Bankruptcy’s Three Ages and Their Underlying Market Conditions

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During the past century, three decisionmaking systems have arisen to accomplish a bankruptcy restructuring—judicial administration, a deal among the firm’s dominant players, and a sale of the firm’s operations in their entirety. Each is embedded in the Bankruptcy Code today, with all having been in play for more than a century and with each having had its heyday—its dominant age. The shifts, rises, and falls among decisionmaking systems have previously been explained by successful evolution in bankruptcy thinking, by the happenstance of the interests and views of lawyers that designed bankruptcy changes, and by the interests of those who influenced decisionmakers. Here I argue that these broad changes also stem from baseline market capacities, which shifted greatly over the past century; I build the case for shifts underlying market conditions being a major explanation for the shifts in decisionmaking modes. Keeping these three alternative decisionmaking types clearly in mind not only leads to better understanding of what bankruptcy can and cannot do, but also facilitates stronger policy decisions today here and in the world’s differing bankruptcy systems, as some tasks are best left to the market, others are best handled by the courts, and still others can be left to the inside parties to resolve.
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INTRODUCTION

Embedded in the Bankruptcy Code are three decisionmaking methods—administration, a deal among creditors, and a sale of the firm intact. The Code’s text and intent privilege a deal among creditors and stakeholders, but it dispenses with the deal at times, empowering the judge to administratively determine the validity of a distribution. Elsewhere, the Code dispenses with both administration and the deal and uses the market to sell the firm.¹

If we stretch out the Code over the past century, accordion-like, we see core provisions emerging in practice, dominating for a time, and then fading in importance. Each decisionmaking method has had its heyday. Each method’s rise and fall fit with underlying market conditions and basic bankruptcy goals usually, mapped to political ideology currents sometimes, and reflected the influence of powerful groups, such as well-organized creditors, often. Sometimes bankruptcy overshoots underlying market conditions, perhaps due to an ideological push or excessively influential interests, but often enough there’s a rough market fit.

The rise and dominance of administration, deal, and sale make for three ages of bankruptcy: Administration flourished during and after the 1930s. The 1938 Bankruptcy Act put in place an administered system in which the judge, with an expert agency’s advice, decided how and whether to restructure the firm, which creditors would survive the reorganization and which would not, and who would manage the firm—all indicative of top-down, market-skeptical, New Deal–style thinking.

The second age—that of the deal among the debtor firm’s principal players—began its dominant era in 1978, when Congress displaced New Deal–style administration with business-deal-oriented rules for the most important bankruptcy decisions. Classes of creditors, grouped along common financial characteristics, and owners negotiate a deal among themselves on how to restructure the firm, with only loose judicial supervision. The 1978 statute, says its legislative history, “removes many of the supervisory functions of the judge. . . .”²

¹ Section 1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2012), and its associated provisions allow classes of creditors to vote on a deal, with two-thirds in dollar amount binding all creditors; judicial review of an approved deal is minimal. If no deal is reached, the judge values the firm and decides whether or not a proposed restructuring will go forward. Id. § 1129(b). Under § 363, the firm can be sold in its entirety, with neither a § 1129(a)(8) deal nor a § 1129(b) judicial determination.

The deal-oriented statute respected the will and knowledge of private parties; it reflect doubt about the expertise of government agencies on business deals. I call this age bankruptcy’s “business judgment rule” phase: corporate law academics would see the similarities, of courts deferring to unconflicted boards of directors in making corporate business decisions, unwilling to displace unconflicted business judgments with the judge’s own view. No corporate law judge would second-guess the dutiful board; and similarly no bankruptcy judge in this age of bankruptcy would second-guess the ordinary bankruptcy deal.

The third age of bankruptcy rose to prominence in the late 1990s, displacing the deal with a sale of the firm in its entirety to the highest bidder. Its rise occurred in a market economy in which mergers were common, professionals in law and finance had little difficulty engineering whole-firm sales, and markets often worked more quickly than courts or deals.

Not just the prevalence of mergers supported the third age: Market structure had made the negotiated second age’s deal harder to strike in the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s, when the deal-making Code was written, because better trading markets meant that creditors did not stay stable enough for long enough to readily negotiate a deal restructuring the right-hand side of the debtor’s balance sheet. But they could take the cash proceeds from selling firm’s operations. This third age rose to prominence in an ideological era when market solutions were often seen as better than government-driven, administered results.

The market sale arose although it was not the process the 1978 Bankruptcy Code favored or even anticipated. It depends even today for its authority on two broad, open-ended sentences in the Code that lack texture, standards, specifics, and instructions. Yet the market sale has become a prime system of industrial restructuring in the United States. Market conditions prevailed over statutory structure and, one can probably say, congressional intent.

* * *

The market-oriented explanation I offer here for bankruptcy’s three ages contrasts with prior explanations, which can be summarized as learning, lawyering, and rent-seeking. First off in current thinking, evolution and learning explains shifts in decisionmaking; practical judges and lawyers sought to solve problems and, as they did, they came up with new and better means to reorganize firms. In contrast to evolutionary improvement, second, the world-view (and narrow interests) of lawyers who wrote the bankruptcy laws has been prominently offered to explain the shifts in systems. Equally importantly, and third, creditor rent-seeking has been brought forward to explain important Code and practice shifts. The market-based explanation I offer here does not replace the learning, lawyering, and rent-seeking explanations now in play, but needs to be put on the same shelf as the preexisting three. I bring forward reasons why it fits well with the broad outline of the decisionmaking shifts during the past century.  

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3 For instances of these views, see, for the first one, Barry E. Adler, Vedran Kapkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, *Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11*, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 461, 462 (2013); David A. Skeel, *Creditors’ Ball: The “New” Corporate Governance in Chapter 11*, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); for the second,
Each system’s emergence and dominance corresponded to underlying market-based phenomena. Moreover, once we identify these primary decisionmaking modes, we can more explicitly analyze whether the decisionmaking mode selected for a bankruptcy task is suitable, accurate, and effective, or whether another mode would do better. In other legal analysis, it’s common to look for the relative advantage of the decisionmaker, in terms of, say, information or lack of bias. Corporate law, for example, regularly analyzes the propriety of decisionmaking by courts and boards of directors, with the business judgment rule its most famous mechanism for doing so.

* * *

The three dominant decisionmaking systems are not stable, in the sense of having reached an end-point. Although a dominating fourth system is not yet in view, we can see fracture lines up and down the current system.

First, widening arrays of creditors can, without bankruptcy law impeding them, immediately enforce their state-based rights. These creditors take no part in the collective bankruptcy proceeding to hold together the enterprise value. I analyze the market conditions — such as rapid, effective refinancing — that can make this structure fit market conditions. Similarly, and second, a new, growing industrial organization no longer depends on the integrity of the vertically integrated firm, but on contractual relationships that can readily adjust; less of the firm must be centrally owned and financed and kept intact through a bankruptcy, because the business nodes can be pulled apart and then reassembled elsewhere. If these two trends continue, one would predict an attack on bankruptcy’s core institution, the automatic stay, which stops all creditor action against the bankrupt during the pendency of what can be a long proceeding. We shall see why these two trends make the traditional, long stay unstable.

* * *

The roadmap for this article: In Part I, I outline the three bankruptcy ages that followed after the first-in-time “race to the courthouse”—government administration of the failed firm, a deal among its creditors, and a market sale of the failed firm.

