance fee of 20%. In return for these generous fees, hedge fund investors expect returns that outperform the market. That is hard (or even impossible) to do consistently. But hedge fund investors are impatient and demanding and will move their investments to the recent winners in the intense competition among hedge funds. Given this competition, the conventional wisdom is that a number of hedge funds became “activists” because they found it too difficult to outperform the market consistently as passive stock-pickers. Instead, they became proactive. Nonetheless, hedge fund managers remain subject to short-term time constraints: if they do not outperform the market, their investors are likely to go elsewhere to others who may. Investors in hedge funds can withdraw their funds at regular intervals, are likely diversified, and probably have put much of their wealth in lower-risk investments. Thus, they can tolerate risk, and they correspondingly expect hedge funds to assume risk in pursuit of short-term gains. Accordingly, these investors have little reason to object to a short-term focus.

More generally, some management scholars have reported empirical evidence showing a strong correlation between “short-termism” within firms and a high ownership level on the part of “activist” hedge funds and certain other institutional investors. In particular, Wharton Professor Brian Bushee has found that “predominant ownership by transient institutions—which have high portfolio turnover and use momentum trading strategies…significantly increases the likelihood that managers cut R&D to manage earnings.” In a later study, he reports that “high levels of ownership by transient institutions are associated with overweighting of the near-term

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103 See Thomsen, Hawke and Calande, supra note 17, at 558. The performance fee is computed on realized and unrealized gains.


105 Id at 307.
earnings component and underweighting of the long-term earnings component.” The archetypal “transient investor” may be the hedge fund (although many mutual hedge funds would qualify also). From this perspective, the more stock that the “wolf pack” of hedge funds acquires in a firm, the greater the likely underweighting of the firm’s investments in research and development and the more the pressure to reduce those investments. Other studies have agreed and suggest both that a high percentage of short-term investors leads to weaker monitoring and a strong preference for near-term earnings (which in turn produce significant misvaluations and a desire to inflate short-term earnings at the expense of the longer term).

This literature certainly suggests a linkage between increased hedge fund activism and shorter investment horizons for the corporations subject to that activism. But this evidence is far from dispositive. Realists would want to see “real world” examples of hedge funds actually


enforcing such a short-term orientation. In that light, we next examine the most significant effort (in terms of market value) yet made by a hedge fund to lead an activist campaign.

In 2014, Pershing Square Capital Management ("Pershing Square") teamed with Valeant Pharmaceuticals International ("Valeant") to seek to acquire Allergan, Inc. ("Allergan"), a major pharmaceutical company, in an over $50 billion transaction. Pershing Square created an entity, PS Fund I, LLC., a Delaware limited liability company ("PS Fund"), to acquire shares in Allergan and certain derivatives referencing Allergan common stock. Pershing Square began buying Allergan's shares quietly on February 25, 2014; then, as it approached the 5% level, PS Fund’s LLC agreement was amended to add Valeant as a member on April 6, 2014. Thereafter, the 5% level was quickly reached on or about April 11, 2014, and then PS Fund picked up the pace of its purchases.109

Ten days later, at the end of the ten-day window under Section 13(d)(1), Pershing Square and Valeant each filed on April 21, 2014 a Schedule 13D disclosing that PS Fund had acquired 9.7% of the outstanding shares of Allergan (with roughly 97% of the funds supplied by Pershing Square). The next day (April 22), Valeant made public its offer to acquire Allergan for a combination of cash and shares totaling over $50 billion (subsequently increased to $53 billion). Two months later, on June 18, 2014, Valeant announced a formal tender offer. Valeant described Pershing Square as a co-bidder, but Pershing Square is itself offering nothing to Allergan’s shareholders (it will be only a seller to Valeant, not a buyer).

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By staying below 10% (and thereby avoiding Section 16(b)) and by not joining in the merger bid, Pershing Square preserved its flexibility and reduced its potential liability. Although it could conceivably have been sued for misstatements or omissions in the tender offer, the shares acquired by Pershing Square through PS Fund were required to be sold to Valeant pursuant to the latter’s merger bid. Pershing Square also retained the right to tender instead to any higher bidder that topped Valeant’s offer. Although the two parties characterized Pershing Square as a “joint bidder,” Pershing Square clearly did not intend to become a long-term owner of Allergan stock (beyond a one year period during which it was contractually committed by Valeant to hold the Valeant stock received in the prospective merger). Thus, it had the best of both worlds: advance knowledge of a tender offer without any obligation to make any portion of the acquisition itself.

Also on April 22, Allergan predictably adopted a poison pill that blocked any acquisition, and shortly thereafter Pershing Square began a proxy contest, seeking to convene a special meeting of Allergan’s shareholders at which Pershing Square and Valeant would attempt to remove and replace Allergan’s directors.\(^{110}\)

What advantage did each participant gain by forming this unique combination of a hedge fund and a strategic bidder? On Valeant’s side, it not only received financing from Pershing Square (i.e., 97% of the funds expended by PS Fund came from Pershing Square), but by using PS Fund as the acquirer of the 9.7% block, Valeant was also able “to sidestep antitrust rules” that

would have delayed its ability to acquire a sizeable block in a competitor.\footnote{Such advance approval is required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.} Pershing Square was required to vote its stock to support Valeant in any proxy contest, and it agreed to waive cash and accept Valeant stock exclusively for its shares, thus reducing the burden on the highly leveraged Valeant to borrow to finance its acquisition.

On Pershing Square’s side, the advantages in this relationship are even clearer: it was able to buy a large block of stock before a merger or tender offer at the pre-announcement price by entering into an alliance with the bidder. The legality of this arrangement was challenged by Allergan and, which asserted in its complaint that SEC Rule 14e-3 had been violated, both because Pershing Square was not in its view a true co-bidder with Valeant and because Valeant had allegedly taken a “substantial step” towards commencing a tender offer by the time of Pershing Square’s purchases. Ultimately, the court declined to enjoin the proposed transaction, but expressed a strong view that Allergan had “raised serious questions” on its Rule 14e-3 theories.\footnote{See Allergan, Inc. v. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, Inc., supra note 109, at * 43.}

For immediate purposes, the motivation of Valeant is particularly relevant. The product of a series of mergers and acquisitions, itself, Valeant is known for its business model under which, as a “serial acquirer,” it buys pharmaceutical companies with established products and cuts back on, or ceases, their research and development efforts in order to maximize the cash flow from their established products.\footnote{See Davidoff Solomon, supra note 110, at B4 (describing Valeant as a “serial acquirer”). Valeant had recently acquired Biovail and Bausch & Lomb. Valeant has also attracted attention and criticism for its alleged inattention to safety issues. See Jesse Eisinger, “Valeant’s Cost-Cutting Ethos May Yet Give Wall Street Indigestion,” N.Y. Times, July 21, 2014 at B6.} According to a Wall Street Journal report on Valeant,
“large pharmaceutical companies often spend as much as 20% of their sales on R&D.” 114 In sharp contrast, in 2013, Valeant spent only 2.7% of its $5.77 billion in revenues on R&D. 115 Disinclined to invest in research and development, Valeant valued Allergan for one product: Botox, a drug with an expanding number of uses, but internationally known as a wrinkle-erasing medication.

Valeant’s CEO did not attempt to hide his plans to cut both research and development and Allergan’s employees if Valeant could take control. Specifically, in April, 2014, when he announced his merger proposal, Valeant’s CEO estimated that about 20% of the combined company’s 28,000 employees would lose their jobs. 116 Valeant similarly estimated that, on a merger with Allergan, “it would reduce the combined company R&D spending by 69%.” 117 In short, it would strip Allergan of R&D not related to Botox, but would seek to expand the uses for that product.

The next step was predictable. Faced with shareholder support for Valeant’s lucrative offer, Allergan’s management decided that if it could not beat Valeant’s strategy, it would mimic it. Thus, in July, 2014, Allergan announced that it would cut its work force by 13%—less than Valeant’s 20% goal but still substantial. 118 Allergan similarly announced that it would reduce research and development spending to about 13% of annual sales, as compared with its historical

115 Id.
117 Id.
118 See Walker and Hoffman, supra note 116, at B-1.
rate of 16% to 17%. In overview, this response is consistent with the earlier noted tactic used by target firms of structuring a large dividend or stock buyback to forestall a proxy contest. In reality, Allergan probably had little choice. Although there has been little public disclosure concerning the size of the “wolf pack” backing Pershing Square and Valeant, Paulson & Co, a major hedge fund, disclosed in a Section 13(f) filing that it acquired 5.6 million shares of Allergan, valued at $948 million, sometime during the Second Quarter of 2014. Other hedge funds had likely also joined the Pershing Square/Valeant team, giving the bidders a likely prospective victory in any proxy contest.

Some may dismiss the Allergan story as a mere anecdote (although a record-setting $62 billion transaction seems more than a trivial “anecdote”). But much the same pattern is evident in the nearly successful campaign by the Trian Fund to elect four of its nominees to the board of DuPont. Although DuPont has regularly outperformed the S&P 500 index and other metrics of corporate profitability, the Trian Fund’s apparent aim was to break DuPont into multiple parts

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119 Id. at B-2.

120 See Kelly Bit, “Paulson Wagers on Allergan Bid, as Ackman Defends Tactics,” Bloomberg, August 15, 2014 (available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-08-15/paulson-wagers-on-allergan-bid-as-ackman-defends-tactics.html). This disclosure did not indicate when John Paulson made this investment (and specifically whether it was prior to Pershing Square’s Schedule 13D filing). We do not suggest that Paulson & Co. formed a “group” with the two bidders; our point is only that the size of the “wolf pack” and its holdings are usually much larger than is disclosed in the Schedule 13D.