In Part II, I describe the dominant era for each, how it typically corresponded to baseline market and institutional conditions, and why perceived market structure is at least as strong as explaining the shift as the other forces that have been identified in bankruptcy scholarship—evolutionary learning, lawyering, and rent-seeking.

It is no accident that the administrative system that persisted until the 1970s first emerged in New Deal statutes when policymakers distrusted markets—often then seen to be corrupt and dysfunctional. Nor is it an accident that the deal among the market players rose to prominence when government action came to be distrusted during the deregulatory Carter presidency, on the eve of the Reagan magic-of-the-market era. Nor is it any accident that the sale rose to prominence during the 1980s and 1990s when the merger market for the firm’s assets became deep and the market for the firm’s liabilities became so liquid that they often could not stabilize long enough to sit

in their lawyers’ conference rooms to negotiate the deal that the 1978 Code had contemplated. Baseline economic conditions simultaneously made bankruptcy-by-sale more viable and creditor dealmaking less viable.

In Part III, I ask whether this decisionmaking evolution is over. It is not, and we can discern fissures in the current mechanisms that could lead to more fundamental change: one based on creditors rapidly realizing their claims on the debtor without becoming subject to the debtor’s bankruptcy and another one for which firms can more readily be dismantled because in an increasing number of industries the vertically-integrated firm—which vitally needs to bankruptcy stay on creditor collection—to hold together its viable parts, is less important than it once was. The rationale for bankruptcy’s core characteristic—the long bankruptcy stay on creditor action—is eroding. The fear of dismantling vital parts of a business enterprise is not as frightening if more firms were never so tightly put together. This development facilitates what at base the original nineteenth century bankruptcy reaction to the “race-to-the-courthouse” sought to avoid: the dismantling of vital parts of the business enterprise. Once this was a cost; increasingly it is becoming a strategy.

I. CONCEPTUALIZING THREE AGES OF BANKRUPTCY: ADMINISTRATION, INSIDER DEAL, AND MARKET SALE

A. The Race-to-the-Courthouse

Recall bankruptcy first principles: When a firm fails and defaults on its debts, creditors sue to be repaid. Under baseline state law, creditors would “race to the courthouse” to obtain a judgment authorizing the sheriff to sell the debtor’s property for cash to go to the creditor. Late creditors would seek to be repaid from a judgment-proof carcass. They would leave empty-handed.

If the firm has greater value as a going concern, then creditors’ levies and sheriff’s collateral sales will destroy organizational value. Worse, because early creditors get paid in full and later creditors do not, the core state-law incentives can propel a destructive run on an otherwise viable enterprise. For a single creditor, it would be better to reach the courthouse first to be fully paid, even if doing so destroyed the debtor’s organization, than for the creditor to wait and find itself with an unsatisfied claim on a hollowed-out debtor—one that had paid the quickly acting creditors first. Theorizing on justifications for a separate, overarching bankruptcy process has at its core the goal of replacing the race with a collective proceeding that maximizes creditors’ joint value in the debtor by holding the firm’s pieces together if they are worth more together than torn asunder.5


B. The Three Systems Conceptually

After bankruptcy law froze the creditors’ race to the courthouse, vital questions still had to be decided: How should the business be redeployed? Should the business be kept intact or should it be shut down in an orderly way? Or should some factories be kept open and others closed? Which ones should be closed, and when? And, since the bankrupt firm lacked enough value to pay all of its creditors, which claims would be cut down, and how would debts and ownership be reallocated?

Three decisional means for restructuring arose, with each reaching its apogee in a different decade during the past century—typically in ways and times fitting with baseline economic conditions. Each is still embedded in the Bankruptcy Code and on-the-ground practice. First, the government could decide what to shut down and what to continue operating. An administrative apparatus could decide how much the firm is worth, which creditors to eliminate, who would own the restructured firm, and how much other debt to write off.

Second, the creditors and the firm could decide among themselves what to do, operating under broad bankruptcy law rules and their state-law contracts. The creditors and the bankrupt firm’s management could negotiate over which factories to shut down and which to keep going. The judge’s role could be confined to handling contract disputes and bankruptcy particulars, like fraudulent conveyances and preferences, not core financial and operational restructuring decisions.

Third, the firm’s operations could be sold intact for cash, with the cash applied to pay off creditors. The buyer would then resolve whether to shut down or reorganize the failed firm, as a matter of its business judgment. Today, bankruptcy sales are lead to the bankrupt firm going to the highest bidder.

And that is all, as the alternatives to the race-to-the-courthouse. There’s a limited menu of restructuring methodologies: administration, deal, and sale. Just three.

II. THREE AGES OF BANKRUPTCY: HISTORICAL EMERGENCE, MARKET CONDITIONS, AND IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE

We here review the historical decisionmaking shifts in light of underlying market conditions. For each shift, we see a supporting underlying market structure and sometimes a related dominant ideological perspective as to the market. First we look at the conditions that had the equity receivership displace the race to the courthouse. While this shift and its underlying market structure explanation is well known to bankruptcy analysts, subsequent shifts have not been systematically subjected to a market-oriented analysis.

A. The Baseline: Displacing the Race to the Courthouse with the Equity Receivership

1. Historical emergence. The race to the courthouse would not seriously degrade the simple firms lacking complex machinery, such as those dominating the early nineteenth century American economy. But the race-to-the-courthouse worked poorly for the complex railroads that crisscrossed the country in the last third of the nineteenth century, and then failed at that century’s end. And while the railroads came first, large-scale, end-of-the-nineteenth-century manufacturing was constructed from interconnected large organizations that were typically vertically integrated. Interacting industrial parts inside a firm could not easily be removed and replaced.6

Although railroad firms operated as an integrated whole, the railroad’s financing contracts were crude and slap-dash.7 One bondholder group had a security interest in the tracks and stations in one city and another group had a security interest in the tracks and stations in another city. If one bondholder group foreclosed on its security, the railroad could not operate between those two cities, as it would be missing a vital section of track and other physical assets.8

Once the tracks were laid down and the stations and rail yards built, the ongoing cost of operating the railroad was insubstantial, even though its corporate debt load was high. Variable costs, compared to fixed costs, were low. “[T]here was usually a consensus that most railroads were worth more as [ongoing] entities than their liquidation value.”9 As a matter of efficiency, the railroad’s business should not have been shattered by creditor grabs if the parties could re-negotiate well,10 but the difficulty of negotiating and coordinating a solution among creditors was substantial. An alternative to the race-to-the-courthouse was needed.

The railroads also had a public utility quality that created a pervasive public policy problem for judges and legislators. Towns and people along the railroad’s route depended on it to pick up their own goods for sale to distant markets and to deliver goods made elsewhere11—and the federal courts recognized as much.12 “From the end

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12 The classic statement for railroads came from the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876):
of the Civil War until the beginning of the First World War, the railroad was a central, if not the major, element in the political, economic, and social development of the United States, with high saliency in multiple dimensions. Politics pressed toward operational continuance. These public considerations affected the courts.

Resolution came by adapting the common law receivership to keep the railroad running. In the equity receivership, a creditor would petition the court to appoint a “receiver” to gather the railroad’s assets, receive its revenue, and operate the railroad, while the managers and the bondholders’ bankers (often JP Morgan & Co. or Kuhn Loeb) reorganized the railroad’s finances. The railroad’s assets would in form be “sold” to a new firm, which was owned by the participating creditors. That sale restructured the railroad’s ownership, as the old owners took new securities with new terms in the “buying” entity.

During the sale’s pendency, the court enjoined creditor action against the railroad’s property, thereby holding the going concern together via an injunction—the predecessor to today’s automatic stay. Although the form of the receivership transaction was a sale, in reality it was a restructuring, because the pre-transaction creditors were approximately the same as the post-transaction creditors, but with the terms of their ownership adjusted. There was no third-party buyer and typically no third-party bidder for the firm.

2. Market conditions, ideological coherence. While the receivership took the form of a marketplace sale, the market for selling large firms was then too weak to support a true arms-length sale. Not only were there too few strategic buyers who wanted to add the bankrupt’s business to their own, but financial markets were too primitive for competitive bidding syndicates to emerge. Thus, although the nineteenth century equity receivership was a sale-in-form, in substance it was a deal among the railroad’s major creditors, with some judicial oversight. Judges were not particularly adept at running railroads and markets were insufficiently deep enough to support whole-firm sales. In such conditions, a deal, perhaps even one susceptible to some insider corruption, was better than the decisionmaking alternatives. The resulting system satisfactorily used the best institutional tools then available to handle a major national practical problem—how to keep the American railroad system running when panics and recessions gave too many creditors choke-point rights to shut the railroad down.

When . . . one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. . . .


14 Ely, supra note 11, at 80–89; White, supra note 11, at 110; Kolko, supra note 13, at 1.

15 Cf. Quincy, Missouri & Pacific RR Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82, 95 (1892) (the “insolvent railroad . . . surrender[s] its property into the custody of the court, to be . . . operated in the public interest”) (emphasis supplied).

16 Skeel, supra note 3, at 56–58.

The equity receivership was an amalgam of our three bankruptcy decisionmaking systems. In form, it was a sale, but in substance, a recapitalization,\textsuperscript{18} one amalgamating the deal and administration; the parties came up with the terms and the judiciary loosely checked the terms for conformity with priority rules.\textsuperscript{19} This amalgam eventually gave way to three more distinct ages of bankruptcy in response to changed underlying market conditions. The first age was that of the administrative proceeding.

\textbf{B. Bankruptcy’s First Modern Age: New Deal Administration}

1. \textit{Historical emergence.} By the 1930s, the equity receivership’s deal qualities came to be seen as detrimental to sound reorganization policy. The Depression-era Congress mandated a study of how reorganizations contributed to the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{20} The report—by New Deal luminaries like William O. Douglas and Abe Fortas, both future Supreme Court Justices—became the blueprint and justification for a new age of bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{21}

Deals were made, yes, but the deals were corrupt, concluded the report, with controlling insiders eviscerating outsider creditors.\textsuperscript{22} Information flow was poor, so markets could not work well. Businesses failed, it was thought, because corrupt creditor bargains impeded business stability and recovery. The judge was \textit{not} to defer to the bankruptcy deal, Douglas decreed, eventually from the Supreme Court. “The court is not merely a ministerial register of the vote of . . . the [creditors],” he wrote in the famous-in-bankruptcy \textit{Los Angeles Lumber} decision.\textsuperscript{23} “[T]he fact that the vast majority of the security holders have approved the plan is \textit{not} the test of whether the plan is a fair and equitable one. . . . Every important determinant by the court in receivership proceedings calls for an informed independent [judicial or administrative] judgment.”\textsuperscript{24} “[B]oth . . . the required percentages of each class of security holders [must] approve the plan and . . . the plan [must] be found [by the court] to be ‘fair and equitable.’”\textsuperscript{25} He was not alone among prominent New Dealers.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{19} Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 500–05 (1913). Continuing the firm’s operations was quite likely efficient in the Coasean sense, because of the railroad’s low scrap value.
\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 114–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bankruptcy and the Market

A judge, with an expert agency’s advice, would decide how valuable the debtor firm was, how far value could be stretched to pay off creditors, how the firm’s debts should be restructured, and whether the firm should be shut down or restructured. The strong-form of bankruptcy’s absolute priority rule did the same, by barring the financial players from deviating from formal priority even if a class of creditors voted in favor of making a deal to get the company more quickly through the proceeding.27

This administrative system that emerged from policymakers’ theory, embedded in chapter X of the 1938 Bankruptcy Act,28 became the means to reorganize public firms for the next four decades. Upon the debtor filing for bankruptcy, incumbent senior management was replaced by a court-appointed trustee. No deference here to market processes or to the sanctity of private management. Then the court determined the firm’s value, with the advice of public experts from the Securities and Exchange Commission. No marketplace valuation here. The plan of reorganization “had to be submitted to the SEC for comment prior to confirmation. The SEC vigorously fulfilled its watchdog role, participating in meetings, challenging the appointment of trustees and trustees’ administrations, opposing plans of reorganization, and criticizing compensation arrangements.”29 Once the court determined the firm’s value, the “logical problem [for the judge] in determining the [proper] participation of various classes of security holders [was] comparatively simple”—the judge, with a valuation number in hand, could mechanically figure out how far down the firm’s creditor hierarchy to go until value was fully allocated.

True, the structure here was “administrative-lite,” in that the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 did not establish a governmental agency that took over the bankrupt firm, such as the “administrative-heavy” mechanisms by which the Interstate Commerce Commission dealt with failed railroads,31 bank regulators handled failed banks,32 the

26 Jerome Frank, Douglas’s protégé and successor as chair of the SEC, sought to bar the judge from considering creditors’ consent when determining if the plan complied with bankruptcy standards:

[N]o probative value whatever shall be given to the number of stockholder or creditors ... who have assented to the plan. But the judge and the [administrative] Commission shall determine such questions on their merits and shall thoroughly investigate ... all facts bearing on the equitableness of the plan and on such values.


27 L.A. Lumber, supra note 23, at 114–15. Absolute priority requires that a higher-ranking creditor be fully paid before lower ranking creditors. Today’s dealmaking Code allows creditors at differing priorities to make a deal to take less; the 1938 Act, as interpreted, did not.


30 Abe Fortas, Ass’t Director, Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech before a Legal Seminar: Corporate Reorganizations and the Holding Company Act, at 9 (July 14, 1938) (text available from author).


SEC restructured public utilities, and foreign bankruptcy regimes restructured ordinary bankrupt corporations. Stronger administrative structures for industrial bankruptcies were contemplated in the 1930s, championed by William O. Douglas, and built or expanded for restructuring key businesses of the era, namely railroads and utilities.

This bankruptcy era, starting in the New Deal, was the age of bankruptcy-by-administration: an outside, court-appointed trustee took over and ran the business, dealmaking consent was suppressed, and the judge was central to plan confirmation. The era lasted for four decades. This was not simply an evolution in decisionmaking or a success for narrow interests, but a change that reflected the perceived weaknesses of market conditions and bankruptcy dealmaking, and the perceived strengths of having a central, administrative decisionmaker, a contrast that we document and analyze next.

2. Market conditions, ideological coherence. The Depression had discredited both markets in general and bankruptcy deal-making in particular. Leading business law academics of the 1930s hailed the 1938 Act’s turning of reorganization from the deal-oriented equity receivership into an administered system. While deference to the business judgment of the relevant players is today commonplace in corporate settings if the players are not afflicted with egregious conflicts of interest, bankruptcy would accord no such deference in the 1930s, when the players were viewed as hopelessly conflicted and corrupt. This concept for bankruptcy was consistent with a more general worldview that those with policymaking influence in that era held—i.e., that marketplace competition had declined greatly and, since competitive checks were few, regulation of the corporation, and not deference to it, was needed.