121 See Bill George, “Petz’s Attack on DuPont Threatens American’s Research Edge,” The New York Times Dealbook Online, April 9, 2015. Nelson Peltz is the founder and CEO of the Trian Fund. The proxy contest was to elect four Trian nominees, but the longer term goal to reduce investment in research was clearly evident.
and “shut down DuPont’s central research labs.”122 Again, this fits the paradigm of the “investment limiting” campaign that hedge funds increasingly favor, but it is directed at an iconic firm with a long history of innovation and highly successful research. Even if this campaign were to fail, the threat that it and other campaigns represent cannot be easily dismissed. Corporate managers quickly recognize the common strategy behind hedge fund interventions and seek to preempt it. Even if not targeted, other firms in the same industry will fear becoming the subject of a similar activist intervention and become more likely to take preemptive steps to cut research expenditures.

Indeed, some evidence shows that the pharmaceutical industry has become painfully aware of hedge fund’s apparent distaste for long-term investment in research and development. A Financial Times survey in July, 2014, noted a “fundamental trend” in this industry: namely, that pharmaceutical and household consumer products companies are divesting their non-core divisions and “reassessing their portfolios.”123 The most obvious example was Reckitt Benckiser’s decision, announced in July, 2014, to spin off its pharmaceutical business124, but that case does not stand alone. Just in 2014, Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly, Merck & Co. and Sanofi

122 Id. In response, DuPont did undertake a significant stock buyback and agreed to spin off a large chemical division that made titanium oxide. See Bunge and Benoit, supra note 19, at 1. Thus, even in this rare loss, the activists achieved many of their goals, and DuPont’s management will likely be more cautious in the future about long-term capital investments.


announced sales or spinoffs of significant pharmaceutical divisions.\textsuperscript{125} No claim is here made that the Allergan takeover bid caused all these transactions.

More generally, a 2015 study of firms recently targeted by activist funds finds that these targets subsequently cut their investments in R&D by over 50% (while a matched random sample of firms modestly increased R&D expenditures).\textsuperscript{126} Possibly, some of these targets were industry laggards, but that characterization cannot apply to an Allergan or DuPont, and this impact appears to be common across multiple industries.

We use these examples not to prove any thesis dispositively, but to frame several questions: (1) Should the law leave the “wolf pack” tactic largely unregulated, non-transparent, and nearly riskless, when it is having a significant impact on corporate behavior?; (2) How significant will the impact be on investment policies at other firms that activists have not yet challenged, but that must also fear they could be attacked if they continue to make long-term investments in research and development?; and (3) Given the extraordinary surge in hedge fund activism, can there be a point at which a tactic becomes overused?

To the extent that the contemporary pattern involves hedge funds buying shortly before or just after the Schedule 13D is filed and exiting within one year thereafter, the risks appear

\textsuperscript{125} Daneshkhu, Ward and Thomson, supra note 123, at 13.

\textsuperscript{126} In a 2015 study, Allaire and Dauphin identify a sample of firms that were targeted by activist hedge funds (and not taken over). These “surviving” firms saw their R&D expenses as a percentage of sales decline from 17.34\% in 2009 to 8.12\% in 2013 (or more than 50\%). In contrast, their random sample of untargeted firms saw R&D expenses as a percentage of sales rise modestly from 6.54\% to 7.65\% over the same period. See Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Hedge Fund Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical Evidence,” (Institute for the Governance of Public and Private Organizations, April 1, 2015). This finding probably understates the full impact, because firms that did not “survive” (and that were taken over) likely experienced an even greater decline in R&D.
low, as the hedge fund may today profit even when its strategy proves wrong. The prospect of profit without risk can encourage a bubble. Put differently, the demand side of the market is outpacing the supply side, as more and more hedge funds stalk fewer and fewer companies that could benefit from their intervention. Predictably, competition will eventually shrink the gains from activism.

Posing these questions does not imply that “activist” investors should be barred from taking collective action. That is not our argument. But the more detailed analysis that we next undertake is intended to inform the question of whether additional transparency is desirable—even if increased transparency carries some cost.

IV. A Survey of the Evidence.

Academic studies of the effect of hedge fund activism have found mixed evidence, both as to their efficacy in generating value for shareholders, bondholders and other corporate claimants, and as to their impact on research and development, leverage and long-term investment. We survey this evidence below, emphasizing whether studies used a control consisting of: firms not targeted by activist hedge funds, whether findings are industry-adjusted, size-adjusted, and book-to-market-adjusted. We are also mindful that all of these studies end generally no later than hedge fund interventions initiated in 2007. Since that time, hedge fund activism has accelerated substantially and altered its targets, thus having impacts that these studies may not capture.

A. Who are the Targets of Hedge Fund Activism? Although the studies do not fully agree, many report that the typical target firm of an activist investor is smaller, more profitable,
has a large institutional ownership level, and has more of a “value” orientation (namely, a higher book-to-market ratio) than a control sample of firms. But these targets are not simply “losers.” Indeed, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas find that the probability of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge fund is positively related to its return-on-assets. Khorana, Hoover, Shivdasani, Sigurdsson and Zhang find over one third of the firms being targeted since 2006 actually experienced stock price overperformance prior to being targeted and this proportion is growing over time. In general, we observe that target firms are often more profitable than the control sample, suggesting that these targets are not poorly performing firms as some advocates for activist hedge fund activism suggest. In fact one study finds that target

127 See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12 (here, the control sample consists of firms not targeted by activist hedge funds but are otherwise similar in size, book-to-market and industry); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Value Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 323 (2008) (here, the control sample consists of firms who face a 13G filing rather than the activist investor’s 13D filing); April Klein and Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187 (2009) (here, the control sample consists of firms not targeted by activist hedge funds but otherwise similar in size, book-to-market and industry); Y. Hamao, K. Kutsuna, and P. Matos, Investor Activism in Japan: The First 100 Years, Working Paper, Columbia Business School (2010) (here, the control sample consists of firms not targeted by activist hedge funds but are otherwise similar in size, book-to-market and industry); Nicole M. Boyson and Robert Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 Rev. Deriv. Res. 169 (2011) (here, the control sample consists of firms not targeted by activist hedge funds but are otherwise similar in size, book-to-market and industry); and April Klein and Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund on the Target Firm’s Existing Bondholders, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1735 (2011) (here, the control sample consists of firms not targeted by activist hedge funds but otherwise similar in bond rating, liquidity, maturity and industry).

128 See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1753.

firms of activist hedge funds have lower bankruptcy risk than a control sample of non-targeted firms that are matched by size, book-to-market and industry.\footnote{See Klein and Zur (2009) supra note 127, at 203-204.}

One common argument made by proponents of hedge fund activism is that these interventions result from agency problems between corporate managers and their dispersed shareholders. Under this argument, managers exploit free cash flow by sub-optimally investing in negative net present value projects, rather than dispersing cash to shareholders via dividends or share repurchases.\footnote{See Michael C. Jensen, \textit{Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers}, 76. Amer. Eco. Rev. 323 (1986).} From this perspective, cutting back on wasteful R&D and capital expenditure programs maximizes shareholder value. Similarly, increasing leverage substantially and forcing managers to focus on servicing this debt is one way to reduce free cash flow problems. If this managerial agency argument is valid and fairly characterizes the targets of activism, then one would expect to find that target firms would have higher capital expenditures, higher wasteful R&D expenditures, lower dividends and stock buybacks, and lower leverage than a control sample of firms not targeted by activists. Although some studies support this thesis, the majority do not report evidence of changes in real variables consistent with this free cash flow hypothesis. For example, some studies have found that target firms of activist hedge fund investors have less leverage,\footnote{See Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, at 181; Hamao, Kutsuna, and Matos, supra note 127, at 18.} whereas others have found similar or higher leverage\footnote{See Clifford, supra note 127, at 330; Klein and Zur (2011), supra note 127, at 1751.} than the control sample. Similarly, one study found that target firms of activist hedge fund investors
have lower dividend payouts,\(^{134}\) whereas another found similar dividends,\(^{135}\) in comparison to the control sample.

To sum up, although many generalizations have been advanced about the characteristics of target firms, the evidence consistently supports only the generalization that targets of activism often tend to have a lower Tobin’s Q and a “value” orientation, but these characteristics are not, by themselves, proof of poor managerial performance or high agency costs.

B. Does Hedge Fund Activism Create Value? For ease of exposition, in this subsection, we subdivide the evidence into two parts, based on whether the measurement period is the short run (a few days) or the long run (a few years).

1. Short-horizon event studies of stock returns: Many studies have examined what happens to targets firm’s stock price when there is a Schedule 13D filing with the SEC. The date of filing is called the event date, and the studies examine whether a target firm earns abnormal returns (generally defined as actual returns less returns adjusted for market movements) in the few days before and after the event date (called the “event window”). Most studies have found that target firms of activist hedge funds earn on average positive abnormal returns in the event window, although differences exist in the studies in their definition of event windows and the economic magnitude of the abnormal returns earned.\(^{136}\)

\(^{134}\) See Klein and Zur (2011), supra note 127, at 1751.

\(^{135}\) See Clifford, supra note 127, at 330.