The SEC’s 1930’s study of reorganization—Douglas’s document which facilitated his rise to fame and authority—pointed to corrupt insider dealings that he...
wanted replaced.\footnote{See supra note 23 and accompanying text; \textit{Los Angeles Lumber}, supra note 23, at 114–15.} As Abe Fortas, the later Supreme Court Justice and, at the time, Douglas’s principal assistant in the 1930s reorganization study, said when rejecting the deal as a model for reorganization and advocating for more administrative control:

\begin{quote}
I need not relate how corporate reorganization was . . . a state of nature in the Hobbesian sense: where substantive rules of law were virtually suspended; where . . . contract rights might be freely violated; and where diplomacy was devious, covenants secret and the rights of thousands of ordinary citizens disposed of by and for their ruling minorities. These were the actualities in hundreds of cases . . . .
\end{quote}

And while Fortas is today the more well-known figure, Jerome Frank wrote the 1933 New Deal analysis of reorganization that then became iconic. Frank—a Douglas protégé who would succeed Douglas as chair of the SEC—excoriated a modern whole-firm, § 363-style sale, considering such an effort to be a sham (as he put it) because merger markets in 1933 were so decrepit that no bidder other than prior controlling creditors would even consider making a bid.\footnote{Id. at 568.} The judicial sale in bankruptcy is “meaningless mumbo-jumbo”\footnote{Id. at 565.} that insiders controlled and that too often failed to benefit the debtor or its other creditors.\footnote{Id. at 554.} There was no competitive bidding, because it was “almost impossible . . . to induce any banking group to compete with [the insiders] in charge of the reorganization.”\footnote{Id. at 554.} “The bulk of the security holders are inevitably uninformed and usually concur in . . . the reorganizers’ plans] because of lack of information and lack of any practical alternatives.”\footnote{Id. at 568.} It often kept scurrilous management in place.\footnote{Id. at 568.} Go straight to the judicial determinations, said Frank.\footnote{Frank, supra note 43, at 561–62.} “[T]he judge [should] look [for the court’s] function from the beginning of the receivership to [be to] . . . supervis[e] . . . the formulation of a reorganization plan.”\footnote{Id. at 569.}

Creditor consent should not be dispositive:

\begin{quote}
Each individual investor will receive elaborate printed documents which he will have difficulty in understanding . . . . Solicited by a more or less self-constituted committee to give his consent, he will not know to whom else to turn for guidance. Inertia and a feeling of helplessness will lead him to accept a plan
\end{quote}
offered by such a committee. Past experience goes to show that the great bulk of the creditors or stockholders take what is offered to them with a feeling of resignation.\textsuperscript{51}

Frank then rejected proposals from the “deans of the reorganization bar, such as Messrs. Cutcheon and Swaine, . . . that the courts should not concern themselves with the formulation of the plan. . . .”\textsuperscript{52} and he pushed courts to actively shape the plan of reorganization.\textsuperscript{53} More conservative voices, such as that of Harvard Law School’s Dean Pound, criticized Douglas’ and Frank’s bankruptcy administration.\textsuperscript{54} But they lost out to the New Deal thinking: an administrative apparatus of experts was needed to handle the problem,\textsuperscript{55} not a deal and not a marketplace sale.

C. The Second Age: Post–World War II Dealmaking, Bankruptcy’s Business Judgment Era

1. Historical emergence. The administered system did not wear well after World War II. It was seen as a death-knell for companies that could have rebuilt themselves. The common cliché was that the patient was dying on an operating table, while all waited for the doctor (the SEC and the courts) to arrive to recommend how to operate.\textsuperscript{56}

The negative results under [the post-1938 bankruptcy system] have resulted from the stilted procedures, under which management is always ousted and replaced by an independent trustee, the courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission examine the plan of reorganization in great detail, no matter how long that takes, and the court values the business, a time consuming and inherently uncertain procedure.\textsuperscript{57}

A deal between and among the debtor and its creditors was to be preferred, said the 1978 Code’s legislative history:

\begin{quote}
How far American legislation is tending to go in the direction of administrative absolutism is illustrated by the [1938 Bankruptcy Act] as to reorganization proceedings. . . . In effect the tendency is to subject the management of all individual property and enterprise to an unchecked administrative control.
\end{quote}

Frank rejected Pound’s view, seeing Pound’s “snarl[ing]” use of “administrative absolutism” as “symptom[atic] of [a] disturbance . . . in the speaker.” Id. at 324.

\begin{quote}
Statement by the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery . . ., Upon Introducing the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to H.R. 8200, 124 CONG. REC. S34004 (Oct. 5, 1978) (quoting the House report).
\end{quote}
[Alternative processes could] allow[] a debtor to negotiate a plan outside of court and, having reached a settlement with a majority in number and amount of each class of creditors, permit[] the debtor to [achieve an] arrangement. . . . The postwar environment became less anti-market, and less suspicious of private dealmaking than had been the case in the Depression environment. Public opinion trusted markets more and regulation less.59

The age of the bankruptcy deal began in 1978, when Congress passed a new Bankruptcy Code, enshrining the deal and displacing administration. “The parties are left to their own to negotiate a fair settlement. . . .”60

In the New Deal’s 1938 Chapter X, the court decided on the distribution of value in the restructuring, without deferring to the parties’ deal. But in the 1978 Code, the creditors voted by class on a proposed deal.61 If a majority of each class of similar creditors approved a plan, no judicial finding on the plan’s fairness, on the value of the debtor, or whether the plan respected priority, would take place. “Administration” after 1978 was weak. Only if dealmaking failed would the court value the firm and decide on the fairness of the distribution.62 Nor would the court involve itself deeply in business operations; as one prominent bankruptcy player said, “the court’s only function [now] with respect to the operation of the business should be to change the composition of the creditors’ committee if it is not representative. The bankruptcy judge should not worry about ‘how’s the business doing?’”63

2. Market conditions, ideological coherence. One again can see the shift as stemming from changes in underlying market conditions and not just interests and simple learning from experience. Congress enacted the deal-oriented 1978 Code during a business-friendly time when dealmakers were, if not respected, at least deferred to, and market-mimicking mechanisms seemed appropriate. One president was elected in 1976 extolling the virtues of small government, deregulation, and zero-based government budgeting.64 Another would be elected in 1980 extolling the “magic of the market.”65 This pro-market tenor in political discourse was reflected in the 1978 Code.

Similarly, the major bankruptcy theoretical innovation just after the 1978 Code appeared was the concept of a (hypothetical) creditors’ bargain—that is, a deal,

58 Id.
61 Bankruptcy Code §§ 1126, 1129(a)(8).
62 Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b).
63 J. Ronald Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 BUS. LAW. 1309, 1216 (1979). Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 576–79 (2015). The on-the-ground dynamic has, however, been more mixed. If the parties cannot conclude a deal, the court can cram one down. The players surely have had one eye on the court even when making a deal.
65 See Barbara Slavin & Milt Freudenheim, Magic of the Market Place, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1981.
justifying (most of) the 1978 Code’s main features as reflecting the deal that creditors would have made beforehand, had transaction costs been low enough for them to specify the terms that would govern if the firm failed.\footnote{Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984); Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 5, at 7–19. Cf. Robert A. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690 (1986).}

When Congress enacted the 1978 Code—four decades after the New Deal—the business judgment of the parties was thought to be good enough,\footnote{Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107–09 (1979) (commenting on general satisfaction with private parties’ dealmaking and dissatisfaction with judicial supervision); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 95 n.93 (2004).} government was again sufficiently disrespected, and, with the impending Reagan election, dominant political players would disrespect it even more (“government is the problem, not the solution”). Hence, policymakers comparing government and market expertise for the task at hand—repositioning a business firm—were then more likely to defer to the market and see the government as prone to error. In corporate law, deference to management in decisionmaking was high.\footnote{See, e.g., sources note supra in note 54, as well as Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 411 (2013) (strong business judgment rule formulated in 1984 in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). See generally Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 980, 996–97 (1994); Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director’s Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505 (1985).}

Moreover, another market change—that of the composition of the firms needing to be restructured—had occurred. Although this overall industrial change is well-known,\footnote{By the second half of the twentieth century fewer than 8% of business bankruptcies were in the transportation, communications, and utilities industries. Sudheer Chava & Robert A. Jarrow, Bankruptcy Prediction with Industry Effects, 8 REV. FIN. 557, 542 (2004).} its impact on bankruptcy has not, as far as I know, been considered: During the century before the passage of the 1978 Code, the bulk of the firms requiring reorganization in bankruptcy had shifted from railroads and public utilities to industrial firms. Railroads were suffused with a public interest and a strong bias for continuation; for industrial firms contractarian, dealmaking thinking could prevail. The long evolution of the market here—in the form of the type of firms that comprised the bulk of bankruptcy reorganization proceedings—helps to explain the shift in reorganization thinking and mechanics. For the railroads, deals that would liquidate trunk lines and stop service were too politically unpalatable to be considered. By 1978, the population of firms needing reorganization was dense with industrial firms, retailers, and ordinary businesses, none of which had the same heavy positive externalities from continuance.

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The inside player deal-making structure was in place for only a few years before it was criticized for three distinct deal-oriented weaknesses: (1) entrenching public firm managers so as they shifted value to themselves and their allies,\footnote{Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1075, 1088 (1992); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747 (1989). The new criticism of the deal ironically echoed the 1930s’ criticism, in} a distortion that
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prolonged the life of zombie firms that had failed operationally, (2) misapplying a respect for dealmaking, because parties who are stuck with one another will not strike deals as effectively as parties who are not already embedded in the firm;71 that kind of embedded bankruptcy dealmaking was costly, slow and susceptible to deadlocking,72 (3) wrongly replicating what financial markets do every day, and do much better, namely, value and reposition firms via mergers and sales.73 These criticisms left bankruptcy unsettled in the 1980s and 1990s, with critics thinking restructuring could be done even better. The age of the bankruptcy deal was reaching its apogee, and critics saw it as needing adjustment and potentially replacement. Many thought it was a failure.74

D. The Third Age: End-of-Twentieth Century Merger Markets

And today?

Today we sell firms in bankruptcy to the highest bidder. The successful buyer decides how to restructure the failed firm’s operations; the cash from the sale is then distributed to the debtor’s creditors. One descriptive:

Chapter 11 has healed itself. According to some of its leading critics, chapter 11 is no longer the long, expensive process that it was in the 1980s, when storied companies . . . wasted away their remaining value in vainglorious attempts to survive in a changed marketplace. Today’s chapter 11 is a swift, market-driven process that quickly moves troubled companies into more capable hands.75

1. Emergence. By the late 1990s, this third decisionmaking mechanism—the whole-firm sale—rapidly rose to stand alongside the prior two.76

ways that have been unremarked upon, because the 1978 Code deferred to a deal that allowed strategically-placed players to extract excessive value in the bargaining process at the expense of creditors and the best repositioning of the firm.


72 Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt, supra note 71, at 536–45.


74 E.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 70.

75 Lubben summarizes the conventional wisdom of supporters of bankruptcy sales. But he is skeptical that the market-driven approach is good, primarily because the sale has control rights migrating to a single lender, who manages the process for the lender’s benefit in ways that need not maximize the firm’s and its stakeholders’ overall value. Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839 (2005).

Firms filed for bankruptcy and soon thereafter put themselves up for bids, with the highest bidder buying the firm’s operations and the proceeds of the sale going to the firm’s prebankruptcy creditors. Sometimes a buyer was ready at the time of the bankruptcy filing, with an auction testing the bona fides of the consideration offered. As late as the 1970s, courts cast aspersions on market value: The standards for market valuation, such as “existing market prices . . . and comparable sales[,] need not be significant factors in determining reorganization value,” said the court in a major bankruptcy of the 1970s. Reorganizational value was for courts, not markets, to find.

Early appellate decisions in the 1980s did not support the whole-firm sale. And the deal-oriented Code’s mechanism for the sale was barebones and on its face did not push towards a sale (because the debtor formally had to propose it without creditor authority to directly move the court to force a sale). But despite only weak early appellate support, the practice became common, statutory authority was found, and it is now a major mechanism for reorganization, as Figure 1 shows. There were no reported § 363 sales of public companies in 1989, but, by 2007, 35% of the reorganized public companies were sold via § 363 sales. And the import of the sale for bankruptcy decisionmaking goes farther, as divisions and subsidiaries are individually sold and the potential for a sale influences administrative determinations, such as the assigned value of the firm, which formerly was disconnected from market value. Even in reorganizations that seem structurally to be deals or administered decisions, the market determines key aspects of the deal or administered result, because the baseline value of the firm becomes its third-party sale value, from which deviation needs to be justified.

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77 Gilson, Hotchkiss & Osborn, supra note 92, at 8.
78 In re Equity Funding Corp., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772–73 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (emphasis supplied). Equity Funding was a huge firm that went bankrupt after the largest financial fraud in American history (up to that time).
79 In re The Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986).
80 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1): “The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”
82 On the limited connection to market value, see Roe, supra note 76, at 547–48, 563; Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 569, 571 (1950). Without a clear marker for value, priority is indeterminate, because the potential dealmaking parties do not how far down the capital structure pecking order the distribution of value can go.
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Figure 1. Increasing Number of Whole-Firm § 363 Sales in Quarter-Century After 1989

The graphic shows the 25-year trend-line of § 363 sales, which go from zero to one-quarter of all public firm bankruptcies most recently and 35% just before the 2008 financial crisis. AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N, supra note 76, at 203. The chart is based on data from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. Id. at n.750.

2. Market conditions, ideological coherence. Criticisms of managerial control of the bankrupt and the Code-supported deals of the 1980s fit snugly with a corporate worldview of that era, namely that the core problem in the large public firm was that of managerial agency costs, with managers running too many public firms poorly; the hostile takeover could, in this view, cure the problem. Bankruptcy should imitate the takeover, in this view, not the deal, ousting managers and putting new owners in place.

In a market-friendly era, a statute that had as its backup a judge—a government figure—valuing a business firm seemed peculiar to market-driven players, because the marketplace was valuing firms and securities every day. Underlying market conditions drove the emergence of the § 363 sale even more strongly than it drove prior shifts; it lacks strong statutory authority but nevertheless prevailed.