\(^{136}\) For ease of exposition, let us define \([-x, +y]\) to be \(x\) days before the 13D filing, to \(y\) days after the filing. On this basis, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 7.2% abnormal returns in \([-10, +10]\), consisting of 3.2% abnormal returns in \([-10, -1]\), 2% in \([0, +1]\), and 2% in \([+2, +10]\); Klein and Zur (2009), supra note 127, find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average
There are two interpretive issues with the above results. First, although it is generally true that the average stock return performance around the event date is positive, substantial differences exist in the distribution of abnormal returns earned by target firms. A significant proportion of firms actually earned negative abnormal returns in the above studies. This finding implies a significant conflict between the goals of activists and corporations. Activists typically invest in many firms concurrently, resulting in superior fund performance even if only some of their targets earn substantial return performance. Corporations do not have this luxury of diversification, as they are invested only in themselves. Thus, the possibility of a negative return

7.2% abnormal returns in [-30, +30]; R. Greenwood and M. Schoar, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. Eco. 362 (2009), find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 3.5% market, size and momentum-adjusted abnormal returns in [-10, +5]; Clifford, supra note 118, finds that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 3.4% abnormal returns in [-2, +2]; Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 8.1% abnormal returns in [-25, +25], and 2.45% abnormal returns in [0, +25]; Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, supra note 7, find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 6% abnormal returns in [-20, +20]; Stuart Gillian and L. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. Fin. Eco. 275 (2000), find that target firms of institutional investors earned zero abnormal returns in [-1, +7]; M. Becht, J. Franks, C. Mayer and S. Rossi, Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3093 (2009), find a 5.74% market-adjusted abnormal return in [-5, +5]; and Hamao, Kutsuna and Matos, supra note 127, find that target firms of activist hedge funds earned on average 2% abnormal returns in [-5, +1].

137 Studies are cited supra at notes 127 and 136. For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, find that 38% of target firms of activist hedge funds earned negative abnormal returns. Consistent with this argument, the 25th percentile of their hedge fund targets earned -5.3% abnormal returns; Klein and Zur (2009), supra note 127, find that the 25th percentile of hedge fund targets earned -2.7% abnormal returns; Clifford, supra note 127, finds that 37.2% of target firms of activist hedge funds earned negative abnormal returns; and Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, supra note 136, find that 28.3% of target firms earned negative abnormal returns.
(particularly when the upside return may be only modest) may reasonably cause a board of directors to reject a strategy favored by a group of hedge funds.

Probably the best known example of such a financial disaster caused by aggressive intervention by hedge funds was the joint acquisition by Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust of over 26% of the stock of J.C. Penney. Most of this stock was purchased during the ten-day window under Section 13(d), and the two activists obtained board representation, forced the resignation of J.C. Penney’s incumbent CEO, and announced a new marketing philosophy. Although J.C. Penney’s stock rose initially, customers fled in droves, and J.C. Penney’s stock price fell some 59.5% over the period between the initial Schedule 13D filing and Ackman’s eventual resignation from the board.138

Beyond the distribution of returns (and the risk inherent in running an operating company without prior experience in the field), the second problem with much of the data on hedge fund activism is the missing evidence as to what causes the stock price gains that are observed. If the positive abnormal stock returns are attributable to actions by activists that reduce managerial agency problems, they should leave some trail. That is, there should be evidence about changed capital structure, reduced executive compensation, dividend payouts, or altered investments. Yet, most of the studies find that the positive abnormal returns are not statistically significantly related to changes in real variables that occur subsequently to the activists’ intervention.139

138 For a detailed review of Pershing Square’s failure (and hubris), see James Surowiecki, “When Shareholder Activism Goes Too Far,” The New Yorker, Aug. 15, 2013. Over the same period, the stock market soared, thus magnifying the loss.
139 For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, find no statistically significant relationship between the target’s abnormal returns and their governance and capital structure. But they find a positive
2. **Long-horizon stock return studies:** Two studies merit special attention. First, Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang find that buy and hold stock returns are on average positive in the three-years and five-years after the Schedule 13D filing.\(^{140}\) In doing so, they control for the returns on the market portfolio and the returns on small size, value and momentum portfolios (often referred to as the four-factor model of stock returns). These positive average long-horizon abnormal returns have also been found in other studies. \(^{141}\) However, when Bebchuk, Brav and relationship to business strategy and general purpose; Klein and Zur (2009), supra note 127, find no statistically significant relationship between the target’s abnormal returns and replacing the CEO, cutting CEO pay, and other corporate governance issues; Greenwood and Schoar, supra note 136, find no statistically significant relationship between the target’s abnormal returns and capital structure changes, corporate governance issues, corporate strategy reasons, or proposing a spinoff. Clifford, supra note 127, finds all activities other than selling part or whole of firm are not related to the target’s abnormal returns; Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, find no statistically significant relationship between the target’s abnormal returns and providing finance, changing capital structure, and changing the firm’s operations; Gillian and Starks, supra note 136, find a statistically insignificant relationship between the target’s abnormal returns and certain governance issues involving the board of directors, confidential voting, repeal of poison pill, and others. In one study, Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, supra note 136, find that target firm earned negative abnormal returns when the stated objective was to force restructuring, or replacing the Chairman or CEO.

\(^{140}\) Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, supra note 7, at 4-5.

\(^{141}\) Unless otherwise defined, let \([-x, +y]\) be \(x\) months before the Schedule 13D filing, to \(y\) months after the filing. On this basis, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, find that the average annualized market-adjusted holding period return in the period \([-1, \text{day of activist exit}]\) is 20.6\%, and the average size-adjusted holding period returns during the same period is 14.3\%; Greenwood and Schoar, supra note 136, find that the average market-, size- and momentum-adjusted holding period return in \([-1, +18]\) is 10.3\%; Clifford, supra note 127, finds that the average market-, size-, value- and momentum-adjusted holding period return in \([-1, +36]\) is 1.3\%; Khorana, Hoover,
Jiang examine the three-year and five-year calendar year returns before and after the filing date, they find them to be statistically insignificant from zero. This suggests that an activist investor cannot beat the performance of the four-factor stock return model.

A second study by Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner in 2015 provides a significantly different perspective.142 Going beyond simply reporting the impact of the announcement of a block’s formation (which in the U.S. occurs on the filing of the Schedule 13D),143 they uniquely focus on the outcome of the activists’ intervention. Unsurprisingly, they find that a successful outcome counts,144 but more surprisingly, they find that the market appears to value only a limited number of successful outcomes. When the outcome announced was a takeover, this announcement produced abnormal returns averaging 9.7%; similarly, announcement of restructuring produced abnormal returns of 5.6%; but changes in board composition yielded only a more modest average abnormal return of 4.5%.145 Finally payout changes (whether achieved through dividends or stock buybacks) resulted in a negative abnormal return of -0.2%.146

Shivdasani, Sigurdsson, and Zhang, supra note 129, find abnormal market-adjusted returns on [-1 month, 2 years] of 33.8%.

142 See Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, supra note 9. This study examines a large sample of 1,740 activist interventions, of which 1,125 were with respect to U.S. firms and 165 were U.K. firms. This article will limit itself to the North American context, where the data sample is larger and practices appear more standardized.

143 As with other studies, they find a positive abnormal return of 7% for U.S. firms over the twenty-day window around the filing of a Schedule 13D. Id at p. 2. This is consistent with other studies, including Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12.

144 Abnormal returns around the announcement of successful outcome averaged 6.4% across all countries and 6.0% in North America. Id at p. 3.

145 Id. at 3. “Restructuring” is a potentially vague word, but these authors define it to mean the “divestitures and spinoffs of non-core assets and blocking diversifying acquisitions.” See Table 6 at p. 56.
Much depended on whether there was a successful outcome; in the case of North American activist engagements, the value-weighted annualized returns were 6.6% for engagements with successful outcomes but minus 1.2% for engagements without such outcomes.\textsuperscript{147} In short, even though the majority of North American engagements do produce a successful outcome, there is clearly a downside. Unless the activist is pursuing a takeover or a restructuring, even successful activist engagements appear to yield only modest, if any, value for shareholders.

Finally, in all these studies, focusing only on the average abnormal returns may miss much of the story. A significant fraction of target firms earn \textit{negative} long-horizon abnormal returns. In fact, one study finds that a small majority of target firms (52\%) earn negative abnormal returns in the one-month before to one-year after the filing period,\textsuperscript{148} and another study (which has one author overlapping with the above Bebchuk study) corroborates this finding that a significant fraction of target firms earn negative abnormal returns.\textsuperscript{149}

C. \textbf{What Are the Sources of Gains From Activism?} In this subsection, we survey the evidence on the sources of shareholder gains from activism. To what extent are they the result of wealth transfers?

1. \textbf{Improvements in operating performance.} The evidence on whether the operating performance of target companies has improved due to activist hedge fund intervention is again mixed, with the preponderance of the studies finding no improvement. Operating performance is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Id. at p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{148} See Khorana, Hoover, Shivdasani, Sigurdsson, and Zhang, supra note 129, at 14.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, find that the 25\textsuperscript{th} percentile of their hedge fund targets earned -19.7\% in market-adjusted holding period returns and -25\% for size-adjusted holding period returns.
\end{itemize}
defined as the firm’s return on assets ("ROA"), and/or operating profits, and/or operating margins, and/or cash flows. Defining the year of the Schedule 13D filing as year t, studies have compared the differences in the operating performance of target firms in the years after filing to years before filing or the year of filing. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas conduct two sorts of matches. The first matching procedure, matches target firms by year to a similar industry, size and momentum firm. Interestingly, ROA and operating margins of target firms are better than the matched firm in year t-2, and then dip in the year of filing. By year t+2, the ROA and operating margins of target firms are once again better than the matched firm in similar fashion as in year t-2. This suggests that activist hedge funds target firms who were more profitable in years t-2, t+1, but that had short-term underperformance in year t. A similar pattern emerges when firms are matched by performance. Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang also report that targeted firms have a higher ROA and Tobin’s Q in the five years after intervention as compared to the year of intervention (or the previous year), but their data does not seem to clearly support their conclusions.

Conversely, Klein and Zur find no evidence that target firms of activist hedge funds had better operating profits than a control sample of firms measured one-year before and after filing.

150 Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1751.

151 Several studies do not control for differences with a sample of matched non-targeted firms, making their results difficult to interpret. For example, Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, supra note 9, does not control for industry or firm size.

152 See Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, supra note 7, at 8-12. Their Table 4, which reports ROA and Tobin’s Q over the six years that begin with the event year, shows only six out of twenty regression coefficients in the post-event year (or 30%) to be positive at the standard 95% confidence level. Thus, the majority of coefficients are not positive, which is hardly supportive of their conclusion. Id. at 12.
Schedule 13D. Clifford finds, however, that firms targeted by activists do experience a median increase in ROA in comparison to firms targeted by passive institutional investors, but he attributes this difference to the fact that firms targeted by activists tend to shed assets (rather than improve cash flow). Boyson and Mooradian find that target firms of active investors did not have a statistically different change in ROA (year after to year before filing) than control firms. A similar insignificant result is found for changes in cash flows. Although these studies differ slightly, all three—Klein and Zur, Clifford, and Boyson and Mooradian—find no significant improvement in cash flow at the targeted firm.

2. Increasing the Expected Takeover Premium. The Brecht, Franks, Grant and Wagner paper strongly implies that a successful takeover appears to be the outcome that most drives the abnormal long-term returns from activist engagements. Although restructurings also produce positive long-term abnormal returns in this study, this may reflect the same control premium source for the gains; that is, if a significant division is to be sold or spun off, it may produce an active auction that benefits shareholders by securing the highest premium that a control seeker will pay. Even in the case of short-term abnormal returns on the filing of a Schedule 13D, the simplest explanation may again be that activist firms are perceived to be putting the target “firm” in play and raising its expected takeover premium. Khorana, Hoover,

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153 See Klein and Zur, supra note 127, at 201.
154 See Clifford, supra note 127, at 330-331. He concludes: “Thus, the improvements in operational efficiency are caused by a reduction in firm assets, more so than an improvement in cash flow.” Id.
155 See Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, at 191.
156 Id. at 191.
157 See Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that activist’s engagements result in takeovers produce average abnormal gains of 9.7% while other outcomes produce much smaller returns).
Shivdasani, Sigurdsson and Zhang report that this is a common way for an activist firm to get higher value.\textsuperscript{158} They find that following an activist campaign more than 7\% of the targets that outperformed in the six month following the filing date were acquired or sold in the subsequent six months. Although 7\% may seem a low percentage, this acquisition frequency is three times higher for targets that underperformed following the activist campaign. In short, the market is sensing who might become an acquisition target and bidding up their price incrementally.

Similarly, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas find that the short-horizon abnormal stock returns are highest (8.54\%) when the activist hedge funds stated objective is to sell the company.\textsuperscript{159} Klein and Zur find short-horizon abnormal stock returns of 13.1\% when the hedge fund is seeking a sale of the company:\textsuperscript{160} Greenwood and Schoar find positive abnormal returns for targets that are ultimately acquired, and zero abnormal returns when targets remain independent;\textsuperscript{161} and Clifford finds positive abnormal returns when the target firms sell themselves to another firm.\textsuperscript{162} All told, this evidence suggests that changes in the expected takeover premium, more than operating improvements, account for most of the stock price gain, both in short-term and long-term studies.

3. \textbf{Wealth transfers.} Definitionally, the value of the target firm is the sum of the value of its debt and equity. Can the higher stock returns found in the above studies be a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders? Klein and Zur suggest that this may be the case.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{158} See Khorana, Hoover, Shivdasani, Sigurdsson and Zhang, supra note 129, at 14.

\textsuperscript{159} See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1758.

\textsuperscript{160} See Klein and Zur (2009), supra note 127, at 210.

\textsuperscript{161} See Greenwood and Schoar, supra note 136, at 368.

\textsuperscript{162} See Clifford, supra note 127, at 328.

\textsuperscript{163} See Klein and Zur (2011), supra note 127, at 1735.
They find that the average abnormal bond returns 10-days before and one-day after the filing date is negative (-3.9%). Furthermore, the average abnormal bond returns for one-year after the filing date is an additional -4.5%. Finally, the study finds that the abnormal stock returns are negatively related to the abnormal bond returns at both the short-term and long-term intervals. This last result convincingly shows that there is a wealth transfer from bond holders to shareholders.

It is also possible that there is wealth transfer from the target firm’s employees to their shareholders. This could be from reduction in the employees promised pension payouts or salary reductions or layoffs. Brav, Jiang and Kim find that the workers of target firms do not benefit from hedge fund activism.\textsuperscript{164} Although their productivity rises, there is stagnation in their wages and only insignificant changes in the hours worked.

4. **Reduction in managerial agency problems.** If positive abnormal stock returns occur because of the actions of hedge fund activists in reducing managerial agency problems, then there should be observable changes in real variables, including changes in corporate governance, reduction of excessive managerial compensation, movement away from non-optimal capital structures, etc. However, most of the evidence shows that the positive abnormal returns are not statistically significantly related to such changes, even if they were stressed by the activist hedge fund in its Schedule 13D filing.\textsuperscript{165}


\textsuperscript{165} See studies cited supra at note 127.
D. **Do the Targets of Hedge Fund Activism Experience Post-Announcement Changes in Real Variables?** In this sub-section we summarize the evidence found in the various studies that examine whether the target firms experienced changes in real variables after filing Schedule 13Ds when compared to a control sample of non-target firms. In summary, we find neither a positive relationship between abnormal stock price returns and changes in real variables nor any consistent evidence of a directional change in the target’s firm variables when compared to the control sample.

1. **Risk.** Klein and Zur find that the target’s idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, or risk, goes up post-filing when compared to the target’s pre-filing risk.\(^\text{166}\)

2. **Leverage.** Some studies have found leverage to increase\(^\text{167}\) after the Schedule 13D filing when compared to before the Schedule 13D filing, but other studies find no statistically significant increase or decrease in leverage.\(^\text{168}\) Thus, although the evidence on leverage seems to be mixed, increases in leverage, which a number of studies find, is consistent with an explanation that hedge fund activism transfers wealth from bondholders to shareholders.

3. **Investment expenditures.** Boyson and Mooradian and Klein and Zur both find no statistical change in capital expenditure and R&D expenses before and after the Schedule 13D filing as compared to a control sample.\(^\text{169}\) In contrast, in a more recent study, Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang focus on a subsample of “investment-limiting” activist interventions that are followed by substantially increased leverage, higher payouts to shareholders, or reduced long-term

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\(^{166}\) See Klein and Zur (2011), supra note 127, at 1751.

\(^{167}\) See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1772; Klein and Zur (2011), supra note 127, at 1751.

\(^{168}\) See Clifford, supra note 127, at 330; Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, at 191.

\(^{169}\) See Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, at 192; Klein and Zur (2009), supra note 127, at 201.
investments over the two years following the year of intervention.\footnote{See Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, supra note 7, at 60-64 (noting that 19% of activist interventions qualify as “investment-limiting” interventions under their strict criteria).} To identify these cases, they classify an activist intervention as “investment limiting” if it falls into one of the three following subcategories (each of which involves extreme departures from the norm): a) the increase in R&D and capital expenditure from the base year (t-1) to year t, t+1 or t+2 falls within the bottom five-percent of all firms in that year; (b) the increase in payout yield (including therein both dividends and share buybacks) from the base year (t-1) to any of the three following years (t, t+1, and t+2) falls within the top 5% of payout increases among all public companies in that year; or (c) the increase in leverage from the base year to any of the three following years falls within the top 5% of leverage increases among all public companies in that year. In short, each of these subcategories involves not just a company cutting research and capital expenditures, or increasing leverage or payout to shareholders, but doing so by such a degree as to make it into the top (or bottom) 5% of all public companies in that year.

Given the extreme selectivity of their criteria (i.e., they are in effect defining the bull’s eye of a broader target), their most important and eye-opening finding may be that 19% of all activist interventions fall into one of these extreme subcategories, and about 25% of these interventions fall into two or more of these subcategories.\footnote{Id. at 61 and n. 95.} Had their categories been moderately expanded to include the top (or bottom) 10% of all public companies, one wonders how many more hedge fund interventions would have been captured. Even on their highly selective basis, the conclusion seems inescapable that activist interventions (or at least many of
them) are associated with a decline in research and development and long-term investment. Our earlier Allergan example does not then stand alone as an idiosyncratic outlier.

But these interventions may boost profits. In particular, Bebchuck, Brav, and Jiang assert that ROA and Tobin’s Q are positively related to year dummy variables t through year t+5, and they suggest that this shows that so called “investment-limiting” actually lifts profits. Their data, however, does not prove clearly this claim because only a small minority of their results are positively related to ROA. Indeed, in the case of Tobin’s Q, the coefficients are often negative and the positive coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting that when activist hedge funds increase leverage and shareholder payouts and decrease R&D, Tobin’s Q actually falls.

4. Growth. On the one hand, it is arguable that activist hedge funds can use their managerial and industry expertise and access to capital to accelerate the growth of target firms. On the other hand, the activists can sell assets and slow down the fast-growing target firms. Boyson and Mooradian find no statistical change in the growth of sales or asset size, whereas Klein and Zur (2011) found the size of assets to decrease.

5. Payouts. Clifford, and Klein and Zur find no statistical change in the level of payouts after the Schedule 13D filing when compared to before the Schedule 13D filing. In

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172 Id. at 64.

173 Id. at 63. Their Table 14 shows only one out of 20 regression coefficients in the post-event period to be positive and statistically significant at the standard 95% confidence level.