Two market conditions made the § 363 sale especially propitious when it arose at the twentieth century’s end, one of which is well-recognized and the other not. First, the merger market boomed in the 1980s, with merger rate double that of even prior booms. Hostile takeovers were common during the 1980s, with nearly one-third of

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83 See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 70.
the largest industrial firms being targeted by a takeover bid. Against that 1980s market backdrop, it was natural to ask why a failed firm in bankruptcy should not just be sold to a better managed firm. The merger market by the 1990s was deep and broad, with a strong infrastructure of supporting bankers, lawyers, and other professionals, all of whom could easily turn from their bread-and-butter merger practice to handle bankruptcy-based mergers, which they did.

A second market change supports the 363 sale’s rise. Debt claims became more fragmented and less often able to form a negotiating block than before, as is well-known among bankruptcy people. The deal-centered framework of the 1978 Code needs creditors with knowledge of the firm and its management. These creditors would negotiate a deal among themselves and with the firm’s executives, and would give input on the best direction for the business. But such deals cannot be concluded if the claims have dispersed to multiple investor portfolios. Fragmented creditors have less reason and reduced capacity to negotiate a deal. Their small economic interest leaves little incentive to invest in understanding the debtor and their smallness weakens them as negotiators.

Some claims may coalesce in hedge fund or so-called vulture fund investment portfolios when the vulture fund buys up the bulk of a class of claims that it thinks is undervalued. But even this coalescence need not lead to a cohesive group that negotiates a deal effectively. The hedge fund typically wants to be able to trade in and out of its position when it assesses the market price as being too low or too high as compared to the investor’s assessment of the ultimate result for this creditor class. But participation in the deal negotiations, particularly if the trading creditor is part of an official creditors’ committee, would usually sterilize the creditors’ ability to trade legally, as it will be privy to much inside information.

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87 “One way to solve the . . . [bankruptcy] problem would be to allow any party . . . to make an all-cash bid for the control rights to the company. At the close of the auction, the highest bidder would immediately assume control of the company and its operations.” Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 13, 31–32 (1991) (emphasis removed).


This new market condition—fragmentation and instability due to claims trading—has been noticed before as debilitating the Code’s preference for a deal. But not yet explained, as far as I know, is that it does not concomitantly weaken bankruptcy’s capacity to auction the whole firm via § 363. Market conditions have strengthened bankruptcy institutions’ relative capacity to use the left hand side of the debtor’s balance sheet (where the assets are), and ignore the right-hand side (where the debts are), by selling the debtor’s operations while leaving the debts behind.

These two market developments (of merger market depth and claims trading liquidity) largely explain the apogee of the age of the sale.

* * *

Here we can see this paper’s market-driving thesis at work, cycling through the twentieth century. When the merger market was rudimentary at the end of the nineteenth century, a deal had comparative advantages over the two other decisionmaking systems. When the policymaking atmospheric was that courts lacked sound business judgment compared to the firm’s players, then courts deferred to parties (in the nineteenth century receivership and a century later in the post-1978 restructurings). When corrupt, insider dealing seemed a bigger risk than administrative and judicial error, as it seemed to be in the 1930s, then judicial administration seemed better suited to handle the vivid problem of the time; yes, courts’ business judgment was imperfect, but they would be better than the parties at rooting out insider deals, or so it was thought. The administrative system emerged to prominence during the Great Depression, when markets generally did not command respect.

III. MODERN FISSIONS?

Consequences of the above analysis: As markets evolve, so will bankruptcy. Moreover, many nations look at chapter 11’s success and seek to emulate it; but if its success depends on underlying market conditions, they may err.

Two new bankruptcy and market features make the collective proceeding less central than it has been: first, the expansion of new, bankruptcy-exempt financial instruments and, second, changes in industrial organization that render bankruptcy’s collective proceeding, potentially less important than it once was.

More specifically: In the past three decades, more financial instruments and structures are exempt from bankruptcy’s core provisions like the automatic stay, creating a decisionmaking system for these instruments that differs from those prevailing during the last century.


Second, when industrial organization was more commonly structured as big, vertically integrated firms, collective restructuring was absolutely critical. But if fewer firms are vertically integrated today, then the need to hold the whole enterprise together in bankruptcy is less vital. The function of the 363 sale would shift—no longer would it hold a coherent organization together, but it would become the means to break it up, similar to how the hostile takeover of the 1980s broke up the unwieldy conglomerates.

Whether these forces will be just an important undertow or will become strong enough to bring about a “fourth age” of bankruptcy remains to be seen. We look at each in more detail.

A. The New Finance

1. The new finance: what is it? A derivative transaction is a risk-transferring transaction—e.g., one party agrees to pay the other, for a fee, if a foreign currency rises above a specified level. Operating firms use derivatives to shield themselves from risks that are not core to their business: An American manufacturer selling to European customers, with the contract payment to come in euros, often wants to avoid the risk of currency fluctuation. So it makes a derivatives contract to sell euros for dollars, with the contract to be performed when the manufacturer expects to deliver the product and be paid in euros. These derivatives transactions are increasingly common.\textsuperscript{92} While many are between financial institutions, many involve operating firms that want to buy their way out of bearing a particular risk. When such a firm goes bankrupt, its derivatives debts are exempt from the firm’s bankruptcy and typically are immediately liquidated.

Wide classes of repurchase agreements, or repo, are exempt from bankruptcy as well. A repo is functionally a secured loan, with the “purchased” security the collateral. The securities that qualify for exemption from bankruptcy include secured loans with U.S. Treasury securities as collateral, as well as secured loans with mortgage-backed securities as collateral.\textsuperscript{93}

2. Exit from bankruptcy. The exempt instruments are neither part of a bankruptcy deal, nor subject to bankruptcy administration, nor sold as part of a bankruptcy sale of the debtor’s operations. Instead the bankrupt’s counterparties are not stopped by the bankruptcy proceeding from immediately collecting on their contracts immediately, by selling their collateral and keeping the proceeds.\textsuperscript{94} Under these conditions, none of the three core decisionmaking methods come into play.

The safe harbors played an important role in the 2008-2009 financial crisis, exacerbating financial instability according to several economists and legal

\textsuperscript{92} Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 544 (2011) [“Roe, Derivatives Priorities”].

\textsuperscript{93} For a precise history of the exemptions, see Steven L. Schwarz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014).

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And there was a run on safe-harbored repo, particularly of mortgage-backed repo’d securities, similar to that of an old-style bank run. That run led to financial institutions reducing lending, freezing transactions, and cutting back their key economic activities. The economy went into a recession.

B. New Market Conditions: Financing Speed, Decentralized Industrial Organization

Market conditions could justify these change and, hence, could support a fourth age of bankruptcy, one that is more liquidation-oriented than the last century’s. Two of the most important market conditions are the increasing speed of finance and potentially changing modes of modern industrial organization.

The rapidity by which assets can be refinanced has not been seen as a variable, but should be: Extremely rapid refinancing capacity, if nearly instantaneous, could justify the rise of bankruptcy-exempt instruments, such as repos and derivatives.

1. The speed of finance. As far as I know, the financial market conditions that would fully justify the exemption from bankruptcy have not been specified—the critical underlying financial market condition being the speed with which firm-specific assets can be refinanced. We are closer in 2016 to the justifying conditions than ever. But like traveling along an asymptote, we will never arrive there. Hence, there is good reason to conclude that the widening full exemption from bankruptcy overshoots what the market can support: narrowing, yes; exemption, no.