174 Boyson and Mooradian, supra note 127, at 191.


176 Clifford, supra note 127, at 330.

contrast to the above four studies, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas find payouts to increase after the Schedule 13D filing as compared to before the Schedule 13D filing.\(^{178}\)

6. **Cash.** Clifford finds no statistical change in the level of payouts after the Schedule 13D filing when compared to before the Schedule 13D filing,\(^{179}\) but Klein and Zur\(^ {180}\) find cash levels to go down.

E. **An Initial Evaluation.** Some of the inconsistencies among these studies may be the result of timing differences. More recent studies (such as both Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang and Allaire and Dauphin) find leverage increases and reductions in R&D and long-term investment, while earlier studies did not.

Overall, the evidence is (1) clear that there is a short-term positive stock price reaction to a Schedule 13D’s filing, (2) unclear that there is any significant positive long-term price reaction (except when a takeover or restructuring is planned), and (3) doubtful that operating performance improves after activist interventions.

The question of who is targeted also produces generally consistent findings: namely, companies with a low Tobin’s Q and a “value” orientation. But little evidence suggests that these firms are industry laggards. Finally, even if we use severe and demanding criteria (as Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang do), it appears that many (and possibly most) activist interventions increase leverage and shareholder payout, while reducing R&D and long-term investment.

V. **Implications**

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\(^{178}\) Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 1771.

\(^{179}\) Clifford, supra note 127, at 330.

The appearance of the “wolf pack” has fundamentally changed corporate governance and the nature of shareholder activism. The data shows this in three ways: (1) “wolf packs” acquire significantly higher stakes than other shareholder activists;\(^ {181}\) (2) the announcement of a “wolf pack” engagement produces a significantly higher return over the window period around this disclosure;\(^ {182}\) and (3) the probability of a “wolf pack” achieving at least one of its intended outcomes is also much higher than in the case of individual activists.\(^ {183}\)

Much of the success of the “wolf pack” as a tactic may derive from its ability to escape transparency because the “wolf pack” enjoys apparent freedom to (i) delay disclosure of material share acquisitions, (ii) form de facto “groups” without any disclosure, and (iii) enter into specially designed partnerships with strategic bidders that essentially tip the bid to the hedge fund investor (who still accepts no responsibility to join in the bid). It is far from clear to us that American corporate and securities law needs to roll out such a red carpet to activists seeking in this fashion to increase leverage and reduce R&D. Today, a formidable “wolf pack” of activist hedge funds can be assembled more quickly and with less disclosure in the United States than may be possible in the other major capital markets.

\(^{181}\) In the most recent study, “wolf packs” appear to acquire 13.4% as compared to 8.3% by other activists. See Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, supra note 9, at 32.

\(^{182}\) During the event window (-20,20) around the disclosure of the “wolf pack” (i.e., on the filing of the Schedule 13D in the U.S.), the abnormal returns are roughly 14% in the case of a “wolf pack” as opposed to 6% for other activists. Id at 32.

\(^{183}\) Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, supra note 9, find that the probability of achieving at least one successful outcome is 78% for the “wolf pack” versus 46% for other activists. Id. at 32. Allaire and Dauphin, supra note 9, place the probability of success at 75.7% in their sample of hedge fund activists. See Allaire and Dauphin, supra note 9. Both reinforce each other and the conclusion that the “wolf pack” is nearly unstoppable.
This gives rise to three different sets of concerns: First, the “wolf pack” can be used to effect a “creeping control” acquisition in which ordinary shareholders receive no control premium, as they sell out during the window period to informed purchasers. Second, activists do not always need to have a superior strategy, because they may seek to launch an activist campaign simply to roil the waters in the belief that noisy activism will be read by the market as signaling a possible takeover or a major liquidity event. That is, some activists may be motivated to launch corporate governance campaigns, based less on the inherent merits of their policy proposals than on the high probability that those who purchase shares in the target firm before the filing of a Schedule 13D will profit handsomely on its filing and thereafter be able to exit quickly. This possibility of a relatively riskless profit that is divorced from the merits of the policy proposal concerns us because it may encourage pretextual corporate governance campaigns, based on the premise that noise generates profit.

Third and most troubling is the concern that hedge fund activism may carry with it an externality: a systemic decrease in the investment by targeted firms in research and development. Examining the Wall Street Journal-Fact Set Activism database, Allaire and Dauphin focus on R&D expenses of firms targeted by hedge fund activists and report the following decline in such expenditures by them as a percentage of sales.184

184 See Allaire and Dauphin, supra note 9.
Of course, the significance of this decline can be debated, and many financial economists may view this as evidence that management’s bias towards expansion and empire building is being successfully curbed. Yet, in light of the Allergan and Dupont cases discussed earlier, we are skeptical of such facile explanations.

In this light, two different views of contemporary shareholder activism are possible. The first view, held almost as a matter of faith by some academics, sees activists as far-sighted investors who carefully monitor managements and seek to market new ideas for enhancing shareholder value to their fellow shareholders. The second and alternative perspective views activists’ ideas as secondary to their ability to assemble a sizeable block before announcing a campaign that will predictably raise the expected takeover premium associated with that stock. In this view, noise (at least if it comes from a vociferous insurgent) moves the market.
Moreover, if the median activist holds for only 266 days,\textsuperscript{185} it is difficult to understand how such activists can implement meaningful organizational change in that period.

We do not argue that one view is entirely correct and the other entirely wrong. Certainly, we do not suggest that most activists are pursuing governance changes just to roil the markets. Still, the downside risk is serious if long-term investments are excessively discouraged. If so, are there policy measures that could reduce the perverse incentive to launch an activist campaign simply to signal that the company was “in play,” without discouraging all such campaigns? What reforms might achieve some good, while also doing the least harm? We next survey some policy options:

A. **Closing the Section 13(d) Window.** In the United Kingdom (and elsewhere), the activist does not have the same ten-day window provided by Section 13(d)(1) before it must disclose its acquisition of a greater than 5% stake.\textsuperscript{186} Disclosure may be required within two business days. The shorter the window, the smaller the position that can be assembled. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to shorten the Williams Act’s ten-day window,\textsuperscript{187} and,

\textsuperscript{185} See text and note supra at note 72.

\textsuperscript{186} Disclosure of beneficial ownership must be filed within two trading days after crossing the 3% ownership level in the United Kingdom. See David Katz and Laura A. Mcintosh, “Corporate Governance Update: Section 13(d) Reporting Requirements Need Updating,” N.Y.L.J., March 22, 2014, at 4. In Australia, Germany and Hong Kong, the requirements range between two and four trading days. Canada requires “prompt disclosure” and limits additional share purchases until one business day after the required disclosure is made. Id. at 4-5. Although the U.S. was ahead of other countries in requiring beneficial ownership disclosure, they have surpassed us in the rigor of their current requirements.

\textsuperscript{187} Section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 amended Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize shortening its ten-day window to “such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule.” For a discussion of the events leading to this change, see Mitts, supra note 74, at 214-215.
unsurprisingly, the Wachtell Lipton firm promptly petitioned the SEC to exercise this authority.\(^{188}\) Their request was met by an outpouring of academic writing, advising the SEC not to do so.\(^{189}\) Among the reasons given were the following:

First, because hedge fund activists rarely acquire all the stock of the target, they cannot capture all the gains from their governance strategy and must share the gains with other shareholders.\(^{190}\) Closing the ten-day window would thus deny hedge fund activists the opportunity to make a sufficient profit from their campaign to motivate them properly to maximize shareholder value.

Second, the empirical evidence does not show any new trend toward increased accumulations by hedge fund activists (or anyone else) during the ten-day window. Rather, one well-known study reports that the size of pre-disclosure accumulations by those filing the Schedule 13D “has remained relatively stable throughout the 14-year period” that they study.\(^{191}\) In fact, most of the stock acquired by the activists who file a Schedule 13D at the end of the ten-day window is “concentrated on the day they cross the threshold as well as the following day.”\(^{192}\)


\(^{189}\) Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39 (2012); Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang, supra note 63; Gilson and Gordon, supra note 2.

\(^{190}\) See Bebchuk and Jackson, supra note 189, at 49-50.

\(^{191}\) See Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang, supra note 63, at 5.

\(^{192}\) Id. at *6.
Third, given the “proliferation of low-threshold poison pills in the United States” (i.e., poison pills with a threshold of 15% or lower), shortening the ten-day window would subject activists to defensive tactics that locked them into no more than a 10% to 15% stake, possibly making it more difficult to win a proxy contest from such a reduced base.\textsuperscript{193}

Fourth, a shortened window for the purposes of Williams Act reporting would also be costly to non-activist investors, who may greatly outnumber hedge fund activists.\textsuperscript{194}

Although none of these arguments can be ignored, each seems overstated. First, although it is true that a hedge fund cannot capture all the gains from a corporate governance campaign, such an activist also avoids taking all of the risk. Instead, a hedge fund that stops below 10% (as most do) maintains a portfolio that has at least some diversification. If the median stake of the activist hedge fund under the current ten-day window is only 6.3% (as these scholars find\textsuperscript{195}), and if the lead activist concentrates its purchases on the day that it crosses the 5% threshold and the next day (as they apparently do\textsuperscript{196}), this failure to exploit the full ten-day period was a voluntary choice that shows that activists did not want to assume the risk of a larger position. In short, even under the current and permissive ten-day window, individual hedge fund activists generally stay below the 10% level, and thus it appears that economic, legal and financial considerations constrain them independent of the length of the statutory window for

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{193} Id.
\textsuperscript{194} Id. at *5.
\textsuperscript{195} Id. at *3.
\textsuperscript{196} Id. at *6 (“Their purchases are likely concentrated on the day they cross the threshold as well as the following day”).
\end{footnotesize}
SEC reporting.\textsuperscript{197} Even a high-risk hedge fund may feel compelled to stop short of risking all (or most of) its portfolio on one transaction (and thus one roll of the proverbial dice).

The bottom line then is that the Williams Act (and its statutory window) are not placing a legal ceiling on the maximum stake that a hedge fund activist can acquire, but other factors may do this. As a result, hedge funds may prefer to share the gains among themselves by using an organizational structure that unites a number of funds into a loosely knit organization (i.e., the “wolf pack”) that may acquire 30% or more of the target. Although the lead hedge fund may not fully exploit the gains in the transaction it leads, it may receive reciprocal treatment from other hedge funds that later invite it to join it to their “wolf packs.”\textsuperscript{198}

Second, if the principal hedge fund activists buy mainly on the day they cross the 5% threshold and the next day (as these scholars find\textsuperscript{199}), shortening the ten-day window to two business days would not prejudice them to any significant degree. Apparently, they could do the same even under a two business day window. More importantly, however, the finding announced by these scholars that pre-disclosure accumulations have not increased is incomplete and misses the forest for the trees. It may be that the lead hedge fund usually stops short of 10%, but the rest of the “wolf pack” on a collective basis does not. Because these other and allied

\textsuperscript{197} As previously discussed, Section 16(b) is one such factor. Fear of illiquidity may be another. We, of course, acknowledge that large blocks (such as the 26.7% acquired in the J.C. Penney’s battle) can be acquired during the ten-day window. See discussion supra at note 74. But these are the exception, not the rule.

\textsuperscript{198} This is an unexplored area, and we express no firm conclusion. But norms of reciprocity characterize many areas of commercial life. Thus, before we accept the thesis advanced by Bebchuk and Jackson that the activist “hedge fund” is undercompensated for its efforts to increase shareholder value, we would want to know more about the possibility of reciprocity within the hedge fund community.

\textsuperscript{199} See Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang, supra note 63, at *6.
activists never concede being a “group,” they never disclose publicly their holdings. Hence, the reported finding that pre-announcement purchases have not increased focuses only (and myopically) on those who report in the Schedule 13D and ignores the rest of the “wolf pack.” This is akin to measuring the size of an iceberg by examining only that portion that floats above the water and ignoring the much greater magnitude below. In the Sotheby’s litigation, the rest of the “wolf pack” brought the total ownership in Sotheby’s up from 9.6% to nearly 33%. In short, empirical research that focuses only on the disclosed ownership ignores the reality of the “wolf pack’s” aggregate stake, which remains out of sight—but may tip the balance in a proxy contest. To be sure, if the ten-day window were shortened to two business days (i.e., the British approach), these hidden allies would still not be disclosed under the existing rules on “grouphood.” Still, the “wolf pack” leader would have much less time to assemble them or to tip other expected allies of its plans. Hence, the “wolf pack” might be smaller.

Finally, while shortening the ten-day window might impact some non-activist investors, these investors have the option of filing a Schedule 13G (which is filed on an annual basis) so long as they do not attempt to seek to “change or influence” control. In short, non-activist investors have little to fear from a partial closing of the ten-day window.

To sum up, the arguments against “closing the window” work only if one assumes both that activists are the hero of the story and that they generate value for all shareholders.

200 See text and notes supra at notes 73 to 74.
201 Under SEC Rule 13d-1(b)(1), a person otherwise obligated to file a Schedule 13D may instead file a shorter Schedule 13G if “such person has acquired such securities in the ordinary course of business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.” See 17 C.F.R. § 290.13d-1(b)(1)(i). A Schedule G need only be filed within 45 days after the end of the calendar in which the person became obligated to file.
Neither assumption seems sound, at least without substantial qualification. Nor does the fear that closing the window will chill activism sound convincing. Activists are reaping record returns at present; the number of such campaigns is accelerating; and fears for their future seem premature.

Even the alleged gains from activism are debatable because the gains that activists make in trading on asymmetric information (before the Schedule 13D’s filing) come at the expense of selling shareholders. This behavior may be lawful, but it represents another wealth transfer. Disclosure that is delayed ten days enables activists to profit from trading on asymmetric information over that period, and the abnormal share turnover over this window period suggests that this is occurring.\(^{202}\) For example, others have estimated that Pershing Square and Vornado made a $230 million gain based on buying 26.7% of J.C. Penney at a discount to the price Penney’s stock rose to on disclosure of their ownership.\(^{203}\) Furthermore, evidence suggests such asymmetric trading harms other investors (not just the sellers), both by reducing liquidity and widening the bid-ask spread.\(^{204}\) Closing or shortening the ten-day window is the simplest, most feasible means of restricting such trading (and primarily by parties—i.e., the tippees of the lead hedge fund—who were not responsible for the original idea). By shortening the ten-day window, new rules would primarily impact and chill not trading by the lead hedge fund (whose trading seems to culminate on the first day after it crosses the 5% threshold\(^{205}\)), but

\(^{202}\) See the chart supra in the text at note 67.

\(^{203}\) See Mitts, supra note 74, at 204.

\(^{204}\) For an overview, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 443, 469-470 (2001) (citing studies).

\(^{205}\) See text and note supra at note 67 (citing Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note 12, at 6).
trading by its allies and tippees in the “wolf pack.” These may be exactly the parties that public policy most wants to deter.206

At present, the SEC seems to have backed off of its original intent to shorten the Williams Act’s ten-day window.207 This may be because the SEC has been overwhelmed by the task of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act or because it wanted to avoid an unexpectedly controversial issue. Various compromises have been suggested, but none seem likely to be adopted.208 Still, if the SEC is reluctant to act, this does not mean that the same outcome cannot be achieved by private ordering. Shortly, we will propose what we call a “window closing” poison pill and suggest that courts should accept it under certain circumstances.

B. Expanding the Definition of Insider Trading. If a hedge fund’s tipping to its prospective allies of its prospective Schedule 13D filing and/or its proxy campaign permits the exploitation of asymmetric information (as the law today seemingly does), a logical response might be to expand the definition of insider trading, either by statute or by SEC rule, to reach it. Some have urged this. Nonetheless, of the various possible reforms, we believe this would be

206 These silent allies are essentially “free riders” who do not need to receive an attractive return in order to encourage efficient monitoring.

207 In the Fall of 2013, the SEC indicated that it was “withdrawing this item from the Unified Agenda because it does not expect to consider this item in the next 12 months, but the Commission may consider the item at a future date.” See Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang, supra note 63, at *3 n.3 (quoting the Commission’s website).

208 One such proposal is that the length of the Schedule 13D window should be left to the target company’s shareholders to determine. See Mitts, supra note 74, for this proposal. Of course, once shareholder choice is legitimized, some may argue that shareholders should be able to opt out entirely from any disclosure of beneficial ownership or to specify a lengthy (say, six months) window that would make disclosure meaningless. Nonetheless, if the default rule were two business days (i.e., the British rule) and if shareholders could vote to extend this period to up to ten days (the current period), the net effect would probably chill “wolf pack” formation.
the worst option to pursue. In our judgment, it would vastly overextend the reach of the insider trading prohibition.

At present, insider trading generally requires a breach of some duty. Either an insider has breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders or an outsider has misappropriated information belonging to another. Eliminating this requirement extends enormously the reach of the insider trading prohibition. Indeed, the term “insider trading” would become a misnomer, because the law would actually prohibit “outsider trading.” Merely the use of material, nonpublic information would become criminal.

All that said, there remains one important respect in which insider trading law could be safely expanded. This is the context addressed by Rule 14e-3, which applies only to tender offers and uniquely does not require proof of a fiduciary breach.209 Its currently uncertain reach is illustrated in the Allergan litigation.210 Although the Allergan court found “serious questions” in that case about Valeant’s tipping to Pershing Square of its proposed bid for Allergan,211 no ultimate decision was reached. Transaction planners may attempt to respond to Allergan by tinkering with the relationship between the bidder and the hedge fund, increasingly slightly the investment by the hedge fund in the bid to make it resemble more a “co-offering person.” With each twist of the legal kaleidoscope, transaction planners can try to outflank Allergan and thereby create new ambiguities about whether the hedge fund/tippee should be exempt from Rule 14e-3.

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211 Id. at * 42.
14e-3, either because (1) it was a “co-offering person” with the strategic bidder, or (2) the bidder had not yet taken a “substantial step” toward launching a tender offer.  

These ambiguities could, and should, be cured by either a modified rule or by legislation. On a policy level it has long been accepted that insider trading on mergers and tender offers is particularly tempting, pervasive, and unjustified. But the line between acquisition by merger and acquisition by tender offer is both razor thin and normatively meaningless. Indeed, once an acquisition proposal is accepted, it usually is in the interests of both sides to turn a merger proposal into a friendly tender offer to accelerate the process and thereby discourage possible third party bids. Hence, Rule 14e-3 should be expanded to cover trading on material, non-public information about either a tender offer or any other form of acquisition by which control over the target company would pass.

This still leaves open the question of who is the bidder. Here, the facts of the Valeant/Pershing Square alliance show how artfully the parties can attempt to exploit the  

212 Rule 14e-3 is applicable and bars trading on material information only once the bidder has taken a “substantial step” to make the tender offer. See Rule 14e-3(a), 17 C.F.R 240.143-3(a).

213 Legislation could simply expand § 14(e) to give the SEC authority to adopt rules relating to the use of material information about all forms of acquisitions (mergers as well as tender offers or “creeping control” acquisitions). An expanded SEC rule under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act would probably need to require an ultimate tender offer to confer jurisdiction on the SEC, but could be phrased to require only a “substantial step” toward any form of acquisition at the time of the trade, if eventually a tender offer was made.