If the debtor could instantaneously replace a defaulted loan with financing from another lender if the debtor’s ongoing business is sound, then the rationale for the traditional bankruptcy stay wanes. The debtor files for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy-exempt creditors immediately have themselves repaid, by helping themselves to any collateral they have obtained.

Even if the specific assets are critically necessary for to the debtor’s operations, bankruptcy exemption will not destroy the debtor’s value if the debtor can rapidly replace the financing. The debtor could cash out the bankruptcy-exempt creditor and, having been paid, the creditor would have to leave the collateral with the debtor, who

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98 Other increasingly-used structures are similarly bankruptcy-exempt. The special purpose entity (SPE) structure has a company placing assets into a business entity that normally will not be pulled into the bankruptcy of the originating company. Creditors of the SPE, then, are able to collect as if the structure were bankruptcy-exempt. Such SPE’s should be grouped with bankruptcy-exempt derivatives and repo for the text’s analysis.
would own it outright. As long as the debtor can immediately obtain sufficient debtor-in-possession financing, then the debtor can use it to pay off its bankruptcy-exempt debt to keep the underlying assets. If financial markets have achieved that level of perfection, there is less reason for traditional bankruptcy decisionmaking, whether by administration, deal, or sale. That instantaneous possibility is of course unavailable, but we are closer to it now than before. A shorter stay of days or weeks might come to be more appropriate than the “forever” stay now embedded in the Code.

Posit that the firm has a steel mill, which secures $1 billion in (hypothetically) bankruptcy-exempt debt. (It’s not bankruptcy-exempt today.) Even if that debt were bankruptcy-exempt, if the debtor could immediately obtain $1 billion in a new loan when the firm is operationally viable, then the debtor could pay off the old creditor and retain the steel mill. The firm would not, in such circumstances, need the bankruptcy stay in order to survive. Properly understood, the longstanding justification for the bankruptcy stay (that without it the firm would be ripped apart) is correct, but incomplete. It’s not just that the debtor has a firm-specific use for the asset, a point that is correct and has been well made. It’s more a mutually dependent combination that justifies the stay: the debtor has a firm-specific asset and it cannot obtain financing for that asset rapidly enough on ordinary market terms to retain the asset if its business warrants retaining it.

That is, firm-specificity in itself does not justify the stay if instantaneous and appropriately priced refinancing is available. Firm-specificity is necessary but insufficient. With instantaneous refinancing, the debtor could retain the firm-specific asset for its reorganization. While formerly it was implausible to expect quick refinancing, rapid debtor-in-possession financing and even out-of-court refinancing is common enough that one core justification for an extended bankruptcy with an endless stay is diminishing.

Hence, even the firm-specific quality of the asset would not justify it being subject to bankruptcy and the stay, if financial markets were so effective that they could immediately refinance the mill without noticeable bargaining or other transaction costs. (Or, stated more properly, without bargaining and other transaction costs greater than those of a regular bankruptcy.)

For the financial contracts that bankruptcy does exempt: Posit that, like the firm-specific steel mill, a financial debtor needs the exempt financial asset, because that derivative interest rate swap is part of a well-constructed portfolio that has more value sold intact than in pieces. Even if the asset has firm-specific value, if the debtor firm could instantaneously refinance the debt financing of that asset at

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99 To be clear, the text is not arguing that debt overhang justifications disappear. Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 147 (1977). And some firms simply are not worth continuing. Rather, if a fully senior, secured loan can be rapidly refinanced, one major justification for bankruptcy and the automatic stay disappears.


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acceptable cost, it could keep the asset for its own operations or portfolio sale. Market conditions would support allowing the asset to be bankruptcy-exempt. If refinancing could be obtained, if firm-specificity was in play and valuable, in, say, a week, then market conditions would justify a stay and a bankruptcy of a week, but not longer.

2. A new industrial organization? Another market change reduces industrial firms’ need for a collective proceeding that holds the organization intact. The collective bankruptcy proceeding is needed for an industry comprised of big, vertically integrated firms that cannot readily be separated into stand-alone businesses.

But more and more, modern industry is not organized as deeply in large, vertically integrated enterprises, but rather in contracting entities. The older organization—celebrated and analyzed in the Alfred Chandler’s famous prize-winning books—is no longer front and center for American and indeed worldwide industrial organization. For today, think first on a small scale of Uber and the gig economy, in which firms rent easily-sold goods or services to customers, or connect end-users with providers, but own neither. This structure lacks the deep synergies from keeping together the physical, dedicated assets of a railroad or an integrated steel mill.

Think now of this industrial organization characteristic for large enterprises and one sees that industrial organization characteristic diminishing the value of the collective bankruptcy proceeding. Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott have analyzed how and why this decentralized structure is particularly important and increasingly widespread in industries dependent on constant innovation.

The emerging organization of the drug industry illustrates: Big Pharma pushes the new drugs through the regulatory process, and then manufactures, markets, and distributes them. But decentralized biotech firms develop the new products and then sell either the product or the small successful company itself to the Big Pharma enterprise, which takes over regulatory relations, manufacturing, and marketing. A

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104 Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 903 (2015). Douglas Baird makes this point well for the service industry. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, supra note 10, at 82 (“[T]he going-concern surplus is less evident now than in the time of the great railroads. Few businesses today center around specialized long-lived assets. In a service-oriented economy, the assets walk out the door at 5:00 pm.”). I here make a related point for more core, vertically-integrated firms.


106 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 103, at 433–34 (contrary to conventional industrial organization theory, rapidly innovating industries today are moving away from vertical integration and toward contract).

107 Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 122–24 (1996); Weijan Shan et al., Interfirm Cooperation and
bankruptcy of the Big Pharma company has less need to keep the debtor together, because a vital part of the business consists of the separately operating biotech firms that can continue despite the big firm’s demise, and then just sell their product (or the firm itself) to another Big Pharma operation.  

Big pieces of the debtor can be removed from its interior and pushed elsewhere in the economy, because the debtor is not as much as previously an integrated whole whose divisions must move in tandem. Yes, bankruptcy disrupts elements of the larger interconnections—the biotech feeder firms must scramble—but they adjust more readily than if they had been, as they once often were, embedded inside a vertically integrated firm. They can find ways to deal with other nonbankrupt firms and survive without crippling costs via existing contracts and relationship with nonbankrupt firms.

A contemporary “plug and play” example: Novartis—a Big Pharma megafirm—has a contracting relationship with KaloBios, a small firm that once might have been a minor division of Novartis; Novartis also contracts with eighty other firms, dealing with nearly as many key products. Novartis has restructured itself with spinoffs that resemble the disassembly that now can be done in a bankruptcy. KaloBios is one of the satellite biotech firms with a Novartis relationship. But KaloBios’ bankruptcy is unlikely to sharply disrupt Novartis’s operations, as Novartis will turn to other contracting partners. And KaloBios has relationships with other entities, suggesting that even a bankruptcy of the Big Pharma firm at the core, Novartis, would mean that KaloBios, like a modular piece in a set, could then shift its business from the Big Pharma firm in bankruptcy to its other partners.  