214 The likelihood of gain to the buyer is much higher in this context than in the context of trading on future earnings (where the market may already have incorporated into price some or all of the projected increase in earnings).

215 Legislation could simply authorize the SEC to adopt rules relating to trading on any form of acquisition based on material nonpublic information, whether or not the information was acquired by means of a fiduciary breach or a misappropriation from any person.
ambiguities in current law by having the hedge fund make some investment in the bidder. In response, the best answer is a bright-line rule: a hedge fund or other investor should not be deemed a “co-offering person” (and thus exempt from insider trading rules) unless it joins fully in making the tender offer and has joint and several liability for its payment. This would preclude most hedge funds from making a modest contribution to the strategic bidder in return for advance knowledge of the bid—a tactic that is hard to distinguish from paying a bribe for a tip.

C. Redefining Group. To the extent that the “wolf pack” is the tactic that has most fueled proxy activism, its feasibility depends on the ability of the lead hedge fund to disclose to allies its prospective Schedule 13D filing and/or proxy campaign without such communication making them members of a “group” for purposes of Section 13(d)(3). Once alerted to a material development that will boost the target’s stock price, other hedge funds have little reason to resist trading in this stock.

But what if the act of trading on such information made them a member of a §13(d) “group”? The consequence of using the fact of a tip (or gift of information) from the lead activist to another as at least a major criterion in the definition of “group” would be that the existence of the “wolf pack” would have to be disclosed at a much earlier stage (and the disclosure might have to be amended as each additional member “joined” the team). Some investors would not want to join the “group” (possibly for fear of liability) and may not invest. Also, any poison pill adopted by the target in response to this disclosure would restrict all the “group” members, holding them to their disclosed stake. In short, the “wolf pack” could less easily grow to the size it reached in the Sotheby’s case. The proxy contest would thus be a closer battle.
The problem with this proposal is that it has little support in the case law. But this does not mean that the SEC could not adopt such a rule or—even more plausibly—that Congress could not so legislate. Unlike simply shortening the ten-day window, this approach directly addresses the perceived unfairness in passing material, non-public information to a selected few and brings the hidden allies out into the open. Still, it is by no means a “showstopper.” The leader of the “wolf pack” could still buy the target’s stock until it crossed the 5% threshold and then quickly tip its allies who could buy heavily during whatever period remained before the Schedule 13D filing disclosed their “group.” Its impact would likely be only to reduce the size and ownership of the “wolf pack” before it was disclosed (and allow the target to take more effective defensive steps).

D. Focusing on the Proxy Advisor. In Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20, issued earlier this year, the SEC has at last focused on the phenomenon of near total deference given by some institutional investors to ISS. But it has still done little, essentially requiring only some additional monitoring.

What more could it reasonably do? A number of steps are possible. For example, the SEC could require a mutual fund to disclose to its shareholders that the fund had automatically adopted ISS’s voting recommendations (or at least disclose the actual percentage of all votes in which it followed its proxy advisor). This might embarrass some mutual funds, but it probably will have little effect on hedge funds, which hold smaller portfolios, behave very differently with respect to voting decisions, and may often be beyond the SEC’s jurisdictional reach. More

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216 See text and note supra at notes 41 to 42.

217 Hedge funds will generally not be subject to the Investment Company Act, and their investment advisers may not be registered with the SEC.
intrusive attempts at restricting proxy advisors by means other than increased disclosure could raise constitutional issues and in any event will probably not affect the outcomes in many proxy contests.

Still, another sensible reform might be to require the proxy advisor to publish an annual scorecard showing its voting recommendations on specific issues. For example, how often had it recommended a vote for the insurgents in a contested director election?

E. Private Ordering. Although the antagonists in the debate over shortening the ten-day window under the Williams Act tend to present the issue as one critical to the fate of contemporary corporate governance, we doubt that that such a reform (or any of the other reforms proposed in this section) would truly have decisive impact. In the case of a tender offer for a target at a premium (such as the recent bid for Allergan), we expect these reforms would not change the likely outcome. Shareholders will predictably vote for a lucrative takeover if given the chance, and the target’s best hope is the “white knight.”

What then could be achieved? These reforms might reduce the possibility of “creeping control” acquisitions and the incentive for a pretextual governance campaign that is grounded less on the value of the proposed governance change than on the hope that a “noisy” signal will produce a short-term gain based on the market’s perception of an increased prospect of a takeover. But these reforms will not much affect a real takeover. So viewed, they may (a) reduce the incentive to create noise for its own sake, and (b) reduce the gains from trading on asymmetric information. But these will be marginal changes.

Private ordering responses might be more effective, but they also carry risks. Two illustrations merit consideration. First, corporations fearful of a “wolf pack” could adopt a “standing” poison pill that would preclude any shareholder (with some possible exemption for
“passive” shareholders) from exceeding a specified level (either 15% or possibly 10%), and such a poison pill could broadly define its coverage so as to apply to any persons “acting in concert” or “in conscious parallelism” with the leader of the “wolf pack.” The goal here is to define “group” for purpose of the poison pill much more broadly than the case law under the Williams Act has done in order to include persons who receive advance information of a Schedule 13D filing from a party making that filing (or an agent thereof). Such a pill will create considerable uncertainty and place high demands on courts. Thus, we think a second alternative is preferable. A “window-closing” poison pill could be designed that would be triggered by ownership of as little as 5.1% of the target’s stock if the acquirer did not file a Schedule 13D before purchasing stock in excess of the specified threshold. By exceeding 5.1% without a prior filing, the acquirer would face significant dilution.

These more sweeping poison pills would impede the wolf pack’s formation, but would be subject to legal challenge and would anger the proxy advisors (who might recommend that institutions withhold their votes for the directors of this corporation). For this reason, some compromises might intelligently be struck in designing such a poison pill. For example, a “window-closing” poison pill that denied the bidder the ability to delay its Schedule 13D filing for the ten day window period permitted by the Williams Act might compensate for its short fuse

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218 We have been advised by Charles Nathan, a leading expert in the M&A field, that such a poison pill has been designed by the law firm of Latham & Watkins LLP. Our suggestion is to focus less on an ineffable concept such as “conscious parallelism” and more on a concrete act, such as tipping.

219 The point of this variant is to deny the acquirer the Williams Act’s ten-day window, because the failure to file a Schedule 13D promptly after crossing 5% would trigger the pill. We have been advised that such a pill has been drafted by the law firm of Fried, Frank, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. We express no views on the validity of these pills in specific contexts, as each context needs to be analyzed on its own facts.
by allowing the bidder to accumulate a greater level of stock (say, 15 or 20%), so long as it filed with the SEC immediately after crossing 5%. Or, as in the Sotheby’s case,\textsuperscript{220} it might permit a 100% bid to be made. Either concession should lead the Delaware courts to accept such a pill, because neither pill is “preclusive.”\textsuperscript{221} The bottom line is that private initiatives by determined targets could both “close” the current ten day window and render irrelevant the inadequacies in the current case law’s definition of “group.” In short, most of what can be done by regulation can also be done by private ordering.

Once, a clear academic consensus existed that takeover defensive measures reduced shareholder value, but today fissures are appearing in that consensus. Some recent studies find defensive measures to increase value for some companies.\textsuperscript{222} Even more ironically, the staggered board (long the target of universal academic scorn) has been cast in a new light by recent research. Employing Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, one study of the period 1978-2011 finds that destaggering the board reduces firm value, while staggering the board results in

\textsuperscript{220} See Third Point LLC. v. Ruprecht, supra note 66. Sotheby’s used a two-tier poison pill, but exempted any 100% bid that was kept open for a specified period (so that management had some time to seek a white knight bidder). The pill was upheld by the Delaware Chancery Court as a non-preclusive response to a “threat.”

\textsuperscript{221} Under contemporary Delaware law, a defensive tactic will generally only be enjoined when it is “preclusive.” See Unitrin Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 615 A. 2d 1361 (Del. 1995)(indicating that a defensive tactic will be enjoined when it is either “coercive” or “preclusive”). A poison pill that allows the potential acquirer to buy up to 15% (after appropriate disclosures) should not be viewed as “preclusive” because the acquirer can launch and win a proxy contest and then redeem the pill. Indeed, such a pill is less preclusive than the one upheld in the Sotheby’s litigation.

increasing value. The authors surmise that staggered boards might be beneficial for some companies because they commit shareholders to longer-term horizons. This association was strongest for firms with high R&D expenditures. The bottom line is that serious academic research now supports the view that staggered boards can provide stability and continuity that enhances shareholder value.

To be sure, it is probably already too late to save the staggered board, as momentum has gathered to purge it in all cases. Almost inevitably, resisting hedge fund activism will bring the company into conflict with its proxy advisors. Companies thus face a difficult choice between lying low or confronting the proxy advisor.

VI. Conclusion

For better or for worse, a transition appears today to be in progress from a “board-centric” system of corporate governance toward a “shareholder-centric” system. How far this transition will go remains in doubt, as are its likely consequences. Some herald this transition as paradigm-shifting and beneficial, while others warn that corporate governance as a result is

224 Id at 3, 4.
225 Id at 7-8.
226 For another such study finding a negative stock price reaction to de-staggering votes, see David F. Larcker, Gaizka Omazabal and Daniel J. Taylor, The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 431 (2011).
227 For an insightful discussion of the strains this transition is causing in Delaware corporate law (which is clearly “board-centric”), see J. Travis Laster and John Zebenkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 Bus. Law 33 (2015).

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becoming excessively focused on the short-run. This debate will continue, but we suspect it is still too early to reach bottom line judgments. Nonetheless, the appearance of the “wolf pack” represents an important, but problematic, milestone in this transition. Uncontroversial as the goal of enhancing shareholder power once seemed, it is increasingly likely that there can be different constituencies of shareholders, with shareholder behavior hinging on which constituency gains control.

Here, the “wolf pack” tactic essentially enables a majority of short-term and undiversified shareholders to gain de facto control, only to exit on average within a year after their appearance. At least sometimes, this majority will view issues differently than a majority of indexed (or at least largely diversified) shareholders. To be sure, the tactic may increase target firm value on the announcement of the wolf pack’s appearance, but long term gains seem to depend upon the tactic achieving one of two outcomes: a takeover or a restructuring.


229 For the typical holding periods of hedge fund activists, see text and note supra at note 72.

230 Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner find that “activism with outcomes generates value-weighted abnormal returns over the engagement period of 8.0 percent, compared with 2.3 percent for activism without outcomes.” Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, supra note 9, at 4. When returns are equal-weighted, “activism with outcomes generates annualized abnormal returns of just 1.1 percent, compared with minus 9.8 percent without. Id. Outcomes involving a takeover generate the highest returns (9.5 percent and 16.2 percent in the case of North American engagements), but
changes in corporate governance or payout practices produce little impact, and if a takeover or restructuring does not result, the expected takeover premium for the target firm will eventually erode. In this light, the “wolf pack” profits by increasing the expected takeover premium, and functionally it achieves what the earlier “bust-up” takeover of the 1980s did: namely, realize the negative synergy in breaking up a conglomerate firm.

But this gain may come at considerable cost. The clearest of these costs is the reduction in R&D expenditures by targeted firms in subsequent years. R&D is most efficiently conducted within larger firms because the directions in which basic research will lead are often unpredictable. Thus, the larger firm is better positioned to exploit these opportunities than a smaller firm with a limited number of product lines. The policy issue then is whether the gains from realizing negative synergy in the short-run exceed the long-term losses from reduced investment in R&D. We do not assert that this question can be dispositively answered today, but it needs to be raised. Moreover, takeover gains and bust-up premiums do not necessarily reflect

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231 Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner find that “in all engagements, the returns crucially depend on the activist achieving outcomes.” Id at 4. In the case of North American engagements, they find that “engagements generate 6.6 percent with outcomes, and minus 1.2 percent without.” Id.

232 For example, in a still preliminary study, Allaire and Dauphin show that, based on a sample of recent targets that “survived” a campaign by hedge fund activists (i.e., they were not acquired), R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales declined at these firms by more than 50% over the period between 2009 and 2013. In contrast, a random sample of firms with similar market capitalizations saw R&D expenses, expressed on the same basis, modestly rise over the same period. See Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, supra note 9. These results likely understate the decline in R&D because targets that were acquired probably experienced an even greater decline in “R&D.”
economic efficiency, but may instead be the product of other factors, such as acquirers gaining market power or bidder overpayment.\textsuperscript{233}

Some will respond that our skepticism about whether the “wolf pack” truly enhances economic efficiency implies that we are criticizing shareholder democracy, because in their view the current shareholders must have the right to determine their own future, free from our paternalistic concerns about the long-term. Here, the debate approaches the heart of the matter, because the wolf pack (and hedge fund activism generally) is introducing a new and very different form of shareholder democracy: a temporary majority of “short-term” activists who are making decisions that will affect the firm long after they exit. Neo-classical finance theorists may deny that different constituencies of shareholders have different investment horizons or may assert that arbitrage will mitigate any such differences, but growing evidence suggests both that the composition of the shareholders owning the firm much affects the firm’s investment horizons and that there are significant limits to arbitrage.\textsuperscript{234}

These issues cannot be fully resolved here, but the appearance of a short-term majority is a distinctly new phenomenon. Traditionally, a majority of the shareholders meant a majority of the firm’s long-term equity holders. Until very recently, few shareholders bought stock in order to initiate a proxy contest. Although takeover bidders might buy stock in advance of a tender

\textsuperscript{233}One common explanation for takeover premiums is “bidder overpayment.” See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1989). Another is that the bidder is acquiring market power. Both imply that, even if the gains to target shareholders are high, the transaction may not be efficiency enhancing.

\textsuperscript{234}The work of Wharton Professor Brian Bushee is particularly relevant here. See Bushee, supra note 104; Bushee, supra note 105, and Bushee, supra note 2. Even within mainstream economics, there is an increased sense of the limits on arbitrage. See Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (1990).
offer, their purchases were constrained by the Williams Act’s disclosure rules and the poison pill. That has now changed, as the “wolf pack” today can effectively outflank both the Williams Act and the poison pill (as currently drafted). As a result, the old equilibrium has been destabilized by the prospect of the sudden appearance of a 25% to 30% (or greater) block that hovers on the brink of possessing control for the short run.235 Arguably, such a short-term majority resembles giving voting control of the corporation to its option holders, as both constituencies have incentives to undervalue long-term outcomes.236

Still, even if this short-term block will dissipate within a year or so, it can be argued that they are the majority, and their right to rule cannot be denied. Here, a basic distinction must be drawn. Although we recognize that there is no alternative to shareholder democracy, this does not mean that elections should be held daily (or whenever activists determine to launch a proxy contest on short notice). One can still debate the appropriate time, place and process for elections. By analogy, the President of the United States can be replaced by the voters every four years.237 That may or may not be the optimal period, but virtually no one would shorten this period to, say, six months. Any such change would result in a virtually constant election contest and much diversion of the President’s time.

By definition, subjecting management and the board to “immediate” accountability weakens executive authority. Even if one believes changing the balance of power between

235 With respect to this 25% figure, see text and note supra at note 73.
236 We do not mean to imply that activist hedge funds necessarily behave like option holders. But it is likely that they have shorter term horizons. See Bushee, supra note 2; Bushee, supra note 104, and Bushee, supra note 105.
237 Obviously, in Parliamentary systems, the period may be shorter if the prime minister loses a vote of “no confidence.” But this generally requires a prior election to change the balance of power within Parliament. Nor is the lesser stability of Parliamentary systems necessarily an advantage.
shareholders and managers is desirable, those empowered by the “wolf pack” are not all shareholders, but rather a short-term control block, composed largely of hedge funds and their allies, whose goal is usually the breakup of the target firm to realize its negative synergy.

What would be the impact if the “wolf pack” could threaten ouster constantly and at low cost? Speculative as predictions necessarily are, the fact that a high percentage of activist interventions seemed aimed at imposing “investment limiting” restrictions on management implies that a management subject to such discipline will likely shorten its investment horizons and shift to a more equivocal, risk-averse style of decision-making. Because activists resist growth in the size of the firm (i.e., “empire-building” in their lexicon), managements may approach corporate investment much like a gin rummy game: each time a card is picked up, another must be discarded. The result could be continual (and more rapid) shift in the assets in the corporation’s portfolio of assets. Investments that would not bear fruit over the short to medium term would be disfavored. This trend could become self-reinforcing. Once the scope of the firm’s business operations is narrowed, then a broad research and development capacity becomes progressively less justifiable, because, as it shrinks, the firm can develop less and less of the potential projects its research makes possible.

To the extent such a scenario seems plausible, it suggests the desirability of moderating any sudden transition. Probably, the simplest route to this end would be tax law changes that forced hedge funds to hold for a longer period to realize capital gains. But such changes are unlikely and beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we prefer increased transparency as the least dangerous means by which to ease any transition.
Here, we must observe that the case for strengthening shareholder power in the belief that to do so will always enhance economic efficiency is far from self-evident. A basic and problematic tradeoff must be recognized. Even if one concedes that management may well be biased in favor of corporate growth and expansion, management still has better information than do outsiders (including hedge funds). Curbing managerial discretion will thus preclude at least some efficient investments that are based on management’s superior knowledge. Exactly how this tradeoff between management’s self-interest and its superior knowledge balances out remains a very open question. We offer no general theory on what is optimal, either in terms of shareholder power, corporate leverage, or when investments in research and development become excessive. Nonetheless, we do observe that strong incentives are today pushing us toward higher leverage and reduced long-term investment.

In particular, we make two assertions about contemporary activism:

(1) The level of activism can become excessive to the extent that activism involves both relatively low cost and low risk (that is, to the extent that members of the “wolf pack” can exploit asymmetric information and anticipate an abnormal short-term gain on the Schedule 13D filing). In this environment, activists have little need to engage in longer-term reform or restructuring, but can seek simply to exit the target after the market’s response to the Schedule 13D and move on to the next activist intervention;

(2) A full accounting of the impact and costs of activism must focus on those firms not targeted, but still influenced. This has not been done to date. The danger exists that the general deterrent effect of hedge fund interventions is to discourage longer-term investment.

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238 For a largely unqualified endorsement of shifting the balance of power towards shareholders, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005)

239 In a nutshell, this is why insider trading is unlawful—because management does have superior information.
horizons and, more specifically, investment in research and development—not just at target firms, but across entire industries. Given the volume of recent interventions, some macro-impact is inevitable.

Over time, we predict that hedge fund activism will yield diminishing returns. Too many activists will eventually chase too few legitimate targets. But in the interim, we also see the prospect of what we term a “hedge fund bubble,” as major and successful firms are disrupted and/or broken up. We do not endorse preclusive reforms to prevent such a bubble, but we do suggest that greater transparency is the least drastic reform. Moreover, this essay has repeatedly made the point that what can be done by regulatory reform can also be done by private ordering.

For the immediately foreseeable future, new regulatory initiatives appear unlikely. Still, over this interim period, courts will be recurrently faced with defensive efforts that use private ordering to slow down the process and buy time for target managements. Given the current state of knowledge, we believe such private ordering will often be justifiable and can moderate an otherwise risky transition.