Contracting entities like KaloBios and Novartis depend less on a collective reorganization than nineteenth century railroads and twentieth century vertically-integrated manufacturing firms. Whereas the race to the courthouse would have dismantled vital parts of such enterprises, the new industrial organization literature sees interconnections more often than before being made outside the traditional firm via contracts and relationships. Bankruptcy thus could come to be a transitional means from the old vertically-integrated structures to new more decentralized ones. If this new decentralization becomes a dominant form of new industrial organization, then we

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110 Neil Unmack, Novartis Spinoff Is Neat Cure for Big Pharma Ills, REUTERS, July 29, 2015, www.blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2015/07/29/novartis-spinoff-is-neat-cure-for-big-pharma-ills/ (“The deal . . . sees Switzerland’s $275 billion market-cap giant[Novartis,] inject the drugs into a startup called Mereo, run by former . . . employees . . . [I]t’s a neat way for Novartis to retain exposure to good drugs . . . .”).


112 Novartis’s pharmaceuticals portfolio of development projects includes 134 potential new products. Novartis, 2014 Annual Report, supra note 109, at 32.

113 See KaloBios, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 16, 2015).
may well see a fourth age, because the change would render the administered system, the deal, and the sale less vital than they once were.

Bankruptcy could become a mechanism to break-up vertically-integrated firms that once needed to be kept intact; picking the right decisionmaking mode to keep the vertically-integrated firm intact would subside, replaced by the goal of picking the right mode to break apart the vertically-integrated firm. Decisionmaking modes would experience a functional shift. For example, the § 363-sale could persist, but be repurposed, with 363-buyers not reconditioning the vertically-integrated firm for continuance but instead sharply breaking up what once seemed necessary interlocks among divisions.  

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These changes do not stand alongside the deal and the sale as a complete decisionmaking means for restructuring a failed firm. And in truth, it will never completely displace the prior systems. It will erode, but not replace them.

First, the formal new exemptions from bankruptcy are big but not all-encompassing for industrial, retail, and other operating firms’ liabilities. And while operating firms sometimes seek to build themselves around bankruptcy-exempt entities, it is hard to build an entire economy that way. Finally, while more businesses can today be run in a decentralized manner, others cannot, and even those that can be decentralized into separate corporate units cannot be decentralized for every business task.

Hence, for now we speak of fissures and not a new bankruptcy era comparable to the prior three ages. The fissures are not yet a fourth age for bankruptcy, but they are now reducing, and could in the future sharply reduce, the strength of prior ages.

C. Foreign Lessons: Can Chapter 11 Travel?

Another lesson can be learned from this Article’s analytic. Nations around the world see an American-style chapter 11 as a model to emulate. “Many European jurisdictions have sought . . . to emulate the perceived success of Chapter 11 by establishing similar regimes,” a leading American law firm reports. And: “The centerpiece of the [new French] act is . . . inspired by the US bankruptcy system’s

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114 Cf. Leslie Picker & Liz Moyer, Xerox Said To Be Ready To Divide Into 2 Units, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2016, at B1 (“Xerox . . . will be joining other big American corporations that have split apart . . . in recent years”).


Chapter 11 process. But emulation is mistaken if the underlying market conditions are a bad fit. Reformers may prefer the deal-oriented structure of a traditional chapter 11, but its efficacy depends on the quality of market transparency, the nation’s financial system’s ability to develop bankruptcy refinancing, and the capacity of managerial markets to replace old management. If any of these underlying market conditions is missing, chapter 11 will not work well.

To be more concrete: Many thought chapter 11 in its first decade was a failure and, hence, emulating 1980s-style chapter 11 could well be mistaken. In this paper’s view, chapter 11 eventually triumphed because of underlying market conditions and the rise of 363-sale, which both took many firms out of the deal and made market values more legitimate and vivid, thereby reducing the likelihood and debilities of deadlocked deals, which could be broken via a sale. But 363-sales depend critically on the viability of merger markets; an economy lacking them may be unable to make chapter 11 work well and could be buying into the bargaining deadlocks, incumbent entrenchedment, and delays that afflicted chapter 11’s first decade.

Bankruptcy cannot be evaluated or even understood without reference to surrounding market conditions.

CONCLUSION

Bankruptcy law imposes a collective proceeding on a debtor’s creditors, who, absent bankruptcy’s constraints, would have strong incentives to race to the courthouse, to sue, to obtain a judgment, and then to levy on the debtor’s property, disassembling the debtor’s business.

Three decisionmaking systems have arisen to accomplish this restructuring—administration, a deal, and a sale. Each is embedded in the Bankruptcy Code today and each has been in play for more than a century. But each has had its heyday, rising, dominating, and then, for the first two, falling from prominence over the twentieth century. Those shifts, rises, and falls give the Code a palimpsest quality, as elements of each survive their decline.

Previous explanations for bankruptcy shifts have relied on bankruptcy institutions’ learning, on lawyers and their influence, and on rent-seeking that typically came from powerful creditor groups. But underlying market conditions can explain the broad outlines of the shifts over the twentieth century, with ideology and political pressures from dominant groups explaining why some shifts went further than underlying market conditions could justify. The first age flourished for four decades after the New Deal’s 1938 Bankruptcy Act established an administered system in


119 See supra note 70. Wessels & Weijs, supra note 116, at 23–25. But to conclude, as some do, that chapter 11 “failed” requires a baseline: chapter 11 may have worked imperfectly in its first decade, but even if suboptimal, if it worked better than 1938 administration, it succeeded.

which the judge, with an expert agency’s advice, decided whether and how to restructure the firm. It reflected top-down, New Deal thinking. The second age began its dominant era in 1978, with the current Bankruptcy Code re-established a deal-oriented system in which classes of creditors and owners negotiate a deal with only loose judicial supervision. The deal-oriented statute reflected a mindset in which the will and knowledge of private parties were respected, while the expertise of government agencies and administrators on business deals was doubted.

In the late 1990s, the third system rose to prominence—sale of the firm in its entirety to the highest bidder. Its rise grew out of a market economy in which mergers were common, professionals in law and finance had little difficulty engineering whole-firm sales, and markets were respected enough and operated more quickly than courts and bargaining creditors. The whole-firm sale has become prominent for industrial restructuring in the United States. Market conditions prevailed over an unfriendly statutory structure, skeptical appellate decisions, and an absence of supportive congressional intent.

Is the current age bankruptcy the culmination? Cracks have appeared. The financial safe harbors, special purposes vehicles, and decentralized industrial organization instead of the single, large vertically-integrated of prior decades all are major market changes that could change bankruptcy. Bankruptcy-exempt creditors can now enforce their state-based based contract rights despite the debtor’s bankruptcy. They take no part in that collective bankruptcy proceeding to hold together the enterprise value. They can be justified—or at least a very short bankruptcy stay against creditor collection could be justified—if financial markets are so good and so fast that valuable assets can readily be refinanced quickly. Second, because connected pieces of industry—think biotech firms with relationships to a bankrupt Big Pharma firm, but not owned by the debtor—can readjust more easily, the stand-alone bankruptcy is less important than it once was. The long bankruptcy stay, to keep the firm together, intact, may no longer be vital for many debtors. Foreign efforts to emulate chapter 11 should be considered more carefully: chapter 11 in the U.S. does work relatively well, but it does so because it is well-adapted to American market conditions.

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Over the past century-long arc for bankruptcy, one can see three ages for bankruptcy decisionmaking—administration, the deal, and the market sale—with each resting on underlying market conditions.